To amend title 31, United States Code, to establish the Life Sciences Research Security Board, and for other purposes.
Analysis under review: This bill has generated analysis that may be too generic or incomplete. Clause-level evidence remains available below.
Summary
What This Bill Does
The Risky Research Review Act establishes an independent Life Sciences Research Security Board as a new federal agency with 9 presidentially-appointed members. The Board has binding authority to approve or deny all federal funding for life sciences research, and must review all high-risk life sciences research proposals including gain-of-function research and work with potential pandemic pathogens. It requires entities seeking federal research funding to attest under penalty of perjury whether their research is high-risk, and imposes strict enforcement including permanent disqualification from federal funding for false attestations.
Who Benefits and How
The general public and national security interests benefit from independent oversight of dangerous research that could create pandemic pathogens. Congressional oversight committees gain significant new visibility into federally funded research through mandatory reporting and briefings. Nongovernmental scientists and national security experts gain influential roles as Board members.
Who Bears the Burden and How
Federal agencies that fund life sciences research face substantial new compliance burdens including mandatory referral of all proposals to the Board, certification processes, and detailed record-keeping. Researchers and research institutions must attest under perjury about the nature of their work and face potential permanent funding disqualification. The Department of Homeland Security bears a 30 million dollar annual transfer to fund the Board. Agency employees face severe penalties for non-compliance including removal, civil penalties, annuity forfeiture, and security clearance revocation.
Key Provisions
- Creates 9-member independent Life Sciences Research Security Board with binding authority over federal research funding
- Requires perjury-backed attestations from all entities seeking federal life sciences funding on whether research is high-risk
- Board must approve all high-risk life sciences research before federal funding can be awarded
- Imposes severe enforcement: permanent funding disqualification, removal, civil penalties up to 10,000 dollars, annuity forfeiture
- Authorizes 30 million dollars annually for fiscal years 2025-2034, funded via transfer from DHS grants
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Creates an independent Life Sciences Research Security Board with binding authority to review and approve or deny all federal funding for life sciences research, with particular focus on high-risk and gain-of-function research involving potential pandemic pathogens.
Key Policy Areas
Science & Research, National Security, Public Health
Primary Purpose
Creates an independent Life Sciences Research Security Board with binding authority to review and approve or deny all federal funding for life sciences research, with particular focus on high-risk and gain-of-function research involving potential pandemic pathogens.
Policy Domains
Risky Research Review Act
Identified Gains
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation- General public (biosecurity)
- Congressional oversight committees
- Nongovernmental scientists and national security experts (Board positions)
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation
Identified Costs
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation- Federal agencies funding life sciences research
- Life sciences researchers and institutions
- Department of Homeland Security (30M annual transfer)
- Agency employees overseeing research proposals
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation
Sponsors
Rand Paul
R-KY | Primary Sponsor
Legislative Progress
ReportedReported by Mr. Peters, with an amendment
Mr. Paul (for himself and Mr. Peters) introduced the following …
Mr. Paul introduced the following bill; which was read twice …
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
Biosecurity policy community, Congressional oversight committees, Department of Homeland Security (grant programs)
Positive-direction: Biosecurity policy community, Congressional oversight committees, Life Sciences Research Security Board
Negative-direction: Department of Homeland Security (grant programs), Federal agencies, Federal agencies funding life sciences research, Federal agencies funding life sciences research (NIH, NSF, DOD, DOE), Federal agency employees overseeing research proposals, Office of Government Ethics
Gain-of-function researchers, Life sciences research institutions, Life sciences researchers and institutions
Positive-direction: Nongovernmental life sciences scientists
Negative-direction: Gain-of-function researchers, Life sciences research institutions, Life sciences researchers and institutions, Life sciences researchers and institutions seeking federal funding, Life sciences researchers awaiting funding decisions, Life sciences researchers working with listed pathogens
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "the_board"
- → Life Sciences Research Security Board
- "the_president"
- → President of the United States
- "the_director_oge"
- → Director of the Office of Government Ethics
- "the_executive_director"
- → Executive Director of the Board
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
Has the meaning given in section 552(f) of title 5
Research that can reasonably be anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be misapplied to pose a significant threat to public health, safety, agricultural crops, animals, or national security
Research that has the potential to enhance the transmissibility or virulence of a potential pandemic pathogen
Life sciences research that has a potential dual use nature or could pose a threat to public health, safety, or national security, including gain of function research and research involving potential pandemic pathogens
A virus, bacteria, fungus, prion, or eukaryotic parasite reasonably anticipated to be transmissible and capable of wide spread in human populations with significant morbidity/mortality
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology