S4600-119

What This Bill Does

The South China Sea Strategy Act states U.S. support for navigation, overflight, commerce, international law, rules-based dispute resolution, resistance to unilateral PRC control, and coordinated action with allies and partners. Within 180 days, the Secretary of State, consulting Defense, must submit an unclassified diplomatic-engagement strategy, with an optional classified annex, to the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. The strategy must set security, diplomatic, legal, and economic goals; assign lead State offices; evaluate bilateral, multilateral, subnational, civil-society, and private-sector mechanisms; identify gaps; and deepen bilateral engagement with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It must plan more frequent collective engagement with those states, Taiwan, and other partners on defense capabilities, maritime law enforcement and governance, gray-zone tactics and illegal fishing, dispute and crisis management below armed conflict, malign influence, economic coercion by foreign adversaries, development, and other risks to U.S. interests. Within 360 days, State must identify program, policy, and budget resources needed for fiscal years 2027 through 2029 and brief Congress within 30 days afterward. A rule of construction states that the Act does not change the U.S. One China Policy as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-PRC communiques, and the Six Assurances.

Who Benefits and How

The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and Taiwan may gain more systematic U.S. engagement, maritime law-enforcement and defense cooperation, crisis planning, and economic-resilience support. U.S. shipping, aviation, fishing, and trade interests benefit from a strategy focused on open routes and reduced coercion and escalation. State and Defense gain defined goals and responsible offices, while Congress gains a strategy, resource assessment, and implementation briefing. Civil-society and private-sector partners gain formal roles in identifying engagement gaps and responding to illegal fishing, malign influence, and economic coercion.

Who Bears the Burden and How

State must coordinate the strategy, assign offices, assess existing programs, plan bilateral and collective engagement, identify three fiscal years of resource needs, and brief Congress. Defense, other agencies, foreign governments, civil society, and private firms must contribute security, legal, economic, and crisis-planning expertise. PRC maritime and influence actors face increased diplomatic, security, and economic-resilience pressure. The One China savings clause constrains implementation by requiring engagement involving Taiwan to remain within existing U.S. policy.

Key Provisions

• Establishes policy supporting navigation, overflight, commerce, international law, and resistance to unilateral PRC control.
• Requires a South China Sea diplomatic-engagement strategy within 180 days.
• Requires goals, responsible State offices, program analysis, gap identification, and bilateral littoral-state plans.
• Expands collective engagement to Taiwan and partners on defense, law enforcement, illegal fishing, crises, influence, and coercion.
• Requires a fiscal year 2027-2029 resource assessment and congressional implementation briefing.
• Protects the existing One China Policy through an express rule of construction.