S3900-119

Reported

Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026

119th Congress Introduced Feb 24, 2026

Summary

What This Bill Does

The reported Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act authorizes State to lead federal Iran internet-freedom coordination and requires a 120-day update to the existing fiscal year 2025 defense authorization strategy. The update evaluates VPNs, centralized and peer-to-peer networks, alternatives, deployment limitations, blackout capabilities, and sanctions implementation that does not block lawful civilian access tools. A second 120-day report evaluates direct-to-cell service, drones, jamming, service-provider ownership, and communications risks. Existing internet-freedom funding is extended through fiscal year 2030. State may use existing interagency mechanisms to develop and rapidly acquire scalable anti-shutdown tools, with required attention to user detectability, cybersecurity, data, supply chains, sanctions, export controls, and diversion to Iran or sanctioned entities; State reports annually. A 120-day human-rights strategy covers civil society, uncensored news, independent journalists, training, partners, metrics, and budgets. GAO must audit fiscal years 2024-2025 Near East Regional Democracy spending within 180 days while protecting identities and operational details. State should establish cybersecurity training and vetted digital tools, report protected aggregate metrics twice yearly, coordinate with existing programs, and receive a GAO evaluation after three years. The reported bill omits the introduced congressional-request sanctions-determination process, omits the new interagency working group, removes the bill-specific authorizations of such sums for fiscal years 2027-2030, narrows the anti-shutdown program to Iran, and relies on State funds. It adds sanctions and export-control savings, user-safety safeguards, and protected reporting.

Who Benefits and How

Iranian journalists, human-rights defenders, civil-society organizations, protesters, and ordinary internet users may gain circumvention tools, cybersecurity training, secure communications, independent news, grants, and safer technology deployment. Companies providing licensed internet-access tools gain clearer sanctions coordination and potential procurement opportunities. Congress gains strategy updates, annual implementation reports, protected metrics, and GAO audits. U.S. agencies and implementing partners gain explicit authority to use existing coordination and acquisition systems while protecting partner identities and sensitive methods.

Who Bears the Burden and How

State, Treasury, Commerce, the Federal Communications Commission, Defense, other agencies, and GAO must update strategies, assess technologies, coordinate sanctions and procurement, vet risks, administer programs, protect sensitive information, and report on short deadlines. Grant and technology partners must meet cybersecurity, safety, supply-chain, sanctions, export-control, and diversion safeguards. The Iranian government, censorship operators, sanctioned persons, and suppliers of surveillance or shutdown capabilities face higher circumvention, exposure, and enforcement risk. The final bill reduces federal fiscal and organizational burdens by removing the new working group and separate open-ended appropriations, but cybersecurity program creation becomes discretionary rather than mandatory.

Key Provisions

  • Requires a 120-day update to the Iran internet-freedom strategy and ongoing reviews.
  • Requires direct-to-cell, jamming, drone, ownership, and telecommunications-risk reporting.
  • Extends existing internet-freedom funding through fiscal year 2030.
  • Authorizes existing interagency mechanisms to develop and acquire anti-shutdown technology with user-safety safeguards.
  • Requires a human-rights assistance strategy and protected GAO audit of Iran-related democracy spending.
  • Provides cybersecurity training, vetted digital tools, protected biannual metrics, and a three-year GAO review.
  • Restricts implementation through sanctions, export-control, no-force, and State-funding savings clauses.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Expands U.S. support for open communications, cybersecurity, independent information, civil society, and human-rights accountability in Iran while preserving sanctions, export controls, and the prohibition on authorizing military force.

Key Policy Areas

Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Telecommunications, Cybersecurity, Sanctions

Primary Purpose

Expands U.S. support for open communications, cybersecurity, independent information, civil society, and human-rights accountability in Iran while preserving sanctions, export controls, and the prohibition on authorizing military force.

Policy Domains

Foreign Affairs Human Rights Telecommunications Cybersecurity Sanctions

Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026

Identified Gains
  • Iranian civil-society organizations
  • Independent Iranian journalists
  • Iranian human-rights defenders
  • Iranian civilian internet users
  • Licensed communications technology providers
  • Congressional foreign-affairs committees
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rs
Iranian human-rights defenders: , , , ,
Independent Iranian journalists: , , , ,
Iranian civilian internet users: , , , ,
Iranian civil-society organizations: , , , ,
Congressional foreign-affairs committees: , , , ,
Licensed communications technology providers: , , , ,
Identified Costs
  • State Department internet-freedom staff
  • Treasury and Commerce sanctions staff
  • Government Accountability Office analysts
  • Internet-freedom technology grantees
  • Iranian government censorship agencies
  • Sanctioned Iranian persons and entities
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rs
Internet-freedom technology grantees: , , , ,
Treasury and Commerce sanctions staff: , , , ,
Iranian government censorship agencies: , , , ,
Sanctioned Iranian persons and entities: , , , ,
State Department internet-freedom staff: , , , ,
Government Accountability Office analysts: , , , ,

Legislative Progress

Reported
Introduced Committee Passed
Jul 27, 2026

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. …

Jul 27, 2026

Committee on Foreign Relations. Reported by Senator Risch with an …

Jul 27, 2026

Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment

Jun 17, 2026

Committee on Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported with an …

Feb 24, 2026

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Feb 24, 2026

Introduced in Senate

Feb 24, 2026

Mr. McCormick (for himself and Ms. Rosen) introduced the following …

Feb 24, 2026

Mr. McCormick (for himself, Ms. Rosen, Mr. Curtis, Mrs. Gillibrand, …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Government
22 mentions across 12 clauses
+2 positive -16 negative ?4 uncertain

Adversary governments imposing internet blackouts, Congressional war-powers oversight, Executive branch military planners

Positive-direction: Congressional war-powers oversight, Other federal agency budget accounts

Negative-direction: Adversary governments imposing internet blackouts, Executive branch military planners, Government Accountability Office analysts, Iranian government censorship agencies, Iranian government surveillance agencies, Iranian regime human-rights violators, Sanctioned Iranian persons and entities, State Department budget accounts, State Department cybersecurity-program staff, State Department human-rights staff, State Department internet-freedom staff, State Department technology-acquisition staff, Treasury and Commerce sanctions staff

General Public
14 mentions across 9 clauses
+10 positive -2 negative ?2 uncertain

Iranian civilian internet users, Iranian civilians, Iranian human-rights defenders

Iranian civilian internet users, Taxpayers face effects in multiple directions

Federal Administration
11 mentions across 5 clauses
-11 negative

Comptroller General of the United States, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury

Technology
10 mentions across 8 clauses
+7 positive -3 negative

Censorship-circumvention technology developers, Companies providing open-internet tools to Iranian civilians, Cybersecurity training providers

Positive-direction: Censorship-circumvention technology developers, Companies providing open-internet tools to Iranian civilians, Cybersecurity training providers, Encrypted messaging application providers, Internet-circumvention developers, VPN service providers

Negative-direction: Foreign persons supplying censorship technology to the Iranian regime, Foreign persons supplying surveillance tools to the Iranian regime, Unlicensed technology exporters

Civil Rights Advocacy
8 mentions across 5 clauses
+8 positive

Iranian civil society users of VPN technologies, Iranian civil-society actors receiving phishing education, Iranian civilians facing internet shutdowns

Media & Entertainment
7 mentions across 4 clauses
+5 positive -2 negative

Independent Iranian journalists, Iranian journalists receiving cybersecurity training, Radio Farda

Positive-direction: Independent Iranian journalists, Iranian journalists receiving cybersecurity training, Radio Farda, Voice of America Persian Service

Negative-direction: United States Agency for Global Media

Legislative Bodies
4 mentions across 2 clauses
+4 positive

House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Human Rights Organizations
3 mentions across 3 clauses
+3 positive

Iranian civil society organizations, Iranian human-rights defenders receiving digital-safety tools, Partner organizations expanding internet access abroad

10/17
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Foreign Affairs Human Rights Telecommunications Cybersecurity Sanctions
Actor Mappings
"adversary"
→ Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
"beneficiaries"
→ Iranian civil-society actors, journalists, and internet users
"diplomatic_lead"
→ Secretary of State
"sanctions_partners"
→ Departments of the Treasury and Commerce
"independent_auditor"
→ Comptroller General of the United States
"communications_partner"
→ Federal Communications Commission

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology