HR8283-119

Reported

Deterring American AI Model Theft Act of 2026

119th Congress Introduced Apr 15, 2026

Summary

What This Bill Does

The Deterring American AI Model Theft Act of 2026 responds to unauthorized extraction of closed-source artificial intelligence models owned by U.S. companies. It defines closed-source AI models by proprietary model weights or architecture, owner-controlled access through APIs or similar interfaces, and contractual limits that prevent third parties from recreating or hosting the model. It defines countries of concern to include the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Macau, Russia, and certain Country Group D:5 countries designated by the Secretary of State, and defines entities of concern to include foreign persons or entities linked to those countries or attempting model extraction attacks. Within 180 days, the Secretary of State, coordinating with Operating Committee for Export Policy agencies, must assess entities conducting model extraction attacks and fraudulent account network providers. The assessment must identify countries of origin, government assistance, attack methods, provider office and data-center locations when possible, attack counts from the prior two calendar years, detection approaches, economic and national-security consequences, and U.S. government assistance to model owners. Within 210 days, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security and End-User Review Committee agencies must decide by majority vote whether identified attackers, facilitators, or 50-percent affiliates should be added to the BIS Entity List. The President, through the State Secretary, may block property and transactions under IEEPA for identified entities, subject to exceptions for United Nations obligations, humanitarian trade and assistance, and authorized intelligence, law-enforcement, or national-security activities.

Who Benefits and How

U.S. closed-source AI model owners benefit because federal agencies must identify, deter, punish, and assist against model extraction attacks. AI safety and security teams benefit from federal analysis of detection methods, fraudulent account networks, and attack origins. BIS Entity List staff benefit from a statutory process for considering model-theft actors and affiliates. U.S. national-security agencies benefit from an assessment of how model theft affects military and foreign-policy interests. Congressional export-control committees benefit from clearer definitions and later oversight of Entity List and sanctions actions. U.S. AI companies benefit if sanctions and export controls reduce foreign adversary access to proprietary model capabilities.

Who Bears the Burden and How

Entities of concern that conduct model extraction attacks face possible Entity List restrictions and IEEPA blocking sanctions. Fraudulent account network providers face identification, sanctions exposure, and export-control consequences. PRC and Russian AI-linked firms face increased scrutiny when tied to attacks or fraudulent account networks. The Secretary of State must complete the assessment and coordinate with export-policy agencies. BIS and End-User Review Committee members must vote on Entity List treatment within 210 days. Humanitarian and medical trade actors must navigate exceptions when sanctioned entities are involved.

Key Provisions

  • Defines closed-source AI models, model extraction attacks, fraudulent account network providers, countries of concern, and entities of concern.
  • Requires a 180-day State-led interagency assessment of AI model extraction attacks and fraudulent account network providers.
  • Requires the assessment to identify attack origins, foreign government assistance, methods, detection approaches, consequences, and U.S. support to victims.
  • Requires BIS and End-User Review Committee agencies to decide within 210 days whether identified entities and affiliates should be added to the Entity List.
  • Authorizes IEEPA blocking sanctions for identified entities of concern.
  • Provides exceptions for United Nations obligations, humanitarian trade and assistance, and authorized intelligence, law-enforcement, or national-security activities.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Requires a State-led interagency assessment within 180 days of model extraction attacks against U.S. closed-source AI models and fraudulent account network providers, defines countries and entities of concern including China, Russia, Hong Kong, Macau, and D:5 countries, requires the assessment to identify attack origins, foreign government assistance, methods, detection approaches, economic and national-security consequences, and U.S. assistance to victims, and then requires BIS and the End-User Review Committee within 210 days to decide whether identified entities or affiliates should be added to the Entity List while authorizing IEEPA blocking sanctions with humanitarian, intelligence, law-enforcement, and national-security exceptions.

Key Policy Areas

Artificial Intelligence, Export Controls, Sanctions, National Security

Primary Purpose

Requires a State-led interagency assessment within 180 days of model extraction attacks against U.S. closed-source AI models and fraudulent account network providers, defines countries and entities of concern including China, Russia, Hong Kong, Macau, and D:5 countries, requires the assessment to identify attack origins, foreign government assistance, methods, detection approaches, economic and national-security consequences, and U.S. assistance to victims, and then requires BIS and the End-User Review Committee within 210 days to decide whether identified entities or affiliates should be added to the Entity List while authorizing IEEPA blocking sanctions with humanitarian, intelligence, law-enforcement, and national-security exceptions.

Policy Domains

Artificial Intelligence Export Controls Sanctions National Security

House resolution provisions

Identified Gains
  • U.S. closed source AI model owners
  • AI security teams
  • BIS Entity List staff
  • U.S. national security agencies
  • Congressional export control committees
  • U.S. AI companies
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
AI security teams: , , ,
U.S. AI companies: , , ,
BIS Entity List staff: , , ,
U.S. national security agencies: , , ,
U.S. closed source AI model owners: , , ,
Congressional export control committees: , , ,
Identified Costs
  • Entities conducting model extraction attacks
  • Fraudulent account network providers
  • PRC AI linked firms
  • Russian AI linked firms
  • Secretary of State
  • BIS Entity List staff
  • Humanitarian trade actors
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
Secretary of State: , , ,
PRC AI linked firms: , , ,
BIS Entity List staff: , , ,
Russian AI linked firms: , , ,
Humanitarian trade actors: , , ,
Fraudulent account network providers: , , ,
Entities conducting model extraction attacks: , , ,

Legislative Progress

Reported
Introduced Committee Passed
Apr 22, 2026

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: …

Apr 22, 2026

Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held

Apr 15, 2026

Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Apr 15, 2026

Introduced in House

Apr 15, 2026

Mr. Huizenga (for himself and Mr. Moolenaar) introduced the following …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Technology
7 mentions across 4 clauses
+3 positive -4 negative

Entities conducting model extraction attacks, Fraudulent account network providers, U.S. AI companies

Positive-direction: U.S. AI companies, U.S. closed source AI model owners

Negative-direction: Entities conducting model extraction attacks, Fraudulent account network providers

Government
5 mentions across 3 clauses
-5 negative

BIS Entity List staff, End User Review Committee members, Operating Committee export policy agencies

4/5
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Artificial Intelligence Export Controls Sanctions National Security
Actor Mappings
"bis"
→ Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security
"state"
→ Secretary of State
"committee"
→ End-User Review Committee

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology