HR620-119

What This Bill Does

The FARM Act amends the Defense Production Act’s CFIUS section. It adds the Secretary of Agriculture as a CFIUS member, expands covered transactions to include any transaction, merger, acquisition, transfer, agreement, takeover, or arrangement that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business engaged in agriculture and using agricultural products, and applies that coverage to proposed, pending, or completed transactions on or after enactment. It also adds agricultural systems and supply chains to critical infrastructure, subject to CFIUS regulations, and adds agricultural supply chains used for agricultural products to the critical-technology definition. Separately, USDA and GAO must each annually analyze foreign influence in the U.S. agriculture industry and report to Congress on foreign investments, risks to U.S. agricultural production and supply chains, the largest international threats for increased foreign control or investment, and agriculture-related espionage and theft techniques targeting agricultural intellectual property, innovation, research and development, cost or pricing data, or internal strategy documents.

Who Benefits and How

U.S. agriculture businesses benefit from additional CFIUS scrutiny of foreign-control transactions involving agricultural products and supply chains. Agricultural supply chain operators benefit if foreign investment reviews reduce national-security or food-security risks. USDA national security staff benefit from a formal seat in CFIUS deliberations affecting agriculture. Congressional agriculture committees benefit from annual USDA and GAO reporting on foreign influence, investment threats, and agricultural espionage. Agricultural intellectual property owners benefit from explicit reporting on foreign theft techniques targeting research, innovation, pricing, and strategy documents.

Who Bears the Burden and How

Foreign investors in U.S. agriculture face additional CFIUS review risk for covered agriculture transactions. U.S. agriculture businesses in foreign-control transactions may face more filings, mitigation conditions, delays, or blocked deals. Treasury CFIUS staff must incorporate agriculture supply chains into transaction review and critical-infrastructure analysis. USDA analysts must participate in CFIUS and prepare annual foreign-influence reports. GAO auditors must conduct annual agriculture foreign-influence analyses and report to Congress.

Key Provisions

• Adds the Secretary of Agriculture to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
• Expands covered transactions to include foreign-control arrangements involving U.S. agriculture businesses using agricultural products.
• Modifies the critical infrastructure definition to include agricultural systems and supply chains.
• Adds agricultural supply chains used for agricultural products to the critical-technology framework.
• Requires annual USDA and GAO reports on foreign agriculture investment, supply-chain threats, and agriculture-related espionage.