HR4506-119

What This Bill Does

The Securing Global Telecommunications Act directs the State Department to lead a secure telecom diplomacy strategy. The findings identify Huawei and Chinese Communist Party-linked firms as risks to global mobile networks and argue that U.S. leadership at the International Telecommunication Union and multilateral financing are needed to support trusted vendors. Within 90 days, the Secretary of State must submit a Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure to House and Senate foreign affairs and commerce committees. The State Department must consult the Export-Import Bank, Development Finance Corporation, USAID, Trade and Development Agency, FCC, and NTIA. The strategy must cover mobile networks, Open RAN, rip-and-replace financing, developing-country and emerging-economy cooperation, collaboration with trusted companies, data centers, and other ICT infrastructure. Separate 90-day reports must describe Chinese and Russian strategies to expand ITU jurisdiction over internet governance, leverage private-sector actors and Huawei market power to influence ITU standards, elections, candidate selection, and other levers of power, and identify opportunities for allied coordination through joint financing, development finance initiatives, and diplomacy encouraging secure telecom infrastructure in countries using untrusted providers.

Who Benefits and How

Open RAN vendors benefit from a U.S. strategy to promote trusted mobile networks and counter Huawei market leadership. Export-Import Bank of the United States benefits from a strategy that identifies financing tools for trusted telecom bids and rip-and-replace projects. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation benefits from coordinated development-finance roles for secure ICT infrastructure. House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee benefit from strategy and influence reports within 90 days.

Who Bears the Burden and How

The Secretary of State must lead the strategy, consult six federal entities, and deliver three reports within 90 days. Federal Communications Commission and NTIA must contribute communications expertise to the State-led strategy. Chinese telecom-aligned actors face greater scrutiny of ITU influence efforts and market-leverage strategies. Huawei and other untrusted vendors face U.S. diplomatic and financing efforts to reduce their role in global networks.

Key Provisions

• Requires a Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure within 90 days.
• Directs State to consult EXIM, DFC, USAID, USTDA, FCC, and NTIA on secure telecom financing and technical policy.
• Requires strategy sections on mobile networks, Open RAN, rip-and-replace financing, trusted vendors, data centers, and developing-country cooperation.
• Requires a report on Chinese and Russian influence at the International Telecommunication Union, including Huawei leverage and internet-governance standards.
• Requires a multilateral coordination report on allied financing, development finance, and diplomacy for secure ICT infrastructure.