To require the United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund to oppose an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the Fund, and for other purposes.
Summary
What This Bill Does
The Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025 directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Governor of the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Executive Director at the IMF to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the IMF Special Drawing Rights currency basket. Treasury may support an increase only after submitting a written report to the House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee certifying three conditions.
The required certification must state that China complies with its Article VIII obligations under the IMF Articles of Agreement, that no report during the preceding 12 months under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 or the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 found China manipulated its currency, and that China adheres to Paris Club rules and the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. The restriction sunsets 10 years after enactment.
Who Benefits and How
U.S. lawmakers concerned about Chinese currency practices, Treasury international-finance officials seeking statutory leverage, U.S. dollar reserve-status advocates, exporters concerned about renminbi policy, and congressional financial-services overseers benefit because the bill conditions U.S. support for a larger renminbi role in the SDR basket on concrete IMF, currency-manipulation, Paris Club, and OECD export-credit findings.
Who Bears the Burden and How
The Treasury Secretary, U.S. Governor at the IMF, U.S. Executive Director at the IMF, People's Republic of China, IMF staff administering the SDR basket, House Financial Services Committee staff, Senate Banking Committee staff, and U.S.-China financial diplomacy officials must comply with opposition instructions, certification analysis, congressional reporting, and a 10-year constraint on U.S. support for increasing renminbi weight.
Key Provisions
- Requires U.S. IMF representatives to oppose any increase in renminbi weight in the SDR basket.
- Provides an exception if Treasury certifies China's compliance with IMF Article VIII obligations.
- Requires certification that China has not been found to manipulate its currency in specified reports during the prior 12 months.
- Requires certification that China adheres to Paris Club rules and the OECD export-credit arrangement.
- Requires Treasury to report the certification to House and Senate financial committees.
- Sunsets the opposition requirement 10 years after enactment.
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Requires Treasury to instruct U.S. representatives at the IMF to oppose any increase in the Chinese renminbi's weight in the Special Drawing Rights basket unless Treasury certifies China's IMF Article VIII compliance, lack of recent currency-manipulation findings, and adherence to Paris Club and OECD export-credit norms, with a 10-year sunset.
Key Policy Areas
International Finance, China, Currency Policy
Primary Purpose
Requires Treasury to instruct U.S. representatives at the IMF to oppose any increase in the Chinese renminbi's weight in the Special Drawing Rights basket unless Treasury certifies China's IMF Article VIII compliance, lack of recent currency-manipulation findings, and adherence to Paris Club and OECD export-credit norms, with a 10-year sunset.
Policy Domains
Substantive provisions
Identified Gains
- U.S. lawmakers concerned about Chinese currency practices
- Treasury international-finance officials
- U.S. dollar reserve-status advocates
- Exporters concerned about renminbi policy
- Congressional financial-services overseers
Identified Costs
- Treasury Secretary
- U.S. Governor at the IMF
- U.S. Executive Director at the IMF
- People's Republic of China
- IMF staff administering the SDR basket
- House Financial Services Committee staff
- Senate Banking Committee staff
- U.S.-China financial diplomacy officials
Legislative Progress
Passed HouseReceived; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign …
Passed House (inferred from eh version)
Mr. Davidson introduced the following bill; which was referred to …
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
House Financial Services Committee staff, People's Republic of China, Senate Banking Committee staff
Positive-direction: House Financial Services Committee staff, Senate Banking Committee staff, Treasury international-finance officials
Negative-direction: People's Republic of China, Treasury Secretary, U.S. Executive Director at the IMF, U.S. Governor at the IMF
IMF staff administering the SDR basket
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "imf"
- → International Monetary Fund
- "sdr"
- → Special Drawing Rights
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology