S3854-118

1. Short title; table of contents This Act may be cited as the International Freedom Protection Act. The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: According to Freedom House’s 2023 report, Freedom in the World, democracy experienced a worldwide decline for 17 consecutive years and has been weakened by factors, such as attacks on democratic institutions, impunity, corruption, disinformation, human rights violations, and conflict. Since 2006, autocratic forces and illiberal forces have been on the rise, with emboldened autocrats from China, Russia, and Iran— refining their tactics to undermine democracy globally; suppressing dissent to sustain their own regimes; and frequently collaborating with each another in such efforts. The rise of authoritarianism— undermines the national security of the United States and the security of our democratic allies and partners; creates instability; weakens the rule of law; and increases the risk of war. Democracies are ill-prepared to fight back against the growing complexity and emerging challenges posed by autocratic and illiberal forces. There is an urgent need to update the United States Government's approach to countering authoritarianism by strengthening and revitalizing the relevant tools, strategies, and institutions.

3. Definitions In this Act: The term appropriate congressional committees means— the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The term relevant Federal agencies means— the Department of State; the United States Agency for International Development; and other Federal agencies that are relevant for purposes of this Act. The term transnational repression— means acts by governments (either directly or through others) to silence, intimidate, or exact reprisal against individuals outside their sovereign borders, including members of diaspora populations, political opponents, civil society activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and members of ethnic or religious minority groups; and may include— extrajudicial killings; physical assaults and intimidation; arbitrary detentions; renditions; deportations; unexplained or enforced disappearances; physical or online surveillance or stalking; unwarranted passport cancellation or control over other identification documents; abuse of international law enforcement systems; unlawful asset freezes; digital threats, such as cyberattacks, targeted surveillance and spyware, online harassment, and intimidation; and coercion by proxy, such as harassment of, or threats or harm to, family and associates of private individuals who remain in their country of origin.

4. Combating transnational repression abroad Congress makes the following findings: Amidst a backdrop of global democratic decline, authoritarian governments are increasingly collaborating and employing aggressive tactics across borders to silence, coerce, harass, or harm individuals for peacefully exercising their rights and fundamental freedoms. Governments commit transnational repression through physical and digital means. The advancement of digital technology provides new tools for censoring, surveilling, harassing, and targeting individuals deemed to be threats across international borders. This is particularly significant for dissidents and journalists forced abroad who rely on communications technology to amplify their messages and communicate with their professional and personal support networks. Since 2014, Freedom House has documented 854 direct physical incidents of transnational repression committed by 38 governments in 91 countries. Nonphysical acts of transnational repression are occurring even more frequently. The combined effect of these direct threats produces a chilling effect that compels countless more people to modify their behavior due to fear of transnational repression. In 2023, the countries whose governments are committing the highest number of direct physical acts of transnational repression are China, Turkey, Tajikistan, Russia, and Egypt. Transnational repression is used by governments to target perceived critics, who may include human rights defenders, democracy activists, political opponents, members of diaspora groups, and the family members of such individuals. It is the policy of the United States— to regard transnational repression as a direct threat to the United States national interests of upholding and promoting democratic values and human rights; to address transnational repression, including by protecting targeted individuals and groups; to strengthen the actions of United States embassy and mission staff in countering transnational repression, including by— monitoring and documenting instances of transnational repression; conducting regular outreach with at-risk or affected populations to provide information regarding available resources without putting such people at further risk; and working with local and national law enforcement, as appropriate, to support victims of transnational repression; to develop policy and programmatic responses based on input from— vulnerable populations who are at risk of, or are experiencing, transnational repression; nongovernmental organizations working on issues of transnational repression; and the private sector; to provide training to relevant Federal personnel— to enhance their understanding of transnational repression; and to identify and combat threats of transnational repression; to strengthen documentation and monitoring by the United States Government of transnational repression in foreign countries and within international organizations; and to seek to hold perpetrators of transnational repression accountable, including through the use of targeted sanctions and visa restrictions. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the efforts of the United States Government to implement the policy objectives described in subsection (b). The report required under paragraph (1) shall include— a detailed description and assessment of United States Government efforts to monitor, prevent, and respond to transnational repression abroad; a detailed accounting, disaggregated by country, of the most common tactics of transnational repression; instances of transnational repression occurring within international organizations; a list of countries perpetrating acts of transnational repression; a list of countries whose governments are known to frequently cooperate with other governments in committing transnational repression; a description of— efforts by personnel at United States embassies and missions to support victims of or those at risk of transnational repression; and resources provided to United States embassies and missions to support such efforts; and a strategy to strengthen interagency efforts and coordination to combat transnational repression, which shall include— a plan, developed in consultation with partner governments, civil society, the business community, and other entities, to promote respect for rule of law and human rights in surveillance technology use, which shall include— improving export licensing policy, including by applying additional scrutiny to export licensing applications for products exported to perpetrators; protecting personal digital data from being used for the purposes of transnational repression; establishing safeguards to prevent the misuse of surveillance technology, including elements such as appropriate legal protections, a prohibition on discrimination, oversight and accountability mechanisms, transparency on the applicable legal framework, limiting biometric tools for surveillance to what is lawful and appropriate, testing and evaluation, and training; working to ensure, as applicable, that such technologies are designed, developed, and deployed with safeguards to protect human rights (including privacy), consistent with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; public diplomacy efforts and plans for, including the use of the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at international organizations, to promote awareness of and oppose acts of transnational repression; a plan to develop or enhance global coalitions to monitor cases of transnational repression at international organizations and to strengthen alert mechanisms for key stakeholders worldwide; a description, as appropriate, of how the United States Government has previously provided, and will continue to provide, support to civil society organizations in foreign countries in which transnational repression occurs— to improve the documentation, investigation, and research of cases, trends, and tactics of transnational repression; and to promote accountability and transparency in government actions impacting victims of transnational repression; and a description of new or existing emergency assistance mechanisms, to aid at-risk groups, communities, and individuals in countries abroad in which transnational repression occurs. The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall provide personnel of the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies, whether serving in the United States or overseas, with training regarding— identifying physical and nonphysical threats of transnational repression; foreign governments that are most frequently involved in transnational repression; foreign governments that are known to frequently cooperate with other governments in committing transnational repression; digital surveillance and cyber tools commonly used in transnational repression; safe outreach methods for vulnerable populations at risk of transnational repression; and tools to respond to transnational repression threats, including relevant authorities which may be invoked. Section 708(a)(1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4028(a)(1)) is amended— in subparagraph (C), by striking and at the end; in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting ; and; and by adding at the end the following: for Foreign Service Officers and Presidential appointees, including chiefs of mission, in missions abroad who work on political, economic, public diplomacy, security, or development issues, a dedicated module of instruction on transnational repression (as such term is defined in section 3(3) of the International Freedom Protection Act), including— how to recognize threats of transnational repression; an overview of relevant laws that can be invoked to combat such threats; and how to support individuals experiencing transnational repression. (E)for Foreign Service Officers and Presidential appointees, including chiefs of mission, in missions abroad who work on political, economic, public diplomacy, security, or development issues, a dedicated module of instruction on transnational repression (as such term is defined in section 3(3) of the International Freedom Protection Act), including—(i)how to recognize threats of transnational repression;(ii)an overview of relevant laws that can be invoked to combat such threats; and (iii)how to support individuals experiencing transnational repression..

5. Strengthening tools to combat authoritarianism The President shall consider the use of transnational repression by a foreign person in determining whether to impose sanctions with respect to such foreign person under— the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.); section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (division K of Public Law 117–328; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note); or any other relevant statutory provision granting human rights-related sanctions authority under which a foreign person has been sanctioned. Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended— in subsection (a)— in paragraph (3), by striking or at the end; by striking paragraph (4); and by inserting after paragraph (3) the following: is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, significant actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions; or has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, an activity described in this subsection. in subsection (d)(2), by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following: A request described in paragraph (1) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity described in paragraph (3) or (5) of subsection (a) shall be submitted to the President in writing jointly by the chairperson and the ranking member of— any of the appropriate congressional committees of the Senate; and any of the appropriate congressional committees of the House of Representatives. A request described in paragraph (1) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity described in subsection (a)(4) shall be submitted in writing to the President jointly by the chairperson and ranking member of any of the appropriate congressional committees. Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a foreign government official shall be ineligible for entry into the United States if the Secretary of State determines that such official was knowingly directly or indirectly involved in— significant corruption, including corruption related to the extraction of natural resources; or a gross violation of human rights, including the wrongful detention of— locally employed staff of a United States diplomatic mission; or a United States citizen or national. Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a foreign government official may be ineligible for entry into the United States if the Secretary of State determines that such official was knowingly directly or indirectly involved in significant actions that undermine democratic governance. The immediate family members of an official described in subparagraph (A) or (B) may be subject to the same restriction on entry into the United States as such official. The Secretary of State, in implementing this subsection, shall, as appropriate, provide information regarding the actions of officials described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, which shall determine whether to impose sanctions authorized under Federal law to block the transfer of property and interests in property, and all financial transactions, in the United States involving any such official. The Secretary of State shall publicly or privately designate or make the determination that the foreign government officials or party members about whom the Secretary has made such designation or determination regarding significant corruption or gross violations of human rights, and their immediate family members, without regard to whether any such individual has applied for a visa. Individuals are not ineligible for entry into the United States pursuant to paragraph (1) if such entry— would further important United States law enforcement objectives; or is necessary to permit the United States to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States or under other international obligations of the United States. Nothing in paragraph (1) may be construed to derogate from United States Government obligations under applicable international agreements or obligations. The Secretary of State may waive the application of paragraph (1) with respect to any individual if the Secretary determines that— such waiver would serve a compelling national interest of the United States; or the circumstances that caused such individual to be ineligible for entry into the United States have sufficiently changed. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report, including a classified annex if necessary, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Each such report shall include— all relevant information relating to corruption, human rights violations, or undermining democratic governance that was a factor in identifying, during the most recent 12-month period— individuals who are ineligible for entry into the United States under paragraph (1)(A); individuals about whom the Secretary has made a designation or determination pursuant to paragraph (1)(E); and individuals who would be ineligible for entry into the United States under paragraph (1)(A), but were excluded from such restriction pursuant to paragraph (2); a list of any waivers granted by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (3); and a description of the justification for each such waiver. The unclassified portion of each report required under subparagraph (A) shall be posted on a publicly accessible website of the Department of State. For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (4), the records of the Department of State and of diplomatic and consular offices of the United States pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States shall not be considered confidential. Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: Except as provided under subsections (b) and (d), no assistance may be furnished under this Act or under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) to the central government of any country in which the duly elected head of government was deposed by a military coup d’état or decree or a coup d’état or decree in which the military played a decisive role. The Secretary of State, after consultation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, may waive the restriction on assistance described in subsection (a) if the Secretary certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 30 days before the provision of such assistance to such government, that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States. Assistance to a foreign government that is subject to the restriction described in subsection (a) may be resumed if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, not fewer than 30 days before the resumption of such assistance, that a democratically elected government has taken office subsequent to the termination of assistance pursuant to subsection (a). The restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply to any assistance used— to promote democratic elections or public participation in the democratic processes; to support a democratic transition; or for humanitarian purposes. In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (4)is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, significant actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions; or(5)has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, an activity described in this subsection.; and (B)Requests relating to corruptionA request described in paragraph (1) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity described in paragraph (3) or (5) of subsection (a) shall be submitted to the President in writing jointly by the chairperson and the ranking member of—(i)any of the appropriate congressional committees of the Senate; and(ii)any of the appropriate congressional committees of the House of Representatives.(C)Requests relating to undermining democracyA request described in paragraph (1) with respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity described in subsection (a)(4) shall be submitted in writing to the President jointly by the chairperson and ranking member of any of the appropriate congressional committees.. 620N.Limitation on assistance in the wake of a coup d’état(a)In generalExcept as provided under subsections (b) and (d), no assistance may be furnished under this Act or under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) to the central government of any country in which the duly elected head of government was deposed by a military coup d’état or decree or a coup d’état or decree in which the military played a decisive role.(b)Exemption for national securityThe Secretary of State, after consultation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, may waive the restriction on assistance described in subsection (a) if the Secretary certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 30 days before the provision of such assistance to such government, that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.(c)Resumption of assistanceAssistance to a foreign government that is subject to the restriction described in subsection (a) may be resumed if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, not fewer than 30 days before the resumption of such assistance, that a democratically elected government has taken office subsequent to the termination of assistance pursuant to subsection (a).(d)Exception for democracy and humanitarian assistanceThe restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply to any assistance used—(1)to promote democratic elections or public participation in the democratic processes; (2)to support a democratic transition; or (3)for humanitarian purposes.(e)Defined termIn this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—(1)the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;(2)the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;(3)the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and(4)the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. .

620N. Limitation on assistance in the wake of a coup d’état Except as provided under subsections (b) and (d), no assistance may be furnished under this Act or under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) to the central government of any country in which the duly elected head of government was deposed by a military coup d’état or decree or a coup d’état or decree in which the military played a decisive role. The Secretary of State, after consultation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, may waive the restriction on assistance described in subsection (a) if the Secretary certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, not later than 30 days before the provision of such assistance to such government, that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States. Assistance to a foreign government that is subject to the restriction described in subsection (a) may be resumed if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional committees, not fewer than 30 days before the resumption of such assistance, that a democratically elected government has taken office subsequent to the termination of assistance pursuant to subsection (a). The restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply to any assistance used— to promote democratic elections or public participation in the democratic processes; to support a democratic transition; or for humanitarian purposes. In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

6. Combating corruption and kleptocracy The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall combat authoritarianism by prioritizing governance and anti-corruption activities and programs that— enhance the transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of governments across relevant sectors; improve the detection and exposure of corruption crimes, including crimes that cross borders; improve citizen oversight and advocacy; protect free expression and civic activism; and support investigative journalism and media independence; expand the investigation and prosecution of corrupt acts; hold corrupt actors accountable; promote the adoption and implementation of anticorruption preventive measures; and promote good governance, public administration, and impartial judiciaries; address corruption in key sectors, whether at the level of— delivery of services to citizens; important governmental processes, such as procurement; or priority economic sectors; strengthen democratic norms and standards at the local, national, regional, and international levels; augment cooperation with the private sector and key industries to root out corruption that— harms competitiveness, economic growth, and development; and taints critical supply chains; address corrosive capital and the strategic use of corruption by authoritarian states to undermine democracy and good governance; and provide essential skills and resources to civil society and media— to counter corruption; and to address the weak governance and poor human rights conditions that cultivate corruption. Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended— in paragraph (13), by striking or at the end; in paragraph (14), by striking the period at the end and inserting ; or; and by adding at the end the following: the restraining, seizing, forfeiting, or repatriating of stolen assets linked to foreign government corruption and the proceeds of such corruption. (15)the restraining, seizing, forfeiting, or repatriating of stolen assets linked to foreign government corruption and the proceeds of such corruption..

7. Investing in democracy research and development The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a program for democracy research and development that— supports research and development by the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and the National Endowment for Democracy on policies and programs relating to democracy efforts; drives innovation within such agencies regarding the response to complex, multidimensional challenges to democracy, including— combating transnational kleptocracy; mitigating hyperpolarization; countering malign authoritarian influence; and leveraging emerging technology for democracy; incentivizes collaboration among governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to identify and mitigate threats to global democracy; identifies lessons learned and best practices for democracy programs and diplomatic approaches to create feedback loops and shape future evidence-based programming and diplomacy; encourages private sector actors to establish and implement business practices that will— strengthen democratic institutions; bolster democratic processes; and support democracy activists and human rights defenders; and strengthens the resilience of democratic actors and institutions. Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes the efforts and results of the program established pursuant to subsection (a).

8. Addressing authoritarians in the multilateral system It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State and the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations should use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations and with other multilateral bodies— to promote the full participation of civil society actors within the United National Human Rights Council and other multilateral bodies; to closely monitor instances of reprisals against such actors; and to support the use of targeted sanctions, censure of member states, and other diplomatic measures to hold responsible any person who engages in reprisals against human rights defenders and civil society within such multilateral bodies; to reform the process for suspending the rights of membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for member states that commit gross and systemic violations of human rights, including— ensuring information detailing the member state’s human rights record is publicly available before a vote for membership or a vote on suspending the rights of membership of such member state; and making publicly available the vote of each member state on the suspension of rights of membership from the United Nations Human Rights Council; to reform the rules for electing members to the United Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure that member states that have committed gross and systemic violations of human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and to oppose the election to the United Nations Human Rights Council of any member state— that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, as determined pursuant to section 116 or 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n and 2304); the government of which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as determined pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371); that is designated as a Tier 3 country under section 110(b)(1)(C) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)(C)); that is included on the list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b)(1) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)(1)) as a government that recruits and uses child soldiers; or the government of which the United States determines to have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.

9. Confronting digital authoritarianism It is the policy of the United States— to combat digital authoritarianism, including the use of digital technologies, that— restricts the exercise of civil and political rights; weakens democratic processes and institutions, including elections; or surveils, censors, or represses human rights defenders, democracy activists, civil society actors, independent media, or political opponents; to counter misinformation and disinformation, especially in the digital domain; to promote internet freedom and elevate the protection of human rights and democratic principles in the design and deployment of current and emerging technologies; and to support efforts to counter government censorship and surveillance, including efforts— to bypass internet shutdowns and other forms of censorship, including blocks on services through circumvention technologies; and to provide digital security and digital activism support and training for democracy activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and other at-risk groups. Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the Department of State's efforts to implement the policy objectives described in subsection (a).

10. Protecting political prisoners Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes, with respect to unjustly detained political prisoners worldwide— a description of existing Department of State processes and efforts to carry out the political prisoner-related activities described in subsection (b); an assessment of any resource gaps or institutional deficiencies that adversely impact the Department of State’s ability to engage in the activities described in subsection (b) in order to respond to increasing numbers of unjustly detained political prisoners; and a strategy for enhancing the efforts of the Department of State and other Federal agencies to carry out the political prisoner-related activities described in subsection (b). The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the Department of State's efforts— to monitor regional and global trends concerning unjustly detained political prisoners and maintain information regarding individual cases; to consistently raise concerns regarding unjustly detained political prisoners, including specific individuals, through public and private engagement with foreign governments, public reporting, and multilateral engagement; to routinely— attend the trials of political prisoners; conduct wellness visits of political prisoners, to the extent practicable and pending approval from political prisoners or their legal counsel; visit political prisoners incarcerated under home arrest, subject to a travel ban, or confined in detention; and report on the well-being of such political prisoners; to regularly request information and specific actions related to individual prisoners’ medical conditions, treatment, access to legal counsel, location, and family visits; to identify cases in which an imminent arrest, a potential re-arrest, or physical violence poses a risk to an at-risk individual; to utilize foreign assistance resources to provide support to civil society and others advocating for the release of unjustly detained political prisoners; to utilize embassy resources to provide shelter or facilitate the safe evacuation of willing individuals and their families, whenever feasible; and to use sanctions and other accountability mechanisms to encourage the release of unjustly detained political prisoners.