S3334-118

1. Short title; table of contents This Act may be cited as the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023. The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

101. Findings; sense of Congress Congress makes the following findings: The Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, which Iran uses to threaten forces of the United States and partners of the United States in the region. Iran is progressing toward developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (commonly referred to an ICBM) capability. In 2023, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Iran’s progress on its space-launch vehicles shortens the time needed for Iran to produce an ICBM since space-launch vehicles and ICBMs use similar technologies. Iran continues to rely on illicit foreign procurement to support its long-range missile aspirations. For example, Iran recently tried to purchase from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China ammonium perchlorate, which is the main ingredient in solid propellants to power missiles. Iran relies at least in part on networks in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China to procure dual-use materials and equipment for its longer-range ballistic missile program. North Korea historically has played a role in supporting longer-range Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. Specifically, North Korea provided the Nodong-A to Iran in the 1990s, which Iran used to develop both its first nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile and liquid propellant engines for its space-launch vehicles. While the Iran Space Agency, a government organization subject to sanctions, develops space capabilities for Iran’s ministry of defense as well as the communications sector, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (commonly referred to as the IRGC–AF) runs a parallel space program employing solid-propellant motors, which if used in ICBM technology, would enable launches with little warning. Iran continues work on larger diameter solid-propellant motors, like the Rafa’e, and is now reportedly in the possession of an all-solid-propellant space-launch vehicle called the Qaem–100. The Qaem–100 was reportedly tested twice, once in November 2022 and again in March 2023. The IRGC–AF last successfully launched a satellite into orbit in September 2023 using its Qased rocket, fueled by both liquid- and solid-fueled stages. Iran’s development, production, and transfer of space-launch vehicle and ballistic missile technology violated Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which enshrined certain restrictions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Those restrictions expired on October 18, 2023. It is the sense of Congress that— Iran’s space program continues to function as a cover for Iran's quest for an ICBM; the possession by Iran of an ICBM would pose a direct threat to the United States homeland and partners of the United States in Europe; and the United States should work to deny Iran the ability to hold the United States homeland or European partners of the United States at risk with an ICBM.

102. Determination and mandatory imposition of sanctions under Executive Order 13382 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall— determine whether each individual or entity specified in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); and with respect to any such individual or entity the President determines does meet such criteria, impose such sanctions. The individuals and entities specified in this subsection are the following: The Space Division of the IRGC–AF. All senior officers of the IRGC–AF. Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC–AF. General Majid Mousavi, the deputy commander of the IRGC–AF. Second Brigadier General Ali-Jafarabadi, the commander of the Space Division of the IRGC–AF.

103. Report on support for Iran's space, aerospace, and ballistic missile sectors and United States capacity to deny intercontinental ballistic missile attacks from Iran Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the following: An identification of entities in Iran not subject to sanctions imposed by the United States as of the date of the report that are helping to support Iran’s space, aerospace, and ballistic missile sectors, including public and private entities making a material contribution to Iran’s development of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs. An identification of the countries the governments of which continue to support Iran’s space, aerospace, and ballistic missile activities. With respect to each country identified under paragraph (2), the following: Actions taken by the government of the country or other entities within the country to support Iran’s space, aerospace, and ballistic missile activities, including the transfer of missiles, engines, propellant or materials that can be used for fuel, or other technologies that could make a material contribution to development of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs. Any actions described in subparagraph (A) or proposals for such actions being negotiated or discussed as of the date of the report. An assessment of Iran’s ICBM technology, including the following: Key steps Iran would need to take to develop an ICBM. An assessment of which rocket motors Iran would likely use to build an ICBM. Technological hurdles Iran would still need to overcome to develop an ICBM. Pathways to overcome the hurdles described in subparagraph (C), including the potential transfer of technologies from North Korea, the Russian Federation, or the People's Republic of China. An estimated timeline for Iran to develop an ICBM if Iran chooses to do so. An assessment of the missile defense capabilities of the United States, as of the date of the report and anticipated for the future, with respect to denying an attack by Iran on the United States homeland, including the following: An assessment of the ability of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, as it exists on the date of the enactment of this Act, to prevent such an attack. An assessment of how the procurement of the Next Generation Interceptor would improve the ability of the United States to intercept ICBMs launched from Iran. How a third missile defense site on the East Coast of the United States would improve the ability of the United States to intercept ICBMs launched from Iran. As new information becomes available and not less frequently than annually, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees an updated version of the report required by subsection (a) that includes updated information under paragraphs (1) through (4) of that subsection. Each report submitted under this section shall be submitting in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. In this section, the term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

104. Report on senior officials of Government of Iran responsible for space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile tests Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President determines that the Government of Iran has conducted a test of a space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification that identifies each senior official of the Government of Iran that the President determines is responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing the test. The notification required by subsection (a) shall include— available information on the ballistic missile or the generic class of ballistic missile or space rocket that was launched; the trajectory, duration, range, and altitude of the flight of the missile or rocket; the duration, range, and altitude of the flight of each stage of the missile or rocket; the location of the launch point and impact point; the payload; and other technical information that is available. The notification required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

201. Findings; sense of Congress Congress makes the following findings: Iran has a robust unmanned aerial system program under which Iran operates several unmanned aerial systems, including combat drones, drones capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and suicide or kamikaze drones. As of December 2022, Iran reportedly supplied more than 1,700 unmanned aerial systems to the Russian Federation, including several hundred of the Shahed–136 suicide drone. Iran and the Russian Federation are reportedly planning to build 6,000 Geran–2 drones, the Russian-made version of the Iranian Shahed–136, at a new facility in the Russian Federation. The Iranian supply of unmanned aerial systems to the Russian Federation has fueled the Russian Federation’s murderous invasion of Ukraine and caused countless civilian deaths. The United States found parts made by more than a dozen United States or western companies in an Iranian unmanned aerial system downed in Ukraine, which are likely transferred to Iran illegally. Iran is also responsible for the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems to terrorist groups in the Middle East, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, which have all employed drones in their murderous attacks on Israel following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks by Hamas in Israel, which killed more than 1,400 innocent civilians. Iran’s transfer of unmanned aerial systems to other governments and terrorist groups has violated Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) and restrictions imposed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which expired on October 18, 2023. Upon the expiration of those restrictions, Iran’s transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems and ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and the Russian Federation became legal under international law. It is the sense of Congress that— Iran’s unmanned aerial system program contributes significantly to the instability of the Middle East and threatens the security of the United States and its partners in the Middle East, including Israel; the provision of Iranian unmanned aerial systems gives the Russian Federation an advantage in its war in Ukraine and contributes to the dangerous partnership between Iran and the Russian Federation; the expiration of restrictions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 on October 18, 2023, helps facilitate Iran’s development and transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems and ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and the Russian Federation; and the United States should seek to hinder Iran’s unmanned aerial system production, its transfer of such systems to the Russian Federation, Hamas, and other hostile state and non-state actors, and to prevent the further use of United States components in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

202. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 Section 2(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501(1)) is amended by striking and ballistic missiles and inserting , ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles. Section 302(b)(1)(B) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8542(b)(1)(B)) is amended— in clause (ii), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and by inserting after clause (ii) the following: unmanned aerial system (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023) or cruise missile program; or Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is amended by striking and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology and inserting , ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology, and unmanned aerial system (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023) and cruise missile programs.. (iii)unmanned aerial system (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023) or cruise missile program; or.

203. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems in enforcement of arms embargos under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act Section 107(a)(1) of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9406(a)(1)) is amended by inserting unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023), after warships,.

204. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems under Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 Section 1608(1) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023), after cruise missiles,.

205. Strategy to counter Iranian unmanned aerial systems Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report (with a classified annex) that includes a strategy for countering Iran’s growing unmanned aerial systems program and its transfer of unmanned aerial systems and related technology to foreign states and non-state actors. The strategy required by subsection (a) shall draw upon the work of the President Biden's interagency task force investigating the presence of United States parts in Iranian unmanned aerial systems to develop a plan for preventing Iran from obtaining United States materials for its unmanned aerial system program. The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: A list of identified United States components found in Iranian unmanned aerial systems and a list of United States suppliers of those components. An assessment of existing export controls for components described in subparagraph (A) and a plan to strengthen those export controls, including through any necessary legislative action by Congress. An investigation into and identification of foreign actors, including individuals and government and nongovernmental entities, that are supplying components to the Iranian unmanned aerial system and weapons programs. Strategies to deny supply chains for such components, including any sanctions or other actions to target the individuals or entities identified under subparagraph (C). An identification of any additional authorities or funding needed to enable the investigation of how Iran is obtaining United States components for its unmanned aerial system program. An assessment of how the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce is monitoring compliance with their restrictions on Iranian unmanned aerial system producers aimed at ensuring United States and other foreign-made components are not being used in Iranian unmanned aerial systems. An investigation into Iran’s use of shell companies to evade sanctions and restrictions on the use of United States or other foreign-made components in Iranian unmanned aerial system production. Strategies to ensure United States manufacturers of critical components for unmanned aerial systems can verify the end users of those components. Any other actions that could be use to disrupt Iran’s unmanned aerial system and weapons programs and its transfers to foreign states and non-state actors. The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include a diplomatic strategy to coordinate with allies of the United States to counter Iran’s unmanned aerial system production and transfer of unmanned aerial systems and related technologies to foreign states and non-state actors, including the following: Coordination with respect to sanctions comparable to the sanctions the United States is required to apply under the amendments made by this title. Intelligence sharing with allies of the United States to determine how Iran is obtaining western components for its unmanned aerial system program. Intelligence sharing with allies of the United States to track, monitor, and disrupt Iranian transfers of its unmanned aerial system technology to foreign states and non-state actors. A plan to cooperate with allies of the United States to develop or advance anti-unmanned aerial system equipment. In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

206. Report on support for Iran’s unmanned aerial system program and related technology transfers Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that outlines the following: Domestic industries, individuals, or entities in Iran not subject to sanctions imposed by the United States as of the date of the report that are helping to support Iran’s unmanned aerial system program, including both public and private entities making a material contribution to Iran’s production of unmanned aerial systems. A list of foreign states or non-state actors using Iranian unmanned aerial system technology or looking to purchase it, including any negotiations or discussions ongoing as of the date of the enactment of this Act between Iran and a foreign state or non-state actor to acquire such technology from Iran. An assessment of cooperation between Iran and the People’s Republic of China to develop, produce, acquire, or export unmanned aerial system technology. An assessment of cooperation between Iran and the Russian Federation to develop, produce, acquire, or export unmanned aerial system technology, including a status update on Russian capabilities to produce Iranian unmanned aerial systems. An assessment on how the October 18, 2023, expiration of sanctions and other restrictions under Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) have or have not increased cooperation between Iran and the Russian Federation or Iran and the People’s Republic of China relating to transactions previously restricted under that resolution. The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. In this section, the term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

207. Unmanned aerial system defined In this title, the term unmanned aerial system— means an aircraft without a human pilot onboard that is controlled by an operator remotely or programmed to fly autonomously; and includes— unmanned vehicles that conduct intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance operations; unmanned vehicles that can loiter, such as suicide or kamikaze drones; and unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

301. Expansion of Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 Section 5(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— in the paragraph heading, by striking Exports, transfers, and transshipments and inserting Weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons; in subparagraph (A), by striking the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 and inserting the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023; in subparagraph (B)— in clause (i), by striking would likely and inserting may; in clause (ii)— in subclause (I)— by striking or develop and inserting develop, or export; and by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (IV); and by inserting after subclause (I) the following: acquire or develop ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch technologies; acquire or develop unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023); or Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following: Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person, on or after the date of the enactment of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, knowingly exports, transfers, or permits or otherwise facilitates the transshipment or reexport of goods, services, technology, or other items to Iran that may support Iran’s efforts to acquire, develop, or export its space-launch programs, space-launch vehicles, or ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch technologies. Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to— an agency or instrumentality of the Government of Iran if the President determines that the agency or instrumentality knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, seeks to develop, procure, or acquire goods, services, or technology that may support efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime (commonly referred to as the MTCR Annex); a foreign person or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code) if the President determines that the person or agency or instrumentality knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, provides material support to the Government of Iran that may support efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the MTCR Annex; and a foreign person that the President determines knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a transaction or transactions with, or provides financial services for, a foreign person or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state described in clause (i) or (ii) with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the MTCR Annex. Not later than 30 days after receiving a request from the chairman or ranking member of the appropriate congressional committees with respect to whether a person meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under subparagraph (A) or (B), the President shall— determine if the person meets such criteria; and submit a report to the chairman or ranking member, as the case may be, who submitted the request with respect to that determination that includes a statement of whether or not the President imposed or intends to impose sanctions with respect to the person. (II)acquire or develop ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch technologies;(III)acquire or develop unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023); or. (4)Space-launch and ballistic missile goods, services, or technology(A)Transfer to IranExcept as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the President determines that the person, on or after the date of the enactment of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, knowingly exports, transfers, or permits or otherwise facilitates the transshipment or reexport of goods, services, technology, or other items to Iran that may support Iran’s efforts to acquire, develop, or export its space-launch programs, space-launch vehicles, or ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch technologies.(B)Development and support for developmentExcept as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to—(i)an agency or instrumentality of the Government of Iran if the President determines that the agency or instrumentality knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, seeks to develop, procure, or acquire goods, services, or technology that may support efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime (commonly referred to as the MTCR Annex);(ii)a foreign person or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code) if the President determines that the person or agency or instrumentality knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, provides material support to the Government of Iran that may support efforts by the Government of Iran with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the MTCR Annex; and(iii)a foreign person that the President determines knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a transaction or transactions with, or provides financial services for, a foreign person or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state described in clause (i) or (ii) with respect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods, services, and items listed on the MTCR Annex.(C)Congressional requestsNot later than 30 days after receiving a request from the chairman or ranking member of the appropriate congressional committees with respect to whether a person meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under subparagraph (A) or (B), the President shall—(i)determine if the person meets such criteria; and(ii)submit a report to the chairman or ranking member, as the case may be, who submitted the request with respect to that determination that includes a statement of whether or not the President imposed or intends to impose sanctions with respect to the person..