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Referenced Laws
50 U.S.C. 1801
50 U.S.C. 3003
50 U.S.C. 1802
50 U.S.C. 1803
50 U.S.C. 1805(c)
50 U.S.C. 1841(1)
50 U.S.C. 1842
50 U.S.C. 1861
50 U.S.C. 1885
50 U.S.C. 1885a(a)(1)
50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)
50 U.S.C. 1881e(a)
42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)
Public Law 115–118
50 U.S.C. 1881 et seq.
Public Law 110–261
18 U.S.C. 2511
50 U.S.C. 1881b
50 U.S.C. 1871(a)(1)
50 U.S.C. 1873(b)(1)
Public Law 109–177
50 U.S.C. 1872
50 U.S.C. 3001
50 U.S.C. 3110
50 U.S.C. 3234
42 U.S.C. 2000ee(j)(1)
chapter 47
chapter 205
Chapter 121
47 U.S.C. 230(f)
Chapter 206
section 7623
47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.
47 U.S.C. 251(e)
42 U.S.C. 300d–71
47 U.S.C. 153
47 U.S.C. 1401
47 U.S.C. 332
47 U.S.C. 225
50 U.S.C. 1804
49 U.S.C. 30101
chapter 124
50 U.S.C. 1874
50 U.S.C. 1808(a)(2)
50 U.S.C. 1824(e)(6)
50 U.S.C. 1826
Section 1
1. Short title; table of contents This Act may be cited as the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023. The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Section 2
2. Definitions Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended by adding at the end the following: The term Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court means the court established under section 103(a). The terms Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and Court of Review mean the court established under section 103(b). The term appropriate committees of Congress means— the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)); the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. Such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended— in section 102 (50 U.S.C. 1802), by striking the court established under section 103(a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; in section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803)— in subsection (a)— in paragraph (2)(A), by striking The court established under this subsection and inserting The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and by striking the court established under this subsection each place it appears and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; in subsection (g)— by striking the court established pursuant to subsection (a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; by striking the court of review established pursuant to subsection (b) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; and by striking The courts established pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) and inserting The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in subsection (h), by striking a court established under this section and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in subsection (i)— in paragraph (1), by striking the courts established under subsections (a) and (b) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in paragraph (3)(B), by striking the courts and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in paragraph (5), by striking the court and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, as the case may be,; in paragraph (6), by striking the court each place it appears and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; by striking a court established under subsection (a) or (b) each place it appears and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; and by striking A court established under subsection (a) or (b) each place it appears and inserting The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in subsection (j)— by striking a court established under subsection (a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and by striking the court determines and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court determines; by striking the court established under subsection (a) each place it appears and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and by striking the court established under subsection (b) each place it appears and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in section 105(c) (50 U.S.C. 1805(c))— in paragraph (2)(B), by striking the Court and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and in paragraph (3), by striking the court each place it appears and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; in section 401(1) (50 U.S.C. 1841(1)), by striking , and State and inserting State, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review; in section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842)— in subsection (b)(1), by striking the court established by section 103(a) of this Act and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and in subsection (h)(2), by striking the court established under section 103(a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861)— in subsection (b)(1), by striking the court established by section 103(a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; in subsection (g)(3), by striking the court established under section 103(a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and in subsection (k)(1), by striking , and State and inserting State, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; in section 502(c)(1)(E), by striking the court established under section 103 and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (as defined by section 101); in section 801 (50 U.S.C. 1885)— in paragraph (8)(B)(i), by striking the court established under section 103(a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and by adding at the end the following new paragraph: The term Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court means the court established under section 103(a). in section 802(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1885a(a)(1)), by striking the court established under section 103(a) and inserting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In this Act, the terms appropriate committees of Congress, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review have the meanings given such terms in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801), as amended by subsection (a). (q)The term Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court means the court established under section 103(a).(r)The terms Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and Court of Review mean the court established under section 103(b).(s)The term appropriate committees of Congress means—(1)the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003));(2)the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and(3)the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. . (10)Foreign Intelligence Surveillance CourtThe term Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court means the court established under section 103(a).; and
Section 3
101. Prohibition on warrantless queries for the communications of United States persons and persons located in the United States Section 702(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(f)) is amended— in paragraph (1)— in subparagraph (A), by inserting and the limitations and requirements in paragraph (2) after Constitution of the United States; and in subparagraph (B), by striking United States person query term used for a query and inserting term for a United States person or person reasonably believed to be in the United States used for a query as required by paragraph (3); by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (5); and by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following: Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), no officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under this section in an effort to find communications or information the compelled production of which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States, of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information. Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a query related to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information if— such person is the subject of an order or emergency authorization authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search under section 105 or 304 of this Act, or a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the query; the officer or employee carrying out the query has a reasonable belief that— an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm; and in order to prevent or mitigate this threat, the query must be conducted before authorization pursuant to subparagraph (I) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and a description of the query is provided to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the appropriate committees of Congress in a timely manner; such person or, if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of such person, has provided consent to the query on a case-by-case basis; or the query uses a known cybersecurity threat signature as a query term; the query is conducted, and the results of the query are used, for the sole purpose of identifying targeted recipients of malicious software and preventing or mitigating harm from such malicious software; no additional contents of communications retrieved as a result of the query are accessed or reviewed; and all such queries are reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. No information retrieved pursuant to a query authorized by clause (i)(II) or information derived from such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in proceedings or investigations that arise from the threat that prompted the query. The Attorney General shall not less frequently than annually assess compliance with the requirements under subclause (I). In the event that a query for communications or information, the compelled production of which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States, of or about 1 more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information is conducted pursuant to an emergency authorization described in subparagraph (B)(i)(I) and the application for such emergency authorization is denied, or in any other case in which the query has been conducted and no order is issued approving the query— no information obtained or evidence derived from such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and no information concerning any United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or the creation of the information acquired from such query may subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. The Attorney General shall not less frequently than annually assess compliance with the requirements under clause (i). Except as provided in subparagraph (B)(i), no officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under this section in an effort to find information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information unless the query is reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information. No officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under this section in an effort to find information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of query or the time of the communication or the creation of the information, unless first an electronic record is created, and a system, mechanism, or business practice is in place to maintain such record, that includes the following: Each term used for the conduct of the query. The date of the query. The identifier of the officer or employee. A statement of facts showing that the use of each query term included under subparagraph (A) is— reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information; or in furtherance of the exceptions described in paragraph (2)(B)(i). If a query of information acquired under this section is conducted in an effort to find communications metadata of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or communication and the query returns such metadata, the results of the query shall not be used as a basis for reviewing communications or information a query for which is otherwise prohibited under this section. The prohibitions and requirements in this section shall apply to queries of federated and mixed datasets that include information acquired under this section, unless a mechanism exists to limit the query to information not acquired under this section. (2)Prohibition on warrantless queries for the communications and other information of United States persons and persons located in the United States(A)In generalExcept as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), no officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under this section in an effort to find communications or information the compelled production of which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States, of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information.(B)Exceptions for concurrent authorization, consent, emergency situations, and certain defensive cybersecurity queries(i)In generalSubparagraph (A) shall not apply to a query related to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information if—(I)such person is the subject of an order or emergency authorization authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search under section 105 or 304 of this Act, or a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the query;(II)(aa)the officer or employee carrying out the query has a reasonable belief that—(AA)an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm; and(BB)in order to prevent or mitigate this threat, the query must be conducted before authorization pursuant to subparagraph (I) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and(bb)a description of the query is provided to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the appropriate committees of Congress in a timely manner;(III)such person or, if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of such person, has provided consent to the query on a case-by-case basis; or(IV)(aa)the query uses a known cybersecurity threat signature as a query term;(bb)the query is conducted, and the results of the query are used, for the sole purpose of identifying targeted recipients of malicious software and preventing or mitigating harm from such malicious software;(cc)no additional contents of communications retrieved as a result of the query are accessed or reviewed; and(dd)all such queries are reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (ii)Limitations(I)Use in subsequent proceedings and investigationsNo information retrieved pursuant to a query authorized by clause (i)(II) or information derived from such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in proceedings or investigations that arise from the threat that prompted the query. (II)Assessment of complianceThe Attorney General shall not less frequently than annually assess compliance with the requirements under subclause (I). (C)Matters relating to emergency queries(i)Treatment of denialsIn the event that a query for communications or information, the compelled production of which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States, of or about 1 more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information is conducted pursuant to an emergency authorization described in subparagraph (B)(i)(I) and the application for such emergency authorization is denied, or in any other case in which the query has been conducted and no order is issued approving the query—(I)no information obtained or evidence derived from such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and(II)no information concerning any United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or the creation of the information acquired from such query may subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.(ii)Assessment of complianceThe Attorney General shall not less frequently than annually assess compliance with the requirements under clause (i). (D)Foreign intelligence purposeExcept as provided in subparagraph (B)(i), no officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under this section in an effort to find information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information unless the query is reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information. (3)DocumentationNo officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired under this section in an effort to find information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of query or the time of the communication or the creation of the information, unless first an electronic record is created, and a system, mechanism, or business practice is in place to maintain such record, that includes the following:(A)Each term used for the conduct of the query.(B)The date of the query.(C)The identifier of the officer or employee.(D)A statement of facts showing that the use of each query term included under subparagraph (A) is—(i)reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information; or(ii)in furtherance of the exceptions described in paragraph (2)(B)(i).(4)Prohibition on results of metadata query as a basis for access to communications and other protected informationIf a query of information acquired under this section is conducted in an effort to find communications metadata of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or communication and the query returns such metadata, the results of the query shall not be used as a basis for reviewing communications or information a query for which is otherwise prohibited under this section.(5)Federated datasetsThe prohibitions and requirements in this section shall apply to queries of federated and mixed datasets that include information acquired under this section, unless a mechanism exists to limit the query to information not acquired under this section..
Section 4
102. Limitation on use of information obtained under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to United States persons and persons located in the United States in criminal, civil, and administrative actions Paragraph (2) of section 706(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881e(a)) is amended to read as follows: No information acquired pursuant to section 702(f) of or about a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication may be introduced as evidence against such person in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or used as part of any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation, except— with the prior approval of the Attorney General; and in a proceeding or investigation in which the information is directly related to and necessary to address a specific threat of— terrorism (as defined in clauses (i) through (iii) of section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code); counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)); proliferation or use of a weapon of mass destruction (as defined in section 2332a(c) of title 18, United States Code); a cybersecurity breach or attack from a foreign country; incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure (as defined in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e))); an attack against the armed forces of the United States or an ally of the United States or to other personnel of the United States Government or a government of an ally of the United States; or international narcotics trafficking. (2)Limitation on use in criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings and investigationsNo information acquired pursuant to section 702(f) of or about a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication may be introduced as evidence against such person in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or used as part of any criminal, civil, or administrative investigation, except—(A)with the prior approval of the Attorney General; and(B)in a proceeding or investigation in which the information is directly related to and necessary to address a specific threat of—(i)terrorism (as defined in clauses (i) through (iii) of section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code);(ii)counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003));(iii)proliferation or use of a weapon of mass destruction (as defined in section 2332a(c) of title 18, United States Code);(iv)a cybersecurity breach or attack from a foreign country;(v)incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure (as defined in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)));(vi)an attack against the armed forces of the United States or an ally of the United States or to other personnel of the United States Government or a government of an ally of the United States; or(vii)international narcotics trafficking..
Section 5
103. Repeal of authority for the resumption of abouts collection Section 702(b)(5) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(b)(5)) is amended by striking , except as provided under section 103(b) of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. Section 702(m) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(m)) is amended— in the subsection heading, by striking Reviews, and Reporting and inserting and Reviews; and by striking paragraph (4). Section 103 of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (Public Law 115–118; 50 U.S.C. 1881a note) is amended— by striking subsection (b); and by striking the following: (a)In general.
Section 6
104. Prohibition on reverse targeting of United States persons and persons located in the United States Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as amended by section 101, is further amended— in subsection (b)(2)— by striking may not intentionally and inserting the following “may not— intentionally in subparagraph (A), as designated by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, by striking if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; and inserting the following: “if a significant purpose of such acquisition is to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication, unless— there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to such United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of acquisition or communication; the information is sought for the purpose of assisting that person; and a description of the targeting is provided to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the appropriate committees of Congress in a timely manner; or the United States person or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication has provided consent to the targeting, or if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of such person has provided consent; and in the case of information acquired pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) or evidence derived from such targeting, be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in proceedings or investigations that arise from the threat that prompted the targeting; in subsection (d)(1), by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows: ensure that— any acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be non-United States persons located outside the United States; and except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a significant purpose of an acquisition is not to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication; and in subsection (h)(2)(A)(i), by amending subclause (I) to read as follows: ensure that— an acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be non-United States persons located outside the United States; and except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a significant purpose of an acquisition is not to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication; and in subsection (j)(2)(B), by amending clause (i) to read as follows: ensure that— an acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be non-United States persons located outside the United States; and except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a significant purpose of an acquisition is not to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication; and (A)intentionally; (i)(I)there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to such United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of acquisition or communication; (II)the information is sought for the purpose of assisting that person; and(III)a description of the targeting is provided to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the appropriate committees of Congress in a timely manner; or(ii)the United States person or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication has provided consent to the targeting, or if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of such person has provided consent; and (B)in the case of information acquired pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) or evidence derived from such targeting, be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in proceedings or investigations that arise from the threat that prompted the targeting;; (A)ensure that—(i)any acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be non-United States persons located outside the United States; and(ii)except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a significant purpose of an acquisition is not to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication; and; (I)ensure that—(aa)an acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be non-United States persons located outside the United States; and(bb)except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a significant purpose of an acquisition is not to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication; and; and (i)ensure that—(I)an acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be non-United States persons located outside the United States; and(II)except as provided in subsection (b)(2), a significant purpose of an acquisition is not to acquire the information of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication; and.
Section 7
105. Data retention limits for information collected under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: The Attorney General shall develop, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall implement, procedures governing the retention of information collected pursuant to section 702. For purposes of this section, covered information includes— any information, including an encrypted communication, to, from, or pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication, or creation of the information that has been evaluated and is not specifically known to contain foreign intelligence information; and any unevaluated information, unless it can reasonably be determined that the unevaluated information does not contain communications to or from or information pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication or creation of the information. The procedures developed and implemented pursuant to subsection (a) shall ensure, with respect to information described in such subsection, that covered information shall be destroyed within 5 years of collection unless the Attorney General determines in writing that— the information is the subject of a preservation obligation in pending administrative, civil, or criminal litigation, in which case the information shall be segregated, retained, and used solely for that purpose and shall be destroyed as soon as it is no longer required to be preserved for such litigation; or the information is being used in a proceeding or investigation in which the information is directly related to and necessary to address a specific threat identified in section 706(a)(2)(B). The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 708 the following: 709.Data retention limits(a)PolicyThe Attorney General shall develop, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall implement, procedures governing the retention of information collected pursuant to section 702.(b)Covered informationFor purposes of this section, covered information includes—(1)any information, including an encrypted communication, to, from, or pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication, or creation of the information that has been evaluated and is not specifically known to contain foreign intelligence information; and(2)any unevaluated information, unless it can reasonably be determined that the unevaluated information does not contain communications to or from or information pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication or creation of the information.(c)RequirementsThe procedures developed and implemented pursuant to subsection (a) shall ensure, with respect to information described in such subsection, that covered information shall be destroyed within 5 years of collection unless the Attorney General determines in writing that—(1)the information is the subject of a preservation obligation in pending administrative, civil, or criminal litigation, in which case the information shall be segregated, retained, and used solely for that purpose and shall be destroyed as soon as it is no longer required to be preserved for such litigation; or(2)the information is being used in a proceeding or investigation in which the information is directly related to and necessary to address a specific threat identified in section 706(a)(2)(B).. Sec. 709. Data retention limits..
Section 8
709. Data retention limits The Attorney General shall develop, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall implement, procedures governing the retention of information collected pursuant to section 702. For purposes of this section, covered information includes— any information, including an encrypted communication, to, from, or pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication, or creation of the information that has been evaluated and is not specifically known to contain foreign intelligence information; and any unevaluated information, unless it can reasonably be determined that the unevaluated information does not contain communications to or from or information pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication or creation of the information. The procedures developed and implemented pursuant to subsection (a) shall ensure, with respect to information described in such subsection, that covered information shall be destroyed within 5 years of collection unless the Attorney General determines in writing that— the information is the subject of a preservation obligation in pending administrative, civil, or criminal litigation, in which case the information shall be segregated, retained, and used solely for that purpose and shall be destroyed as soon as it is no longer required to be preserved for such litigation; or the information is being used in a proceeding or investigation in which the information is directly related to and necessary to address a specific threat identified in section 706(a)(2)(B).
Section 9
106. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court supervision of demands for technical assistance from electronic communication service providers under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Section 702(i)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(1)) is amended— by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively, and moving such clauses 2 ems to the right; in the matter before clause (i), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by striking With respect to and inserting the following: Subject to subparagraph (B), in carrying out by adding at the end the following: The Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may not direct technical assistance from an electronic communication service provider under subparagraph (A) without demonstrating that the assistance sought— is necessary; is narrowly tailored to the surveillance at issue; and would not pose an undue burden on the electronic communication service provider or its customers who are not intended targets of the surveillance. An electronic communication service provider is not obligated to comply with a directive to provide technical assistance under this paragraph unless— such assistance is a manner or method that has been explicitly approved by the Court; and the Court issues an order, which has been delivered to the provider, explicitly describing the assistance to be furnished by the provider that has been approved by the Court. (A)In generalSubject to subparagraph (B), in carrying out; and (B)LimitationsThe Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may not direct technical assistance from an electronic communication service provider under subparagraph (A) without demonstrating that the assistance sought—(i)is necessary;(ii)is narrowly tailored to the surveillance at issue; and(iii)would not pose an undue burden on the electronic communication service provider or its customers who are not intended targets of the surveillance.(C)ComplianceAn electronic communication service provider is not obligated to comply with a directive to provide technical assistance under this paragraph unless—(i)such assistance is a manner or method that has been explicitly approved by the Court; and(ii)the Court issues an order, which has been delivered to the provider, explicitly describing the assistance to be furnished by the provider that has been approved by the Court..
Section 10
107. Prohibition on warrantless acquisition of domestic communications pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended— in subsection (b)(4), by striking known at the time of the acquisition and inserting reasonably believed at the time of acquisition or communication; in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking known at the time of the acquisition and inserting reasonably believed at the time of the acquisition or communication; in subsection (h)(2)(A)(i)(II), by striking known at the time of the acquisition and inserting reasonably believed at the time of the acquisition or communication; and in subsection (j)(2)(B)(ii), by striking known at the time of the acquisition and inserting reasonably believed at the time of the acquisition or communication.
Section 11
108. Requirement of a foreign intelligence purpose Section 702(h)(2)(A)(v) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(h)(2)(A)(v)) is amended by striking a significant and inserting the.
Section 12
109. Four-year extension of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–261) is amended— in paragraph (1) (50 U.S.C. 1881–1881g note), by striking December 31, 2023 and inserting September 30, 2027; and in paragraph (2) (18 U.S.C. 2511 note), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking December 31, 2023 and inserting September 30, 2027. The heading of section 404(b)(1) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–261; 50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is amended by striking December 31, 2023 and inserting September 30, 2027.
Section 13
201. Court supervision of collection targeting United States persons and persons located inside the United States Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. 1881 et seq.) is amended— by striking sections 703, 704, and 705 (50 U.S.C. 1881b, 1881c, and 1881d); and by inserting after section 702 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) the following: No officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target any United States person, regardless of location, or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information under circumstances in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy or a warrant would be required if the officer or employee sought to compel production of the information inside the United States for law enforcement purposes, unless such person is the subject of— an order or emergency authorization under section 105 or 304 of this Act covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such order or authorization; or a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such warrant. No officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target any United States person, regardless of location, or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information through the installation and use of pen register or trap and trace device, or to acquire information the compelled production of which would require a pen register or trap and trace device order if conducted inside the United States, unless such person is the subject of— an order or emergency authorization under title IV of this Act covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such authorization; or an order has been issued pursuant to section 3123 of title 18, United States Code, by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition. In the event that an emergency acquisition is conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) and the application for such emergency authorization is denied, or in any other case in which the acquisition has been conducted and no order is issued approving the acquisition— no information obtained or evidence derived from such acquisition may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and no information concerning any United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States a may subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General, if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply regardless of the location of the acquisition. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended— in section 601(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1871(a)(1)— by striking subparagraphs (D) through (F); and in subparagraph (B), by striking the semicolon and inserting ; or; in section 603(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1873(b)(1)), in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking and sections 703 and 704; and in section 706 (50 U.S.C. 1881e), by striking subsection (b). The table of contents for such Act is amended— by striking the items relating to sections 703, 704, and 705; and by inserting after the item relating to section 702 the following: 703.Acquisitions targeting United States persons and persons located inside the United States(a)Warrant requirementNo officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target any United States person, regardless of location, or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information under circumstances in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy or a warrant would be required if the officer or employee sought to compel production of the information inside the United States for law enforcement purposes, unless such person is the subject of—(1)an order or emergency authorization under section 105 or 304 of this Act covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such order or authorization; or(2)a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such warrant.(b)Pen register trap and traceNo officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target any United States person, regardless of location, or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information through the installation and use of pen register or trap and trace device, or to acquire information the compelled production of which would require a pen register or trap and trace device order if conducted inside the United States, unless such person is the subject of—(1)an order or emergency authorization under title IV of this Act covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such authorization; or(2)an order has been issued pursuant to section 3123 of title 18, United States Code, by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition.(c)Matters relating to emergency acquisitionIn the event that an emergency acquisition is conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) and the application for such emergency authorization is denied, or in any other case in which the acquisition has been conducted and no order is issued approving the acquisition—(1)no information obtained or evidence derived from such acquisition may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and(2)no information concerning any United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States a may subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General, if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.(d)Rule of constructionSubsections (a) and (b) shall apply regardless of the location of the acquisition.. Sec. 703. Acquisitions targeting United States persons and persons located inside the United States..
Section 14
703. Acquisitions targeting United States persons and persons located inside the United States No officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target any United States person, regardless of location, or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information under circumstances in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy or a warrant would be required if the officer or employee sought to compel production of the information inside the United States for law enforcement purposes, unless such person is the subject of— an order or emergency authorization under section 105 or 304 of this Act covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such order or authorization; or a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such warrant. No officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target any United States person, regardless of location, or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information through the installation and use of pen register or trap and trace device, or to acquire information the compelled production of which would require a pen register or trap and trace device order if conducted inside the United States, unless such person is the subject of— an order or emergency authorization under title IV of this Act covering the period of the acquisition and the acquisition is subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such authorization; or an order has been issued pursuant to section 3123 of title 18, United States Code, by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition. In the event that an emergency acquisition is conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) and the application for such emergency authorization is denied, or in any other case in which the acquisition has been conducted and no order is issued approving the acquisition— no information obtained or evidence derived from such acquisition may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and no information concerning any United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States a may subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General, if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply regardless of the location of the acquisition.
Section 15
202. Required disclosure of relevant information in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 applications The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: The Attorney General or any other Federal officer or employee making an application for a court order under this Act shall provide the court with— all information in the possession of the Government that is material to determining whether the application satisfies the applicable requirements under this Act, including any exculpatory information; and all information in the possession of the Government that might reasonably— call into question the accuracy of the application or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the application is made; or otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings that are required to be made under the applicable provision of this Act in order for the court order to be issued. The table of contents of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 is amended by adding at the end the following: IXRequired disclosure of relevant information901.Disclosure of relevant informationThe Attorney General or any other Federal officer or employee making an application for a court order under this Act shall provide the court with—(1)all information in the possession of the Government that is material to determining whether the application satisfies the applicable requirements under this Act, including any exculpatory information; and(2)all information in the possession of the Government that might reasonably—(A)call into question the accuracy of the application or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the application is made; or(B)otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings that are required to be made under the applicable provision of this Act in order for the court order to be issued.. Title IX—DISCLOSURE OF RELEVANT INFORMATIONSec. 901. Disclosure of relevant information..
Section 16
901. Disclosure of relevant information The Attorney General or any other Federal officer or employee making an application for a court order under this Act shall provide the court with— all information in the possession of the Government that is material to determining whether the application satisfies the applicable requirements under this Act, including any exculpatory information; and all information in the possession of the Government that might reasonably— call into question the accuracy of the application or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the application is made; or otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings that are required to be made under the applicable provision of this Act in order for the court order to be issued.
Section 17
203. Certification regarding accuracy procedures Title IX of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 202, is amended by adding at the end the following: In this section, the term accuracy procedures means specific procedures, adopted by the Attorney General, to ensure that an application for a court order under this Act, including any application for renewal of an existing order, is accurate and complete, including procedures that ensure, at a minimum, that— the application reflects all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about the requested findings; the application reflects all material information that might reasonably call into question the reliability and reporting of any information from a confidential human source that is used in the application; a complete file documenting each factual assertion in an application is maintained; the applicant coordinates with the appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), concerning any prior or existing relationship with the target of any surveillance, search, or other means of investigation, and discloses any such relationship in the application; before any application targeting a United States person is made, the applicant Federal officer shall document that the officer has collected and reviewed for accuracy and completeness supporting documentation for each factual assertion in the application; and the applicant Federal agency establish compliance and auditing mechanisms on an annual basis to assess the efficacy of the accuracy procedures that have been adopted and report such findings to the Attorney General. Any Federal officer making an application for a court order under this Act shall include with the application— a description of the accuracy procedures employed by the officer or the officer's designee; and a certification that the officer or the officer's designee has collected and reviewed for accuracy and completeness— supporting documentation for each factual assertion contained in the application; all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about the requested findings; and all material information that might reasonably call into question the reliability and reporting of any information from any confidential human source that is used in the application. A judge may not enter an order under this Act unless the judge finds, in addition to any other findings required under this Act, that the accuracy procedures described in the application for the order, as required under subsection (b)(1), are actually accuracy procedures as defined in this section. The table of contents of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 202, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 901 the following: 902.Certification regarding accuracy procedures(a)Definition of accuracy proceduresIn this section, the term accuracy procedures means specific procedures, adopted by the Attorney General, to ensure that an application for a court order under this Act, including any application for renewal of an existing order, is accurate and complete, including procedures that ensure, at a minimum, that—(1)the application reflects all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about the requested findings;(2)the application reflects all material information that might reasonably call into question the reliability and reporting of any information from a confidential human source that is used in the application;(3)a complete file documenting each factual assertion in an application is maintained;(4)the applicant coordinates with the appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), concerning any prior or existing relationship with the target of any surveillance, search, or other means of investigation, and discloses any such relationship in the application;(5)before any application targeting a United States person is made, the applicant Federal officer shall document that the officer has collected and reviewed for accuracy and completeness supporting documentation for each factual assertion in the application; and(6)the applicant Federal agency establish compliance and auditing mechanisms on an annual basis to assess the efficacy of the accuracy procedures that have been adopted and report such findings to the Attorney General.(b)Statement and certification of accuracy proceduresAny Federal officer making an application for a court order under this Act shall include with the application—(1)a description of the accuracy procedures employed by the officer or the officer's designee; and(2)a certification that the officer or the officer's designee has collected and reviewed for accuracy and completeness—(A)supporting documentation for each factual assertion contained in the application;(B)all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about the requested findings; and(C)all material information that might reasonably call into question the reliability and reporting of any information from any confidential human source that is used in the application.(3)Necessary Finding for Court OrdersA judge may not enter an order under this Act unless the judge finds, in addition to any other findings required under this Act, that the accuracy procedures described in the application for the order, as required under subsection (b)(1), are actually accuracy procedures as defined in this section.. Sec. 902. Certification regarding accuracy procedures..
Section 18
902. Certification regarding accuracy procedures In this section, the term accuracy procedures means specific procedures, adopted by the Attorney General, to ensure that an application for a court order under this Act, including any application for renewal of an existing order, is accurate and complete, including procedures that ensure, at a minimum, that— the application reflects all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about the requested findings; the application reflects all material information that might reasonably call into question the reliability and reporting of any information from a confidential human source that is used in the application; a complete file documenting each factual assertion in an application is maintained; the applicant coordinates with the appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), concerning any prior or existing relationship with the target of any surveillance, search, or other means of investigation, and discloses any such relationship in the application; before any application targeting a United States person is made, the applicant Federal officer shall document that the officer has collected and reviewed for accuracy and completeness supporting documentation for each factual assertion in the application; and the applicant Federal agency establish compliance and auditing mechanisms on an annual basis to assess the efficacy of the accuracy procedures that have been adopted and report such findings to the Attorney General. Any Federal officer making an application for a court order under this Act shall include with the application— a description of the accuracy procedures employed by the officer or the officer's designee; and a certification that the officer or the officer's designee has collected and reviewed for accuracy and completeness— supporting documentation for each factual assertion contained in the application; all information that might reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any assessment in the application, or otherwise raises doubts about the requested findings; and all material information that might reasonably call into question the reliability and reporting of any information from any confidential human source that is used in the application. A judge may not enter an order under this Act unless the judge finds, in addition to any other findings required under this Act, that the accuracy procedures described in the application for the order, as required under subsection (b)(1), are actually accuracy procedures as defined in this section.
Section 19
204. Clarification regarding treatment of information and evidence acquired under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended by adding at the end the following: For the purposes of notification provisions of this Act, information or evidence is derived from an electronic surveillance, physical search, use of a pen register or trap and trace device, production of tangible things, or acquisition under this Act when the Government would not have originally possessed the information or evidence but for that electronic surveillance, physical search, use of a pen register or trap and trace device, production of tangible things, or acquisition, and regardless of any claim that the information or evidence is attenuated from the surveillance or search, would inevitably have been discovered, or was subsequently reobtained through other means. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence shall publish the following: Policies concerning the application of subsection (q) of section 101 of such Act, as added by subsection (a). Guidance for all members of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) and all Federal agencies with law enforcement responsibilities concerning the application of such subsection (q). Whenever the Attorney General and the Director modify a policy or guidance published under paragraph (1), the Attorney General and the Director shall publish such modifications. (q)For the purposes of notification provisions of this Act, information or evidence is derived from an electronic surveillance, physical search, use of a pen register or trap and trace device, production of tangible things, or acquisition under this Act when the Government would not have originally possessed the information or evidence but for that electronic surveillance, physical search, use of a pen register or trap and trace device, production of tangible things, or acquisition, and regardless of any claim that the information or evidence is attenuated from the surveillance or search, would inevitably have been discovered, or was subsequently reobtained through other means..
Section 20
205. Sunset on grandfather clause of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act Section 102(b)(2) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109–177; 50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended by inserting , except that title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as in effect on March 14, 2020, shall continue in effect until the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023 after continue in effect.
Section 21
206. Written record of Department of Justice interactions with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court; protection against judge shopping by DOJ Subsection (c) of section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended— by inserting , and shall be transcribed before the first period; and by inserting , transcriptions, after applications made. Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following: The Attorney General shall maintain all written communications with the court established under subsection (a), including the identity of the employees of the court to or from whom the communications were made, regarding an application or order made under this title in a file associated with the application or order. The Attorney General shall— document a summary of any oral communications with the court established under subsection (a), including the identity of the employees of the court to or from whom the communications were made, relating to an application or order described in paragraph (1); and keep such documentation in a file associated with the application or order. Section 105(d)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following: To the extent practicable, an extension of an order issued under this title shall be granted or denied by the same judge who issued the original order.. (l)Written record of interactions(1)Written communicationsThe Attorney General shall maintain all written communications with the court established under subsection (a), including the identity of the employees of the court to or from whom the communications were made, regarding an application or order made under this title in a file associated with the application or order. (2)Oral communicationsThe Attorney General shall—(A)document a summary of any oral communications with the court established under subsection (a), including the identity of the employees of the court to or from whom the communications were made, relating to an application or order described in paragraph (1); and (B)keep such documentation in a file associated with the application or order..
Section 22
207. Appointment of amici curiae and access to information Section 103(i)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(2)) is amended— by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following: shall appoint at least 1 individual who has been designated under paragraph (1) and who possesses expertise in privacy and civil liberties to serve as amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration of any application or motion for an order or review, unless the court issues a written finding that such application neither presents nor involves— a novel or significant interpretation of the law; a significant concern related to constitutional rights; a sensitive investigative matter; a request for approval of a new program, a new technology, or a new use of existing technology; a request for reauthorization of programmatic surveillance; or any other privacy or civil liberties issue for which an appointment of an amicus curiae to assist the court in the consideration of the application would be appropriate; and in subparagraph (B), by striking an individual or organization each place it appears and inserting 1 or more individuals or organizations; by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (D); and by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: shall appoint at least 1 individual who has been designated under paragraph (1) and who possesses technical expertise to serve as amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration of any application for an order or review, unless the court issues a written finding that such application neither presents nor involves— a request for approval of a new program, a new technology, or a new use of existing technology; a request for approval of a previously authorized program, technology, or use of existing technology for which no prior application for approval of such program, technology, or use was considered by the court with the assistance of an amicus curiae who possesses technical expertise; or a technical issue material to any legal determination for which an appointment of an amicus curiae who possesses technical expertise to assist the court in the consideration of the application would be appropriate; shall randomly appoint at least 1 individual with legal expertise and at least 1 individual with technical expertise, from among individuals who have been designated under paragraph (1), to assist the court in the review of a certification under section 702(j); and Section 103(i) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following: In this subsection, the term sensitive investigative matter means— an investigative matter involving the activities of— a domestic public official or political candidate, or an individual serving on the staff of such an official or candidate; a domestic religious or political organization, or a known or suspected United States person prominent in such an organization; or the domestic news media; or any other investigative matter involving a domestic entity or a known or suspected United States person that, in the judgment of the applicable court established under subsection (a) or (b), is as sensitive as an investigative matter described in subparagraph (A). Section 103(i)(3)(A) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(3)(A)) is amended— by inserting cybersecurity, cryptography, after communications technology,; and by adding at the end the following: Of such individuals, at least 1 shall possess legal expertise and at least 1 shall possess technical expertise.. Section 103(i) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) is amended by striking paragraph (7) and inserting the following: A presiding judge of a court established under subsection (a) or (b) shall, not less frequently than quarterly, provide to the Attorney General and the appropriate committees of Congress— a notification of each appointment of an individual to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (2); and a copy of each written finding issued under paragraph (2). Section 702(j)(5)(A) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1881a(j)(5)(A)) is amended by striking at least 30 days prior to the expiration of such authorization and inserting such number of days, not less than 30 days, before the expiration of such authorization as the Court considers necessary to permit review by amici curiae appointed under section 103(i)(2)(C).. Section 103(i) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) is amended— in paragraph (4), by striking amicus curiae under paragraph (2)(A) and inserting amicus curiae under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (2); and in paragraph (5), by striking appointed under paragraph (2)(A) and inserting appointed under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (2). Section 103(i) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended— in paragraph (4)— in the paragraph heading, by inserting ; authority after Duties; by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively, and moving such clauses, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right; in the matter preceding clause (i), as so designated, by striking the amicus curiae shall and inserting the following: the amicus curiae— shall in subparagraph (A)(i), as so designated, by inserting before the semicolon at the end the following: , including legal arguments regarding any privacy or civil liberties interest of any United States person that would be significantly affected by the application or motion; and by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: ; and may seek leave to raise any novel or significant privacy or civil liberties issue relevant to the application or motion or other issue directly affecting the legality of the proposed electronic surveillance with the court, regardless of whether the court has requested assistance on that issue. by redesignating paragraphs (7) through (12) as paragraphs (8) through (13), respectively; and by inserting after paragraph (6) the following: Following issuance of an order under this Act by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to certify for review to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review a question of law pursuant to subsection (j). If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court denies a petition described in clause (i), the court shall provide for the record a written statement of the reasons for such denial. Upon certification of any question of law pursuant to this subparagraph, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review shall appoint the amicus curiae to assist the Court of Review in its consideration of the certified question, unless the Court of Review issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate. An amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review to certify for review to the Supreme Court of the United States any question of law pursuant to section 1254(2) of title 28, United States Code. For purposes of section 602, a petition filed under subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph and all of its content shall be considered a decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review described in paragraph (2) of section 602(a). Section 103(i)(6) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(6)) is amended— in subparagraph (A), by striking clauses (i) and (ii) and inserting the following: shall have access to, to the extent such information is available to the Government— the application, certification, petition, motion, and other information and supporting materials, including any information described in section 901, submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in connection with the matter in which the amicus curiae has been appointed, including access to any relevant legal precedent (including any such precedent that is cited by the Government, including in such an application); any other information or materials that the court determines is relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae; and an unredacted copy of each relevant decision made by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review in which the court decides a question of law, without regard to whether the decision is classified; and may make a submission to the court requesting access to any other particular materials or information (or category of materials or information) that the amicus curiae believes to be relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae. by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); and by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, upon the motion of an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) or upon its own motion, may require the Government to make available the supporting documentation described in section 902. Section 103(i)(6) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(6)) is amended— in subparagraph (B), by striking may and inserting shall; and by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following: An amicus curiae appointed by the court shall have access to, to the extent such information is available to the Government, unredacted copies of each opinion, order, transcript, pleading, or other document of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, including, if the individual is eligible for access to classified information, any classified documents, information, and other materials or proceedings. Section 103(i)(6) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(6)), as amended by paragraphs (1) and (2), is further amended— by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review determines that it is relevant to the duties of an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2), the amicus curiae may consult with 1 or more of the other individuals designated to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1) regarding any of the information relevant to any assigned proceeding. (A)shall appoint at least 1 individual who has been designated under paragraph (1) and who possesses expertise in privacy and civil liberties to serve as amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration of any application or motion for an order or review, unless the court issues a written finding that such application neither presents nor involves—(i)a novel or significant interpretation of the law;(ii)a significant concern related to constitutional rights;(iii)a sensitive investigative matter;(iv)a request for approval of a new program, a new technology, or a new use of existing technology;(v)a request for reauthorization of programmatic surveillance; or(vi)any other privacy or civil liberties issue for which an appointment of an amicus curiae to assist the court in the consideration of the application would be appropriate; and; (B)shall appoint at least 1 individual who has been designated under paragraph (1) and who possesses technical expertise to serve as amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration of any application for an order or review, unless the court issues a written finding that such application neither presents nor involves—(i)a request for approval of a new program, a new technology, or a new use of existing technology;(ii)a request for approval of a previously authorized program, technology, or use of existing technology for which no prior application for approval of such program, technology, or use was considered by the court with the assistance of an amicus curiae who possesses technical expertise; or(iii)a technical issue material to any legal determination for which an appointment of an amicus curiae who possesses technical expertise to assist the court in the consideration of the application would be appropriate;(C)shall randomly appoint at least 1 individual with legal expertise and at least 1 individual with technical expertise, from among individuals who have been designated under paragraph (1), to assist the court in the review of a certification under section 702(j); and. (12)Definition of sensitive investigative matterIn this subsection, the term sensitive investigative matter means—(A)an investigative matter involving the activities of—(i)a domestic public official or political candidate, or an individual serving on the staff of such an official or candidate;(ii)a domestic religious or political organization, or a known or suspected United States person prominent in such an organization; or(iii)the domestic news media; or(B)any other investigative matter involving a domestic entity or a known or suspected United States person that, in the judgment of the applicable court established under subsection (a) or (b), is as sensitive as an investigative matter described in subparagraph (A).. (7)NotificationA presiding judge of a court established under subsection (a) or (b) shall, not less frequently than quarterly, provide to the Attorney General and the appropriate committees of Congress—(A)a notification of each appointment of an individual to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (2); and(B)a copy of each written finding issued under paragraph (2).. the amicus curiae—(A)shall; ; and(B)may seek leave to raise any novel or significant privacy or civil liberties issue relevant to the application or motion or other issue directly affecting the legality of the proposed electronic surveillance with the court, regardless of whether the court has requested assistance on that issue.. (7)Authority to seek review of decisions(A)Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court decisions(i)PetitionFollowing issuance of an order under this Act by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to certify for review to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review a question of law pursuant to subsection (j).(ii)DenialsIf the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court denies a petition described in clause (i), the court shall provide for the record a written statement of the reasons for such denial.(iii)CertificationUpon certification of any question of law pursuant to this subparagraph, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review shall appoint the amicus curiae to assist the Court of Review in its consideration of the certified question, unless the Court of Review issues a finding that such appointment is not appropriate.(B)Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review decisionsAn amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review to certify for review to the Supreme Court of the United States any question of law pursuant to section 1254(2) of title 28, United States Code.(C)Declassification of referralsFor purposes of section 602, a petition filed under subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph and all of its content shall be considered a decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review described in paragraph (2) of section 602(a).. (i)shall have access to, to the extent such information is available to the Government—(I)the application, certification, petition, motion, and other information and supporting materials, including any information described in section 901, submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in connection with the matter in which the amicus curiae has been appointed, including access to any relevant legal precedent (including any such precedent that is cited by the Government, including in such an application);(II)any other information or materials that the court determines is relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae; and(III)an unredacted copy of each relevant decision made by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review in which the court decides a question of law, without regard to whether the decision is classified; and (ii)may make a submission to the court requesting access to any other particular materials or information (or category of materials or information) that the amicus curiae believes to be relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae.; (D)Supporting documentation regarding accuracyThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, upon the motion of an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) or upon its own motion, may require the Government to make available the supporting documentation described in section 902.. (C)Classified informationAn amicus curiae appointed by the court shall have access to, to the extent such information is available to the Government, unredacted copies of each opinion, order, transcript, pleading, or other document of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, including, if the individual is eligible for access to classified information, any classified documents, information, and other materials or proceedings.. (B)ConsultationIf the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review determines that it is relevant to the duties of an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2), the amicus curiae may consult with 1 or more of the other individuals designated to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1) regarding any of the information relevant to any assigned proceeding..
Section 23
208. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and opinions Section 602 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1872) is amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: Subject to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall— conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in section 601(e)) that is described in paragraph (2); consistent with that review, make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each such decision, order, or opinion; and complete the declassification review required by subparagraph (A) and public release of each such decision, order, or opinion pursuant to subparagraph (B) by not later than 180 days after the date on which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issues such decision, order, or opinion. A decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that is described in this paragraph is any such decision, order, or opinion issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act that— includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law, including any novel or significant construction or interpretation of any term; or has been nominated for a declassification review by an amicus curiae appointed by the court. (a)Declassification required(1)In generalSubject to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall—(A)conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in section 601(e)) that is described in paragraph (2);(B)consistent with that review, make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each such decision, order, or opinion; and(C)complete the declassification review required by subparagraph (A) and public release of each such decision, order, or opinion pursuant to subparagraph (B) by not later than 180 days after the date on which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issues such decision, order, or opinion. (2)Decision, order, or opinion describedA decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that is described in this paragraph is any such decision, order, or opinion issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act that—(A)includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law, including any novel or significant construction or interpretation of any term; or(B)has been nominated for a declassification review by an amicus curiae appointed by the court..
Section 24
209. Clarification of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court jurisdiction over records of the court and other ancillary matters Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803), as amended by sections 206 and 207, is further amended— by adding at the end the following: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall have jurisdiction to hear claims ancillary to any of its own proceedings, including jurisdiction to hear any claim for access to the court’s records, files, and proceedings under the Constitution of the United States, statute, common law, or any other authority. Upon deciding such a claim, such court shall provide immediately for the record a written statement of the reasons for such decision. A party may file a petition for review of such decision with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which shall have jurisdiction to consider such petition and, upon deciding such petition, shall provide for the record a written statement of the reasons for its decision. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review shall have jurisdiction to hear claims ancillary to any of its own proceedings, including jurisdiction to hear any claim for access to the court’s records, files, and proceedings under the Constitution of the United States, statute, common law, or any other authority. Upon deciding such a claim, such court shall provide immediately for the record a written statement of the reasons for such decision. A party may file a petition for a writ of certiorari for review of a decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review under paragraphs (1) or (2), and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review such decision. in subsection (a)(2)(A), in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting paragraph (1) of subsection (l) of this section or before paragraph (4) or (5) of section 702(i); and in subsection (k)(1), by striking section 1254(2) of title 28 and inserting section 1254 of title 28. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803), as amended by section (a), is further amended— in subsection (a)(2)(A), in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking section 501(f) or; and in subsection (e), by striking section 501(f)(1) or each place it appears. (m)Ancillary claims(1)Foreign Intelligence Surveillance CourtThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall have jurisdiction to hear claims ancillary to any of its own proceedings, including jurisdiction to hear any claim for access to the court’s records, files, and proceedings under the Constitution of the United States, statute, common law, or any other authority. Upon deciding such a claim, such court shall provide immediately for the record a written statement of the reasons for such decision. A party may file a petition for review of such decision with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which shall have jurisdiction to consider such petition and, upon deciding such petition, shall provide for the record a written statement of the reasons for its decision.(2)Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of ReviewThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review shall have jurisdiction to hear claims ancillary to any of its own proceedings, including jurisdiction to hear any claim for access to the court’s records, files, and proceedings under the Constitution of the United States, statute, common law, or any other authority. Upon deciding such a claim, such court shall provide immediately for the record a written statement of the reasons for such decision.(3)Supreme Court reviewA party may file a petition for a writ of certiorari for review of a decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review under paragraphs (1) or (2), and the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review such decision.;
Section 25
210. Grounds for determining injury in fact in civil actions relating to surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 or pursuant to executive authority The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), as amended by section 202, is further amended by adding at the end the following: In this section, the terms foreign intelligence information, person, United States, and United States person have the meaning given such terms in section 101. In any claim in a civil action brought in a court of the United States relating to the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information acquired under this Act or pursuant to any other authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government, by a United States person or person located inside the United States, the person asserting the claim has suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to that conduct if the person— regularly communicates foreign intelligence information with persons who are not United States persons and who are located outside the United States; and has taken or is taking objectively reasonable measures to avoid the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of the person’s information under this Act or pursuant to another authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government; or has a reasonable basis to believe that the person’s rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated by an individual acting under color of Federal law. For the purposes of this section, a reasonable basis exists when the person demonstrates a concrete injury arising from a good-faith belief that the person’s rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated through the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of the person’s information under this Act or pursuant to any other authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government. The state secrets privilege is abrogated, and the procedure set forth in section 106(f) shall apply, with respect to any claim where the plaintiff, who is a United States person or person located in the United States, plausibly alleges an injury-in-fact relating to the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information acquired under this Act or pursuant to another authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government and plausibly alleges that the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information violates the Constitution or laws of the United States. The table of contents of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by section 202, is further amended by adding at the end the following: XAdditional matters1001.Challenges to Government surveillance(a)DefinitionsIn this section, the terms foreign intelligence information, person, United States, and United States person have the meaning given such terms in section 101.(b)Injury in factIn any claim in a civil action brought in a court of the United States relating to the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information acquired under this Act or pursuant to any other authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government, by a United States person or person located inside the United States, the person asserting the claim has suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to that conduct if the person—(1)(A)regularly communicates foreign intelligence information with persons who are not United States persons and who are located outside the United States; and(B)has taken or is taking objectively reasonable measures to avoid the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of the person’s information under this Act or pursuant to another authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government; or(2)has a reasonable basis to believe that the person’s rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated by an individual acting under color of Federal law. (c)Reasonable basisFor the purposes of this section, a reasonable basis exists when the person demonstrates a concrete injury arising from a good-faith belief that the person’s rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated through the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of the person’s information under this Act or pursuant to any other authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government.(d)State secrets privilege abrogatedThe state secrets privilege is abrogated, and the procedure set forth in section 106(f) shall apply, with respect to any claim where the plaintiff, who is a United States person or person located in the United States, plausibly alleges an injury-in-fact relating to the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information acquired under this Act or pursuant to another authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government and plausibly alleges that the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information violates the Constitution or laws of the United States.. Title X—ADDITIONAL MATTERSSec. 1001. Challenges to Government surveillance..
Section 26
1001. Challenges to Government surveillance In this section, the terms foreign intelligence information, person, United States, and United States person have the meaning given such terms in section 101. In any claim in a civil action brought in a court of the United States relating to the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information acquired under this Act or pursuant to any other authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government, by a United States person or person located inside the United States, the person asserting the claim has suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to that conduct if the person— regularly communicates foreign intelligence information with persons who are not United States persons and who are located outside the United States; and has taken or is taking objectively reasonable measures to avoid the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of the person’s information under this Act or pursuant to another authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government; or has a reasonable basis to believe that the person’s rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated by an individual acting under color of Federal law. For the purposes of this section, a reasonable basis exists when the person demonstrates a concrete injury arising from a good-faith belief that the person’s rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated through the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of the person’s information under this Act or pursuant to any other authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government. The state secrets privilege is abrogated, and the procedure set forth in section 106(f) shall apply, with respect to any claim where the plaintiff, who is a United States person or person located in the United States, plausibly alleges an injury-in-fact relating to the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information acquired under this Act or pursuant to another authority of the executive branch of the Federal Government and plausibly alleges that the acquisition, copying, querying, retention, access, or use of information violates the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 27
211. Accountability procedures for violations by Federal employees Title X of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881 et seq.), as added by this title, is amended by adding at the end the following: In this section: The term appropriate committees of Congress has the meaning given such term in section 101. The term covered agency means the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Counterterrorism Center. The term covered violation means a violation of this Act or Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, by an employee of a covered agency that results in the inappropriate collection, use, querying, or dissemination of any communication, record, or information of a United States person or a person inside the United States. The terms person, United States, and United States person have the meanings given such terms in section 101. The head of each covered agency shall— establish procedures to hold employees of the covered agency accountable for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations; and designate an entity within the agency to investigate possible willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations; and establish an internal process for the designated entity to determine culpability for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations. The procedures established under subsection (b)(1) shall include the following: Centralized tracking of individual employee performance incidents involving willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations, over time. Escalating consequences for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations, including— consequences for an initial reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum— suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 90 days; and documentation of the incident in the personnel file of each employee responsible for the violation; consequences for a second reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum— suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 180 days; and reassignment of each employee responsible for the violation; consequences for a third reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum— termination of security clearance; and reassignment or termination of each employee responsible for the violation; consequences for an initial willful or knowing covered violation, including, at a minimum— suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 180 days; and reassignment of each employee responsible for the violation; and consequences for a second willful or knowing covered violation, including, at a minimum— termination of security clearance; and reassignment or termination of each employee responsible for the violation. For purposes of subparagraphs (C)(ii) and (E)(ii) of subsection (c)(2), there shall be a presumption in favor of termination of an employee. If the head of a covered agency determines not to terminate an employee for a third reckless or negligent violation under subparagraph (C)(ii) of subsection (c)(2) or a second willful or knowing violation under subparagraph (E)(ii) of that subsection, the agency head shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written justification for the determination. If a covered agency determines, through an investigation, that an employee committed a willful, knowing, reckless, or negligent covered violation, the agency head shall determine what consequences to impose on the employee under subsection (c)(2) not later than 60 days after the conclusion of the investigation. The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1001, as added by this title, the following: Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each covered agency, as defined in section 710 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by subsection (a)), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing— the procedures established under section 710 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by subsection (a); and a description of any actions taken pursuant to such procedures. The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex to the extent necessary to protect sources and methods. 1002.Accountability procedures for violations by Federal employees(a)DefinitionsIn this section:(1)Appropriate committees of CongressThe term appropriate committees of Congress has the meaning given such term in section 101.(2)Covered agencyThe term covered agency means the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Counterterrorism Center.(3)Covered violationThe term covered violation means a violation of this Act or Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, by an employee of a covered agency that results in the inappropriate collection, use, querying, or dissemination of any communication, record, or information of a United States person or a person inside the United States.(4)Person, United States, and United States personThe terms person, United States, and United States person have the meanings given such terms in section 101.(b)Accountability procedures; designated investigative entityThe head of each covered agency shall—(1)establish procedures to hold employees of the covered agency accountable for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations; and(2)(A)designate an entity within the agency to investigate possible willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations; and(B)establish an internal process for the designated entity to determine culpability for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations.(c)ElementsThe procedures established under subsection (b)(1) shall include the following:(1)Centralized tracking of individual employee performance incidents involving willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations, over time.(2)Escalating consequences for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations, including—(A)consequences for an initial reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum—(i)suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 90 days; and(ii)documentation of the incident in the personnel file of each employee responsible for the violation; (B)consequences for a second reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum—(i)suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 180 days; and(ii)reassignment of each employee responsible for the violation;(C)consequences for a third reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum—(i)termination of security clearance; and(ii)reassignment or termination of each employee responsible for the violation;(D)consequences for an initial willful or knowing covered violation, including, at a minimum—(i)suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 180 days; and(ii)reassignment of each employee responsible for the violation; and(E)consequences for a second willful or knowing covered violation, including, at a minimum—(i)termination of security clearance; and(ii)reassignment or termination of each employee responsible for the violation.(d)Presumption of termination(1)In generalFor purposes of subparagraphs (C)(ii) and (E)(ii) of subsection (c)(2), there shall be a presumption in favor of termination of an employee.(2)JustificationIf the head of a covered agency determines not to terminate an employee for a third reckless or negligent violation under subparagraph (C)(ii) of subsection (c)(2) or a second willful or knowing violation under subparagraph (E)(ii) of that subsection, the agency head shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written justification for the determination.(e)TimingIf a covered agency determines, through an investigation, that an employee committed a willful, knowing, reckless, or negligent covered violation, the agency head shall determine what consequences to impose on the employee under subsection (c)(2) not later than 60 days after the conclusion of the investigation.. Sec. 1002. Accountability procedures for violations by Federal employees..
Section 28
1002. Accountability procedures for violations by Federal employees In this section: The term appropriate committees of Congress has the meaning given such term in section 101. The term covered agency means the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Counterterrorism Center. The term covered violation means a violation of this Act or Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, by an employee of a covered agency that results in the inappropriate collection, use, querying, or dissemination of any communication, record, or information of a United States person or a person inside the United States. The terms person, United States, and United States person have the meanings given such terms in section 101. The head of each covered agency shall— establish procedures to hold employees of the covered agency accountable for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations; and designate an entity within the agency to investigate possible willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations; and establish an internal process for the designated entity to determine culpability for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations. The procedures established under subsection (b)(1) shall include the following: Centralized tracking of individual employee performance incidents involving willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations, over time. Escalating consequences for willful, knowing, reckless, and negligent covered violations, including— consequences for an initial reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum— suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 90 days; and documentation of the incident in the personnel file of each employee responsible for the violation; consequences for a second reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum— suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 180 days; and reassignment of each employee responsible for the violation; consequences for a third reckless or negligent covered violation, including, at a minimum— termination of security clearance; and reassignment or termination of each employee responsible for the violation; consequences for an initial willful or knowing covered violation, including, at a minimum— suspension of access to information acquired under this Act or to the dataset that gave rise to the violation for not less than 180 days; and reassignment of each employee responsible for the violation; and consequences for a second willful or knowing covered violation, including, at a minimum— termination of security clearance; and reassignment or termination of each employee responsible for the violation. For purposes of subparagraphs (C)(ii) and (E)(ii) of subsection (c)(2), there shall be a presumption in favor of termination of an employee. If the head of a covered agency determines not to terminate an employee for a third reckless or negligent violation under subparagraph (C)(ii) of subsection (c)(2) or a second willful or knowing violation under subparagraph (E)(ii) of that subsection, the agency head shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written justification for the determination. If a covered agency determines, through an investigation, that an employee committed a willful, knowing, reckless, or negligent covered violation, the agency head shall determine what consequences to impose on the employee under subsection (c)(2) not later than 60 days after the conclusion of the investigation.
Section 29
301. Definitions In this title: The terms intelligence, intelligence community, and foreign intelligence have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). The terms electronic surveillance, person, State, United States, and United States person have the meanings given such terms in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
Section 30
302. Prohibition on warrantless queries for the communications of United States persons and persons located in the United States Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), no officer or employee of the Federal Government may conduct a query of information acquired pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, in an effort to find communications or information the compelled production of which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information. Subsection (a) shall not apply to a query relating to United States person or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information if— such persons or person are the subject of an order or emergency authorization authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search under section 105 or 304 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805, 1824 ), or a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the query; the officer or employee carrying out the query has a reasonable belief that— an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm; and in order to prevent or mitigate this threat, the query must be conducted before authorization pursuant to subparagraph (A) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and a description of the query is provided to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) in a timely manner; such persons or, if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of the person, has provided consent to the query on a case-by-case basis; or the query uses a known cybersecurity threat signature as a query term; the query is conducted, and the results of the query are used, for the sole purpose of identifying targeted recipients of malicious software and preventing or mitigating harm from such malicious software; no additional contents of communications retrieved as a result of the query are accessed or reviewed; and all such queries are reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. No information retrieved pursuant to a query authorized by paragraph (1)(B) or evidence derived from such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in a proceeding or investigation that arises from the threat that prompted the query. Not less frequently than annually, the Attorney General shall assess compliance with the requirements under subparagraphs (A). In the event that a query for communications or information the compelled production of which would require a probable cause warrant if sought for law enforcement purposes in the United States relating to 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of communication, or creation of the information is conducted pursuant to an emergency authorization described in subsection (b)(1)(A) and the application for such emergency authorization is denied, or in any other case in which the query has been conducted and no order is issued approving the query— no information obtained or evidence derived from such query may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and no information concerning any United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or the time of communication or creation of the information acquired from such query may subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner without the consent of such person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. Not less frequently than annually, the Attorney General shall assess compliance with the requirements under paragraph (1). This section shall not apply to queries of communications and information collected pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). Except as provided in subsection (b)(1), no officer or employee of the United States may conduct a query of information acquired pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, in an effort to find information of our about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of communication or creation of the information unless the query is reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information. No officer or employee of the Federal Government may conduct a query of information acquired pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, in an effort to find information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information unless first an electronic record is created, and a system, mechanism, or business practice is in place to maintain such record, that includes the following: Each term used for the conduct of the query. The date of the query. The identifier of the officer or employee. A statement of facts showing that the use of each query term included under paragraph (1) is reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information. If a query of information is conducted in an effort to find communications metadata of 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or communication and the query returns such information, the results of the query may not be used as a basis for reviewing communications or information a query for which is otherwise prohibited under this sections.
Section 31
303. Prohibition on reverse targeting of United States persons and persons located in the United States No officer or employee of the United States may intentionally target, pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, any person if a significant purpose of the acquisition is to target 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication, or the creation of the information as prohibited by Section 703 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 201 of this Act, unless— there is a reasonable belief that an emergency exists involving a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm to such United States person or person reasonably believed to be in the United States at the time of the query or the time of acquisition or communication; the information is sought for the purpose of assisting that person; and a description of the targeting is provided to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) in a timely manner; or the United States person or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication or creation of the information has provided consent to the targeting, or if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of such person has provided consent. No information acquired pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) or evidence derived from such targeting may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in proceedings or investigations that arise from the threat that prompted the targeting. This section shall not apply to— an acquisition carried out pursuant to both section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as amended by section 103 of this Act, and section 703(b)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 201 of this Act; an acquisition authorized under section 105 or 304 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805 and 1824); or an acquisition pursuant to a warrant issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 32
304. Prohibition on intelligence acquisition of United States person data In this section: The term covered data means data, derived data, or any unique identifier that— is linked to or is reasonably linkable to a covered person; and does not include data that— is lawfully available to the public through Federal, State, or local government records or through widely distributed media; is reasonably believed to have been voluntarily made available to the general public by the covered person; or is a specific communication or transaction with a targeted individual who is not a covered person. The term covered person means an individual who— is reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the creation or the time of acquisition of the covered data; or is a United States person. Subject to paragraphs (2) through (7), an element of the intelligence community may not acquire a dataset that includes covered data. An element of the intelligence community may acquire covered data if the data has been authorized for collection pursuant to an order or emergency authorization pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court of competent jurisdiction covering the period of the acquisition, subject to the use, dissemination, querying, retention, and other minimization limitations required by such authorization. An element of the intelligence community may acquire covered data about an employee of, or applicant for employment by, an element of the intelligence community for employment-related purposes, provided that— access to and use of the covered data is limited to such purposes; and the covered data is destroyed at such time as it is no longer necessary for such purposes. An element of the intelligence community may acquire covered data for the purpose of supporting compliance with collection limitations and minimization requirements imposed by statute, guidelines, procedures, or the United States Constitution, provided that— access to and use of the covered data is limited to such purpose; and the covered data is destroyed at such time as it is no longer necessary for such purpose. An element of the intelligence community may acquire covered data if— there is a reasonable belief that— an emergency exists involving an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm; and in order to prevent or mitigate this threat, the acquisition must be conducted before authorization pursuant to paragraph (2) can, with due diligence, be obtained; access to and use of the covered data is limited to addressing the threat; the covered data is destroyed at such time as it is no longer necessary for such purpose; and a description of the acquisition is provided to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) in a timely manner. An element of the intelligence community may acquire covered data if— each covered person linked or reasonably linked to the covered data, or, if such person is incapable of providing consent, a third party legally authorized to consent on behalf of the person, has provided consent to the acquisition and use of the data on a case-by-case basis; access to and use of the covered data is limited to the purposes for which the consent was provided; and the covered data is destroyed at such time as it is no longer necessary for such purposes. An element of the intelligence community may acquire a dataset that includes covered data if the covered data is not reasonably segregable prior to acquisition, provided that the element of the intelligence community complies with the minimization procedures in subsection (c). The Attorney General shall adopt specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention of covered data that is not subject to 1 or more of the exceptions set forth in subsection (b). The procedures adopted under paragraph (1) shall require elements of the intelligence community to exhaust all reasonable means— to exclude covered data not subject to 1 or more exceptions set forth in subsection (b) from datasets prior to acquisition; and to remove and delete covered data not subject to 1 or more exceptions set forth in subsection (b) prior to the operational use of the acquired dataset or the inclusion of the dataset in a database intended for operational use. The procedures adopted under paragraph (1) shall require that if an element of the intelligence community identifies covered data acquired in violation of subsection (b), such covered data shall be promptly destroyed. Covered data acquired by an element of the intelligence community in violation of subsection (b), and any evidence derived therefrom, may not be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board a report on the acquisition of datasets that the Director anticipates will contain information of covered persons that is significant in volume, proportion, or sensitivity. The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following: A description of the covered person information in each dataset. An estimate of the amount of covered person information in each dataset. After submitting the report required by paragraph (1), the Director shall, in coordination with the Under Secretary, notify the appropriate committees of Congress of any changes to the information contained in such report. The Director shall make available to the public on the website of the Director— the unclassified portion of the report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1); and any notifications submitted pursuant to paragraph (3). Nothing in this section shall authorize an acquisition otherwise prohibited by this title, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), or title 18, United States Code.
Section 33
305. Prohibition on the warrantless acquisition of domestic communications No officer or employee of the United States may intentionally acquire pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition or the time of communication except— as authorized under section 105 or 304 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805 and 1824); or if— there is a reasonable belief that— an emergency exists involving the imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm; and in order to prevent or mitigate this threat, the acquisition must be conducted before an authorization pursuant to the provisions of law cited in paragraph (1) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and a description of the acquisition is provided to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) in a timely manner. No information acquired pursuant to an emergency described in subsection (a)(2) or information derived from such acquisition may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, except in a proceeding or investigation that arises from the threat that prompted the acquisition.
Section 34
306. Data retention limits Each head of an element of the Intelligence Community shall develop and implement procedures governing the retention of information collected pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order. In this subsection, the term covered information includes— any information, including an encrypted communication, to, from, or pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication, or creation of the information that has been evaluated and is not specifically known to contain foreign intelligence information; and any unevaluated information, unless it can reasonably be determined that the unevaluated information does not contain communications to or from, or information pertaining to a United States person or person reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of acquisition, communication, or creation of the information. The procedures developed and implemented pursuant to subsection (a) shall ensure, with respect to information described in such subsection, that covered information shall be destroyed within 5 years of collection unless the Attorney General determines in writing that— the information is the subject of a preservation obligation in pending administrative, civil, or criminal litigation, in which case the covered information shall be segregated, retained, and used solely for that purpose and shall be destroyed as soon as it is no longer required to be preserved for such litigation; or the information is being used in a proceeding or investigation in which the information is directly related to and necessary to address a specific threat identified in section 706(a)(2)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881e(a)(2)(B)), as amended by section 102.
Section 35
307. Reports on violations of law or Executive order Section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3110) is amended by adding at the end the following: The Director of National Intelligence shall make each report submitted under subsection (a) publicly available on an internet website, with such redactions as may be necessary to protect sources and methods. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a version of the report described in subsection (a) that only addresses violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.). (c)Public availabilityThe Director of National Intelligence shall make each report submitted under subsection (a) publicly available on an internet website, with such redactions as may be necessary to protect sources and methods.(d)Department of Justice reportThe Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a version of the report described in subsection (a) that only addresses violations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.)..
Section 36
401. Inspector General oversight of orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice and the Inspector General of each element of the intelligence community shall each initiate an audit of the applications for court orders made under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) and directives issued under section 702(i) of such Act by the Department or the element, respectively. In conducting an audit under subsection (a)— an Inspector General shall— review such sample of applications and directives described in such subsection as the Inspector General determines appropriate in order to carry out the objectives of this section; assess whether— adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the assertions made in applications are scrupulously accurate; adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that each application includes all material information, including any information that suggests that the court should deny the application or that the court should include one or more conditions in an order, as required under section 901 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as added by section 202(a); and in the determination of the Inspector General, there are any other areas of potential risk or violation; and make recommendations to address any deficiencies identified by the Inspector General; and the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall assess the information provided by the Department of Justice under section 903 and include a determination on the accuracy and completeness of the information provided under that section. For each audit conducted by an Inspector General under subsection (a), such Inspector General shall submit to the persons specified in paragraph (2) a report of the audit, including findings and recommendations of the Inspector General and any remediations taken by the Department or element, respectively. The persons specified in this paragraph are the following: The Attorney General. The Director of National Intelligence. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The appropriate committees of Congress. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (as defined in section 601(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1871(e))). Any amicus curiae appointed under section 103(i)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(2)). The Attorney General and head of each element of the intelligence community shall ensure full and complete cooperation with the respective Inspector General conducting an audit under subsection (a), including by providing access to all evidence and information relevant to the assessments required under subsection (b)(2), subject to such procedures as are necessary to protect the national security of the United States. The Inspector General of each element of the intelligence community shall each make publicly available on a website of the relevant element an unclassified version of any report submitted under subsection (c) by the respective Inspector General.
Section 37
402. Department of Justice inspector general review of high intensity drug trafficking area surveillance programs In this section: The term covered HIDTA surveillance program means a HIDTA surveillance program in which a non-Federal Government entity provides to law enforcement agencies access to a database maintained by that entity containing information on more than 1,000,000 United States persons or persons in the United States. The term HIDTA surveillance program means a program that— enables law enforcement agencies to share, query, receive, or process information on United States persons; is operated by, or receives funding from 1 or more high intensity drug trafficking areas; and is supported financially, in whole or in part, with Federal funds. The term United States person has the meaning given the term in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall— in the case of a HIDTA surveillance program established before the date of the enactment of this Act, conduct a review of such HIDTA surveillance program— not later than 180 days after the earlier of— the date of the enactment of this Act; or the date such HIDTA surveillance program becomes a covered HIDTA surveillance program; and not less frequently than once every 5 years for as long as such HIDTA surveillance program is a covered HIDTA surveillance program; and in the case of a HIDTA surveillance program established after the date of the enactment of this Act, conduct a review of such HIDTA surveillance program— not later than 180 days after the HIDTA surveillance program becomes a covered HIDTA surveillance program; and not less frequently than once every 5 years for as long as such HIDTA surveillance program is a covered HIDTA surveillance program.
Section 38
403. Intelligence community parity and communications with Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended— in subsection (b)(1), in the matter before subparagraph (A), by inserting the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, after Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,; and in subsection (c)(1)(A), in the matter before clause (i), by inserting the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, after Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,. Section 1061(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(j)(1)) is amended by striking except that and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the highest amount paid by any element of the intelligence community for a comparable position, based on salary information provided to the chairman of the Board by the Director of National Intelligence..
Section 39
404. Congressional oversight of grants of immunity by the Attorney General for warrantless surveillance assistance Section 2511(2)(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: Not later than 30 days after providing a certification described in clause (B) of the first sentence of subparagraph (ii) to a provider of wire or electronic communication service, an officer, employee, or agent thereof, a landlord, a custodian, or another person, the person providing the certification shall submit the certification to the appropriate committees of Congress, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). In this subsection— the term appropriate committees of Congress has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801), as amended by section 2 of this Act; the terms electronic communication, electronic communication service, and wire communication have the meanings given such terms in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code; and the term ongoing certification means a certification described in clause (B) of the first sentence of section 2511(2)(a)(ii) of title 18, United States Code, pursuant to which a provider of wire or electronic communication service, an officer, employee, or agent thereof, a landlord, a custodian, or another person is providing information, facilities, or technical assistance on the date of enactment of this Act. Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the person that provided an ongoing certification to a provider of wire or electronic communication service, an officer, employee, or agent thereof, a landlord, a custodian, or another person shall submit the ongoing certification to the appropriate committees of Congress. (iv)Not later than 30 days after providing a certification described in clause (B) of the first sentence of subparagraph (ii) to a provider of wire or electronic communication service, an officer, employee, or agent thereof, a landlord, a custodian, or another person, the person providing the certification shall submit the certification to the appropriate committees of Congress, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)..
Section 40
501. Warrant protections for location information, web browsing records, and search query records Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in subsection (a)— in the subsection heading, by striking Contents of wire or electronic communications and inserting Location information, web browsing records, search query records, or contents of wire or electronic communications; and in the first sentence, by inserting location information, a web browsing record, a search query record, or before the contents of a wire; and in subsection (c)(1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting location information, a web browsing record, a search query record, or before the contents. Section 2711 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting (a) In general.— before As used; in subsection (a), as so designated— in paragraph (3)(C), by striking and at the end; in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and by adding at the end the following: the term location information means information derived or otherwise calculated from the transmission or reception of a radio signal that reveals the approximate or actual geographic location of a customer, subscriber, user, or device; the term web browsing record— means a record that reveals, in part or in whole, the identity of a service provided by an online service provider, or the identity of a customer, subscriber, user, or device, for any attempted or successful communication or transmission between an online service provider and such a customer, subscriber, user, or device; includes a record that reveals, in part or in whole— the domain name, uniform resource locator, internet protocol address, or other identifier for a service provided by an online service provider with which a customer, subscriber, user, or device has exchanged or attempted to exchange a communication or transmission; or the network traffic generated by an attempted or successful communication or transmission between a service provided by an online service provider and a customer, subscriber, user, or device; and does not include a record that reveals information about an attempted or successful communication or transmission between a known service and a particular, known customer, subscriber, user, or device, if the record is maintained by the known service and is limited to revealing additional identifying information about the particular, known customer, subscriber, user, or device; the term search query record— means a record that reveals a query term or instruction submitted, in written, verbal, or other format, by a customer, subscriber, user, or device to any service provided by an online service provider, including a search engine, voice assistant, chat bot, or navigation service; and includes a record that reveals the response provided by any service provided by an online service provider to a query term or instruction by a customer, subscriber, user, or device; by adding at the end the following: Nothing in this section or section 2510 shall be construed to mean that a record may not be more than 1 of the following types of record: The contents of a communication. Location information. A web browsing record. A search query record. Section 3117 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in the section heading, by striking Mobile tracking devices and inserting Tracking orders; by striking subsection (b); by redesignating subsection (a) as subsection (c); by inserting before subsection (c), as so redesignated, the following: No officer or employee of a governmental entity may install or direct the installation of a tracking device, except pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures and, in the case of a court-martial or other proceeding under chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), issued under section 846 of that title, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President) by a court of competent jurisdiction. Subject to paragraph (2), the prohibition under subsection (a) does not apply in a instance in which an investigative or law enforcement officer reasonably determines that— a circumstance described in subparagraph (i), (ii), or (iii) of section 2518(7)(a) exists; and there are grounds upon which a warrant could be issued to authorize the installation of the tracking device. If a tracking device is installed under the authority under paragraph (1), an application for a warrant shall be made within 48 hours after the installation. In the absence of a warrant, use of a tracking device under the authority under paragraph (1) shall immediately terminate when the investigative information sought is obtained or when the application for the warrant is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event an application for a warrant described in paragraph (2) is denied, or in any other case where the use of a tracking device under the authority under paragraph (1) is terminated without a warrant having been issued, the information obtained shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this section, and an inventory describing the installation and use of the tracking device shall be served on the person named in the warrant application. in subsection (c), as so redesignated— in the subsection heading, by striking In general and inserting Jurisdiction; by striking or other order; by striking mobile; by striking such order and inserting such warrant; and by adding at the end the following: For purposes of this subsection, the installation of a tracking device occurs within the jurisdiction in which the device is physically located when the installation is complete.; and by adding at the end the following: As used in this section— the term computer has the meaning given that term in section 1030(e); the terms court of competent jurisdiction and governmental entity have the meanings given such terms in section 2711; the term installation of a tracking device means, whether performed by an officer or employee of a governmental entity or by a provider at the direction of a governmental entity— the physical placement of a tracking device; the remote activation of the tracking software or functionality of a tracking device; or the acquisition of a radio signal transmitted by a tracking device; and the term tracking device means an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object, including a phone, wearable device, connected vehicle, or other computer owned, used, or possessed by the target of surveillance. The table of sections for chapter 205 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 3117 and inserting the following: Section 2510(12)(C) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: a communication from a lawfully installed tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title), if— the tracking device is physically placed; or the tracking software or functionality of the tracking device is remotely activated and the communication is transmitted by the tracking software or functionality as a result of the remote activation; or Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: A governmental entity may require the prospective disclosure by an online service provider of a web browsing record only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in subsection (a). A warrant requiring the prospective disclosure by an online service provider of web browsing records may require disclosure of web browsing records for only a period as is necessary to achieve the objective of the disclosure, not to exceed 30 days from issuance of the warrant. Extensions of such a warrant may be granted, but only upon satisfaction of the showings necessary for issuance of the warrant in the first instance. A governmental entity may require the prospective disclosure by an online service provider of location information only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in subsection (a), that satisfies the restrictions imposed on warrants for tracking devices imposed by section 3117 of this title and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (5)the term location information means information derived or otherwise calculated from the transmission or reception of a radio signal that reveals the approximate or actual geographic location of a customer, subscriber, user, or device;(6)the term web browsing record—(A)means a record that reveals, in part or in whole, the identity of a service provided by an online service provider, or the identity of a customer, subscriber, user, or device, for any attempted or successful communication or transmission between an online service provider and such a customer, subscriber, user, or device; (B)includes a record that reveals, in part or in whole— (i)the domain name, uniform resource locator, internet protocol address, or other identifier for a service provided by an online service provider with which a customer, subscriber, user, or device has exchanged or attempted to exchange a communication or transmission; or(ii)the network traffic generated by an attempted or successful communication or transmission between a service provided by an online service provider and a customer, subscriber, user, or device; and(C)does not include a record that reveals information about an attempted or successful communication or transmission between a known service and a particular, known customer, subscriber, user, or device, if the record is maintained by the known service and is limited to revealing additional identifying information about the particular, known customer, subscriber, user, or device; (7)the term search query record—(A)means a record that reveals a query term or instruction submitted, in written, verbal, or other format, by a customer, subscriber, user, or device to any service provided by an online service provider, including a search engine, voice assistant, chat bot, or navigation service; and(B)includes a record that reveals the response provided by any service provided by an online service provider to a query term or instruction by a customer, subscriber, user, or device;; and (b)Rule of constructionNothing in this section or section 2510 shall be construed to mean that a record may not be more than 1 of the following types of record:(1)The contents of a communication.(2)Location information.(3)A web browsing record.(4)A search query record.. (a)In generalNo officer or employee of a governmental entity may install or direct the installation of a tracking device, except pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures and, in the case of a court-martial or other proceeding under chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), issued under section 846 of that title, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President) by a court of competent jurisdiction.(b)Emergencies(1)In generalSubject to paragraph (2), the prohibition under subsection (a) does not apply in a instance in which an investigative or law enforcement officer reasonably determines that— (A)a circumstance described in subparagraph (i), (ii), or (iii) of section 2518(7)(a) exists; and (B)there are grounds upon which a warrant could be issued to authorize the installation of the tracking device.(2)Application deadlineIf a tracking device is installed under the authority under paragraph (1), an application for a warrant shall be made within 48 hours after the installation.(3)Termination absent warrantIn the absence of a warrant, use of a tracking device under the authority under paragraph (1) shall immediately terminate when the investigative information sought is obtained or when the application for the warrant is denied, whichever is earlier.(4)LimitationIn the event an application for a warrant described in paragraph (2) is denied, or in any other case where the use of a tracking device under the authority under paragraph (1) is terminated without a warrant having been issued, the information obtained shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this section, and an inventory describing the installation and use of the tracking device shall be served on the person named in the warrant application.; (d)DefinitionsAs used in this section—(1)the term computer has the meaning given that term in section 1030(e);(2)the terms court of competent jurisdiction and governmental entity have the meanings given such terms in section 2711;(3)the term installation of a tracking device means, whether performed by an officer or employee of a governmental entity or by a provider at the direction of a governmental entity— (A)the physical placement of a tracking device; (B)the remote activation of the tracking software or functionality of a tracking device; or(C)the acquisition of a radio signal transmitted by a tracking device; and(4)the term tracking device means an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object, including a phone, wearable device, connected vehicle, or other computer owned, used, or possessed by the target of surveillance.. 3117. Tracking orders.. (C)a communication from a lawfully installed tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title), if—(i)the tracking device is physically placed; or(ii)the tracking software or functionality of the tracking device is remotely activated and the communication is transmitted by the tracking software or functionality as a result of the remote activation; or. (i)Prospective disclosure of web browsing records(1)In generalA governmental entity may require the prospective disclosure by an online service provider of a web browsing record only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in subsection (a).(2)Time restrictionsA warrant requiring the prospective disclosure by an online service provider of web browsing records may require disclosure of web browsing records for only a period as is necessary to achieve the objective of the disclosure, not to exceed 30 days from issuance of the warrant. Extensions of such a warrant may be granted, but only upon satisfaction of the showings necessary for issuance of the warrant in the first instance.(j)Prospective disclosure of location recordsA governmental entity may require the prospective disclosure by an online service provider of location information only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in subsection (a), that satisfies the restrictions imposed on warrants for tracking devices imposed by section 3117 of this title and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure..
Section 41
502. Consistent protections for phone and app-based call and texting records Section 2703(c)(2)(C) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking local and long distance telephone connection records, or.
Section 42
503. Email Privacy Act This section may be cited as the Email Privacy Act. Section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in subsection (a)— in paragraph (1)— by striking divulge and inserting disclose; and by striking while in electronic storage by that service and inserting that is in electronic storage with or otherwise stored, held, or maintained by that service; in paragraph (2)— by striking to the public; by striking divulge and inserting disclose; and by striking which is carried or maintained on that service and inserting that is stored, held, or maintained by that service; and in paragraph (3)— by striking divulge and inserting disclose; and by striking a provider of and inserting a person or entity providing; in subsection (b)— in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting wire or electronic before communication; by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows: to an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of such communication, to the subscriber or customer on whose behalf the provider stores, holds, or maintains such communication, or to an agent of such addressee, intended recipient, subscriber, or customer; by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows: with the lawful consent of the originator, addressee, or intended recipient of such communication, or of the subscriber or customer on whose behalf the provider stores, holds, or maintains such communication; in subsection (c) by inserting wire or electronic before communications; in each of subsections (b) and (c), by striking divulge and inserting disclose; and in subsection (c), by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows: with the lawful consent of the subscriber or customer; Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by this Act, is amended— in subsection (a)— by striking A governmental entity and inserting Except as provided in subsections (l) and (m), a governmental entity; by striking pursuant to and inserting if the governmental entity obtains; and by striking by a court of competent jurisdiction. and inserting that is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and that may indicate the date by which the provider must make the disclosure to the governmental entity. In the absence of a date on the warrant indicating the date by which the provider must make disclosure to the governmental entity, the provider shall promptly respond to the warrant.; in subsection (c)— in paragraph (1)— in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)— by striking A governmental entity and inserting Except as provided in subsections (l) and (m), a governmental entity; and by striking only when the governmental entity— and inserting only— in subparagraph (A)— by striking obtains a warrant issued and inserting if the governmental entity obtains a warrant; by striking by the President) by a court and inserting the following: “by the President) that— is issued by a court by inserting and after jurisdiction;; and by adding at the end the following: may indicate the date by which the online service provider must make the disclosure to the governmental entity; in subparagraph (B), by inserting if the governmental entity before obtains; in subparagraph (C), by striking has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; and inserting with the lawful consent of the subscriber or customer; or; by striking subparagraph (D); by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D); in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking seeks information and inserting as otherwise authorized; and in paragraph (2)— in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting , in response to an administrative subpoena authorized by Federal or State statute, a grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena, or any means available under paragraph (1), after shall; and in the matter following subparagraph (F), by striking of a subscriber and all that follows and inserting of a subscriber or customer of such online service provider.; in subsection (d)— by striking the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or; by striking sought, and inserting sought; and by striking section and inserting subsection; and by adding after subsection (j), as added by section 501(c) of this Act, the following: Except as provided in section 2705, an online service provider may notify a subscriber or customer of a receipt of a warrant, court order, subpoena, or request under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of this section. Nothing in this section or in section 2702 shall limit the authority of a governmental entity to use an administrative subpoena authorized by Federal or State statute, a grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena, or a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction to— require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of a wire or electronic communication that is not acting as an online service provider with regard to that wire or electronic communication to disclose a wire or electronic communication (including the contents of that communication) to the governmental entity; require a person or entity that provides an electronic communication service to the officers, directors, employees, or agents of the person or entity (for the purpose of carrying out their duties) to disclose a wire or electronic communication (including location information, a web browsing record, a search query record, or the contents of that communication) to or from the person or entity itself or to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity to a governmental entity, if the wire or electronic communication is stored, held, or maintained on an electronic communications system owned, operated, or controlled by the person or entity; or require an online service provider to disclose a wire or electronic communication (including the contents of that communication) that advertises or promotes a product or service and that has been made readily accessible to the general public. Nothing in this section or in section 2702 shall limit the power of inquiry vested in the Congress by article I of the Constitution of the United States, including the authority to compel the production of a wire or electronic communication (including location information, a web browsing record, a search query record, or the contents of a wire or electronic communication) that is stored, held, or maintained by an online service provider. Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in subsection (a)— by striking , that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less,; and by striking the last sentence; by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following: [Repealed]. in subsection (d) by striking (b) or. Chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in the table of sections, by striking the item relating to section 2704; in section 2701(c)(3), by striking , 2704 ; by striking section 2704; and in section 2706(a), by striking , 2703, or 2704 and inserting or 2703. (1)to an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of such communication, to the subscriber or customer on whose behalf the provider stores, holds, or maintains such communication, or to an agent of such addressee, intended recipient, subscriber, or customer;; and (3)with the lawful consent of the originator, addressee, or intended recipient of such communication, or of the subscriber or customer on whose behalf the provider stores, holds, or maintains such communication;; (2)with the lawful consent of the subscriber or customer;. (i)is issued by a court; (ii)may indicate the date by which the online service provider must make the disclosure to the governmental entity;; (k)NoticeExcept as provided in section 2705, an online service provider may notify a subscriber or customer of a receipt of a warrant, court order, subpoena, or request under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of this section.(l)Rule of construction related to legal processNothing in this section or in section 2702 shall limit the authority of a governmental entity to use an administrative subpoena authorized by Federal or State statute, a grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena, or a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction to—(1)require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of a wire or electronic communication that is not acting as an online service provider with regard to that wire or electronic communication to disclose a wire or electronic communication (including the contents of that communication) to the governmental entity;(2)require a person or entity that provides an electronic communication service to the officers, directors, employees, or agents of the person or entity (for the purpose of carrying out their duties) to disclose a wire or electronic communication (including location information, a web browsing record, a search query record, or the contents of that communication) to or from the person or entity itself or to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity to a governmental entity, if the wire or electronic communication is stored, held, or maintained on an electronic communications system owned, operated, or controlled by the person or entity; or(3)require an online service provider to disclose a wire or electronic communication (including the contents of that communication) that advertises or promotes a product or service and that has been made readily accessible to the general public.(m)Rule of construction related to Congressional subpoenasNothing in this section or in section 2702 shall limit the power of inquiry vested in the Congress by article I of the Constitution of the United States, including the authority to compel the production of a wire or electronic communication (including location information, a web browsing record, a search query record, or the contents of a wire or electronic communication) that is stored, held, or maintained by an online service provider.. (b)[Repealed].; and
Section 43
504. Consistent protections for demands for data held by interactive computing services Subsection (a) of section 2711 of title 18, United States Code, as so designated and amended by section 501 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: the term online service provider means a provider of electronic communication service, a provider of remote computing service, or a provider of an interactive computer service (as defined in section 230(f) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f))); and Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in subsection (a), in the first sentence, by striking a provider of electronic communication service and inserting an online service provider; in subsection (c)— in paragraph (1), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service and inserting an online service provider; and in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service and inserting An online service provider; and in subsection (g), by striking a provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service and inserting an online service provider. (8)the term online service provider means a provider of electronic communication service, a provider of remote computing service, or a provider of an interactive computer service (as defined in section 230(f) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f))); and.
Section 44
505. Consistent protections for real-time and historical metadata Chapter 206 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in section 3122(b)(2), by striking that the information likely to be obtained is relevant and inserting providing specific and articulable facts showing there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information likely to be obtained is relevant and material; and in section 3123(a)— in paragraph (1), in the first sentence— by striking the court shall enter and inserting the court may enter; and by striking certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant and inserting submitted a certification providing specific and articulable facts showing there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant and material; and in paragraph (2)— by striking the court shall enter and inserting the court may enter; and by striking certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant and inserting submitted a certification providing specific and articulable facts showing there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant and material.
Section 45
506. Subpoenas for certain subscriber information Section 2703(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended, in the matter following subparagraph (F), as amended by section 503(c) of this Act, by inserting with respect to whom the governmental entity identifies the name, address, temporarily assigned network address, or account identifier (such as a user name) before the period at the end.
Section 46
507. Minimization standards for voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall issue and make publicly available minimization procedures applicable to disclosures to a Federal agency under paragraph (5) or (8) of subsection (b) or paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (c) of section 2702 of title 18, United States Code. The procedures issued under subsection (a) shall include provisions to— limit, to the greatest extent possible, the acquisition, use, and dissemination of the contents of communication and records and other information to that which is required for the specific purpose for which the disclosure was intended; to the greatest extent possible, remove personally identifiable information prior to acquisition; to the extent personally identifiable information cannot be removed prior to acquisition, mask such information prior to its use or dissemination, consistent with the purpose for which the disclosure was intended; and ensure that no contents of communications or records or other information are retained by the agency to which the disclosure was made, or any agency to which the contents of communications or records or other information were disclosed, after the completion of the investigation or action for which the disclosure was intended.
Section 47
508. Prohibition on law enforcement purchase of personal data from data brokers Section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: In this subsection and subsection (f)— the term covered governmental entity means a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity; the term covered organization means a person who— is not a governmental entity; and is not an individual; the term covered person means an individual who— is reasonably believed to be located inside the United States at the time of the creation of the covered personal data; or is a United States person, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801); the term covered personal data means personal data relating to a covered person; the term electronic device has the meaning given the term computer in section 1030(e); the term lawfully obtained public data means personal data obtained by a particular covered organization that the covered organization— reasonably understood to have been voluntarily made available to the general public by the covered person; and obtained in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, contracts, privacy policies, and terms of service; the term obtain in exchange for anything of value means to obtain by purchasing, to receive in connection with services being provided for monetary or nonmonetary consideration, or to otherwise obtain in exchange for consideration, including an access fee, service fee, maintenance fee, or licensing fee; and the term personal data— means data, derived data, or any unique identifier that is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an individual or to an electronic device that is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, 1 or more individuals in a household; includes anonymized data that, if combined with other data, can be linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an individual or to an electronic device that identifies, is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to 1 or more individuals in a household; and does not include data that is lawfully available through Federal, State, or local government records or through widely distributed media. Subject to clauses (ii) through (vii), a covered governmental entity may not obtain in exchange for anything of value covered personal data if— the covered personal data is directly or indirectly obtained from a covered organization; or the covered personal data is derived from covered personal data that was directly or indirectly obtained from a covered organization. A covered governmental entity may obtain in exchange for something of value covered personal data as part of a larger compilation of data which includes personal data about persons who are not covered persons, if— the covered governmental entity is unable through reasonable means to exclude covered personal data from the larger compilation obtained; and the covered governmental entity minimizes any covered personal data from the larger compilation, in accordance with subsection (f). Clause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data that is obtained by a covered governmental entity under a program established by an Act of Congress under which a portion of a penalty or a similar payment or bounty is paid to an individual who discloses information about an unlawful activity to the Government, such as the program authorized under section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to awards to whistleblowers in cases of underpayments or fraud). Clause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data that is obtained by a covered governmental entity from a covered organization in accordance with compulsory legal process that— is established by a Federal or State statute; and provides for the reimbursement of costs of the covered organization that are incurred in connection with providing the record or information to the covered governmental entity, such as the reimbursement of costs under section 2706. Clause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data about an employee of, or applicant for employment by, a covered governmental entity that is— obtained by the covered governmental entity for employment-related purposes; accessed and used by the covered governmental entity only for employment-related purposes; and destroyed at such time as the covered personal data is no longer needed for employment-related purposes. Clause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data about a covered person that is— obtained by a covered governmental entity for purposes of conducting a background check of the covered person with the written consent of the covered person; accessed and used by the covered governmental entity only for background check-related purposes; and destroyed at such time as the covered personal data is no longer needed for background check-related purposes. Clause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data that is obtained by a covered governmental entity if— the covered personal data is lawfully obtained public data; or the covered personal data is derived from covered personal data that solely consists of lawfully obtained public data. The limitation under subparagraph (A) shall apply without regard to whether the covered organization possessing the covered personal data is the covered organization that initially obtained or collected, or is the covered organization that initially received the disclosure of, the covered personal data. An agency of a governmental entity that is not a covered governmental entity may not provide to a covered governmental entity covered personal data that was obtained in a manner that would violate paragraph (2) if the agency of a governmental entity were a covered governmental entity. Covered personal data obtained by or provided to a covered governmental entity in violation of paragraph (2) or (3), and any evidence derived therefrom, may not be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated by, on behalf of, or upon a motion or other action by a covered governmental entity in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to limit the use of covered personal data by a covered person aggrieved of a violation of paragraph (2) or (3) in connection with any action relating to such a violation. The Attorney General shall adopt specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention, and to restrict the querying, of covered personal data, and prohibit the dissemination of information derived from covered personal data. The procedures adopted under paragraph (1) shall require covered governmental entities to exhaust all reasonable means— to exclude covered personal data that is not subject to 1 or more of the exceptions set forth in clauses (iii) through (vii) of subsection (e)(2)(A) from the data obtained; and to remove and delete covered personal data described in subparagraph (A) after a compilation is obtained and before operational use of the compilation or inclusion of the compilation in a dataset intended for operational use. The procedures adopted under paragraph (1) shall require that, if a covered governmental entity identifies covered personal data in a compilation described in paragraph (2)(B), the covered governmental entity shall promptly destroy the covered personal data and any dissemination of information derived from the covered personal data shall be prohibited. Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), no officer or employee of a covered governmental entity may conduct a query of personal data, including personal data already subjected to minimization, in an effort to find records of or about a particular covered person. Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a query related to a particular covered person if— such covered person is the subject of a court order issued under this title that would authorize the covered governmental entity to compel the production of the covered personal data, during the effective period of that order; the officer or employee of a covered governmental entity carrying out the query has a reasonable belief that the life or safety of such covered person is threatened and the information is sought for the purpose of assisting that person, in which case information resulting from the query may be accessed or used solely for that purpose and shall be destroyed at such time as it is no longer necessary for such purpose; or such covered person has consented to the query. For a query of a compilation of data obtained under subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii)— each query shall be reasonably designed to exclude personal data of covered persons; and any personal data of covered persons returned pursuant to a query shall not be reviewed and shall immediately be destroyed. (e)Prohibition on obtaining in exchange for anything of value personal data by law enforcement agencies(1)DefinitionsIn this subsection and subsection (f)—(A)the term covered governmental entity means a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity;(B)the term covered organization means a person who—(i)is not a governmental entity; and(ii)is not an individual; (C)the term covered person means an individual who—(i)is reasonably believed to be located inside the United States at the time of the creation of the covered personal data; or(ii)is a United States person, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801);(D)the term covered personal data means personal data relating to a covered person;(E)the term electronic device has the meaning given the term computer in section 1030(e); (F)the term lawfully obtained public data means personal data obtained by a particular covered organization that the covered organization—(i)reasonably understood to have been voluntarily made available to the general public by the covered person; and(ii)obtained in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, contracts, privacy policies, and terms of service; (G)the term obtain in exchange for anything of value means to obtain by purchasing, to receive in connection with services being provided for monetary or nonmonetary consideration, or to otherwise obtain in exchange for consideration, including an access fee, service fee, maintenance fee, or licensing fee; and(H)the term personal data—(i)means data, derived data, or any unique identifier that is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an individual or to an electronic device that is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, 1 or more individuals in a household; (ii)includes anonymized data that, if combined with other data, can be linked to, or is reasonably linkable to, an individual or to an electronic device that identifies, is linked to, or is reasonably linkable to 1 or more individuals in a household; and(iii)does not include data that is lawfully available through Federal, State, or local government records or through widely distributed media.(2)Limitation(A)In general(i)ProhibitionSubject to clauses (ii) through (vii), a covered governmental entity may not obtain in exchange for anything of value covered personal data if—(I)the covered personal data is directly or indirectly obtained from a covered organization; or(II)the covered personal data is derived from covered personal data that was directly or indirectly obtained from a covered organization. (ii)Exception for certain compilations of dataA covered governmental entity may obtain in exchange for something of value covered personal data as part of a larger compilation of data which includes personal data about persons who are not covered persons, if—(I)the covered governmental entity is unable through reasonable means to exclude covered personal data from the larger compilation obtained; and(II)the covered governmental entity minimizes any covered personal data from the larger compilation, in accordance with subsection (f).(iii)Exception for whistleblower disclosures to law enforcementClause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data that is obtained by a covered governmental entity under a program established by an Act of Congress under which a portion of a penalty or a similar payment or bounty is paid to an individual who discloses information about an unlawful activity to the Government, such as the program authorized under section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to awards to whistleblowers in cases of underpayments or fraud).(iv)Exception for cost reimbursement under compulsory legal processClause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data that is obtained by a covered governmental entity from a covered organization in accordance with compulsory legal process that—(I)is established by a Federal or State statute; and(II)provides for the reimbursement of costs of the covered organization that are incurred in connection with providing the record or information to the covered governmental entity, such as the reimbursement of costs under section 2706.(v)Exception for employment-related useClause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data about an employee of, or applicant for employment by, a covered governmental entity that is—(I)obtained by the covered governmental entity for employment-related purposes; (II)accessed and used by the covered governmental entity only for employment-related purposes; and(III)destroyed at such time as the covered personal data is no longer needed for employment-related purposes. (vi)Exception for use in background checksClause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data about a covered person that is— (I)obtained by a covered governmental entity for purposes of conducting a background check of the covered person with the written consent of the covered person; (II)accessed and used by the covered governmental entity only for background check-related purposes; and(III)destroyed at such time as the covered personal data is no longer needed for background check-related purposes. (vii)Exception for lawfully obtained public dataClause (i) shall not apply to covered personal data that is obtained by a covered governmental entity if—(I)the covered personal data is lawfully obtained public data; or(II)the covered personal data is derived from covered personal data that solely consists of lawfully obtained public data. (B)Indirectly acquired records and informationThe limitation under subparagraph (A) shall apply without regard to whether the covered organization possessing the covered personal data is the covered organization that initially obtained or collected, or is the covered organization that initially received the disclosure of, the covered personal data.(3)Limit on sharing between agenciesAn agency of a governmental entity that is not a covered governmental entity may not provide to a covered governmental entity covered personal data that was obtained in a manner that would violate paragraph (2) if the agency of a governmental entity were a covered governmental entity.(4)Prohibition on use as evidence by covered governmental entities(A)In generalCovered personal data obtained by or provided to a covered governmental entity in violation of paragraph (2) or (3), and any evidence derived therefrom, may not be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated by, on behalf of, or upon a motion or other action by a covered governmental entity in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.(B)Use by aggrieved partiesNothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to limit the use of covered personal data by a covered person aggrieved of a violation of paragraph (2) or (3) in connection with any action relating to such a violation. (f)Minimization procedures(1)In generalThe Attorney General shall adopt specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention, and to restrict the querying, of covered personal data, and prohibit the dissemination of information derived from covered personal data.(2)Acquisition and retentionThe procedures adopted under paragraph (1) shall require covered governmental entities to exhaust all reasonable means—(A)to exclude covered personal data that is not subject to 1 or more of the exceptions set forth in clauses (iii) through (vii) of subsection (e)(2)(A) from the data obtained; and(B)to remove and delete covered personal data described in subparagraph (A) after a compilation is obtained and before operational use of the compilation or inclusion of the compilation in a dataset intended for operational use.(3)DestructionThe procedures adopted under paragraph (1) shall require that, if a covered governmental entity identifies covered personal data in a compilation described in paragraph (2)(B), the covered governmental entity shall promptly destroy the covered personal data and any dissemination of information derived from the covered personal data shall be prohibited.(4)Querying(A)In generalExcept as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), no officer or employee of a covered governmental entity may conduct a query of personal data, including personal data already subjected to minimization, in an effort to find records of or about a particular covered person.(B)ExceptionsSubparagraph (A) shall not apply to a query related to a particular covered person if—(i)such covered person is the subject of a court order issued under this title that would authorize the covered governmental entity to compel the production of the covered personal data, during the effective period of that order;(ii)the officer or employee of a covered governmental entity carrying out the query has a reasonable belief that the life or safety of such covered person is threatened and the information is sought for the purpose of assisting that person, in which case information resulting from the query may be accessed or used solely for that purpose and shall be destroyed at such time as it is no longer necessary for such purpose; or(iii)such covered person has consented to the query.(C)Special rule for compilations of dataFor a query of a compilation of data obtained under subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii)—(i)each query shall be reasonably designed to exclude personal data of covered persons; and(ii)any personal data of covered persons returned pursuant to a query shall not be reviewed and shall immediately be destroyed..
Section 48
509. Consistent privacy protections for data held by data brokers Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by section 503 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: In this subsection, the terms covered personal data and covered organization have the meanings given such terms in section 2702(e). Unless a governmental entity obtains an order in accordance with paragraph (3), the governmental entity may not require a covered organization that is not an online service provider to disclose covered personal data if a court order would be required for the governmental entity to require an online service provider to disclose such covered personal data that is a record of a customer or subscriber of the online service provider. A court may only issue an order requiring a covered organization that is not an online service provider to disclose covered personal data on the same basis and subject to the same limitations as would apply to a court order to require disclosure by an online service provider. For purposes of subparagraph (A), a court shall apply the most stringent standard under Federal statute or the Constitution of the United States that would be applicable to a request for a court order to require a comparable disclosure by an online service provider of a customer or subscriber of the online service provider. (n)Covered personal data(1)DefinitionsIn this subsection, the terms covered personal data and covered organization have the meanings given such terms in section 2702(e).(2)LimitationUnless a governmental entity obtains an order in accordance with paragraph (3), the governmental entity may not require a covered organization that is not an online service provider to disclose covered personal data if a court order would be required for the governmental entity to require an online service provider to disclose such covered personal data that is a record of a customer or subscriber of the online service provider.(3)Orders(A)In generalA court may only issue an order requiring a covered organization that is not an online service provider to disclose covered personal data on the same basis and subject to the same limitations as would apply to a court order to require disclosure by an online service provider.(B)StandardFor purposes of subparagraph (A), a court shall apply the most stringent standard under Federal statute or the Constitution of the United States that would be applicable to a request for a court order to require a comparable disclosure by an online service provider of a customer or subscriber of the online service provider..
Section 49
510. Protection of data entrusted to intermediary or ancillary service providers Subsection (a) of section 2711 of title 18, United States Code, as so designated and amended by sections 501 and 504 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: the term intermediary or ancillary service provider means an entity or facilities owner or operator that directly or indirectly delivers, transmits, stores, or processes communications or any other covered personal data (as defined in section 2702(e) of this title) for, or on behalf of, an online service provider. Section 2702(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in paragraph (1), by striking and at the end; in paragraph (2)(B), by striking and at the end; in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting ; and; and by adding at the end the following: an intermediary or ancillary service provider may not knowingly disclose— to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that intermediary or ancillary service provider; or to any governmental entity a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of, a recipient of a communication from a subscriber to or customer of, or the sender of a communication to a subscriber to or customer of, the online service provider for, or on behalf of, which the intermediary or ancillary service provider directly or indirectly delivers, transmits, stores, or processes communications or any other covered personal data (as defined in subsection (e)). (9)the term intermediary or ancillary service provider means an entity or facilities owner or operator that directly or indirectly delivers, transmits, stores, or processes communications or any other covered personal data (as defined in section 2702(e) of this title) for, or on behalf of, an online service provider.. (4)an intermediary or ancillary service provider may not knowingly disclose—(A)to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that intermediary or ancillary service provider; or(B)to any governmental entity a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of, a recipient of a communication from a subscriber to or customer of, or the sender of a communication to a subscriber to or customer of, the online service provider for, or on behalf of, which the intermediary or ancillary service provider directly or indirectly delivers, transmits, stores, or processes communications or any other covered personal data (as defined in subsection (e))..
Section 50
511. Modernizing criminal surveillance reports Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by section 509 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following: In January of each year, any judge who has issued an order under this section or a warrant to obtain records described in this section, or who has denied approval of an application under this section during the preceding year, shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts— the fact that the order or warrant was applied for; the type of records sought in the order or warrant; whether the order or warrant was— granted as applied for; granted as modified; or denied; the subsection of this section under which the application for the order or warrant was filed; the nature of the offense or criminal investigation that was the basis for the application for the order or warrant; the name of each provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service served with the order or warrant, if so granted; and the investigative or law enforcement agency that submitted the application. In June of each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall publish on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and include in the report required under section 2519(3)— a full and complete report concerning the number of applications for orders or warrants requiring the disclosure of, during the preceding calendar year— the contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage under subsection (a); and records concerning electronic communication service or remote computer service under subsection (c); the number of orders and warrants granted or denied under this section during the preceding calendar year; and a detailed summary and analysis of each category of data required to be filed with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts under paragraph (1). Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Administrator of General Services, the Electronic Public Access Public User Group, private entities offering electronic case management software, the National Center for State Courts, and the National American Indian Court Judges Association, publish a machine readable form that shall be used for any report required under paragraph (1). The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may issue binding regulations with respect to the content and form of the reports required under paragraph (1). Section 2519(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended, in the first sentence, by inserting publish on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and before transmit. Section 3126 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: In January of each year, any judge who has issued an order (or an extension thereof) under section 3123 that expired during the preceding year, or who has denied approval of an installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device during that year, shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts— the fact that an order or extension was applied for; the kind of order or extension applied for; the fact that the order or extension was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied; the period of installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized by the order, and the number and duration of any extensions of the order; the offense specified in the order or application, or extension of an order; the precise nature of the facilities affected and the precise nature of the information sought; and the investigative or law enforcement agency that submitted the application. In June of each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall publish on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and include in the report required under section 2519(3)— a full and complete report concerning— the number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to this chapter; and the number of orders and extensions granted or denied pursuant to this chapter during the preceding calendar year; and a detailed summary and analysis of each category of data required to be reported under subsection (a). Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Administrator of General Services, private entities offering electronic case management software, the National Center for State Courts, and the National American Indian Court Judges Association, publish a machine readable form that shall be used for any report required under subsection (a). The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may issue binding regulations with respect to the content and form of the reports required under subsection (a). Section 2702(d) of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in the heading, by striking emergency and inserting voluntary; in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting and publish on the website of the Department of Justice after Senate; and in paragraph (1)— by striking the Department of Justice and inserting each Federal agency; and by striking subsection (b)(8) and inserting paragraph (5) or (8) of subsection (b) or paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (c), broken down by each such paragraph; in paragraph (2)(A)— by striking Department of Justice and inserting Federal agency; and by striking subsection (b)(8) and inserting paragraph (5) or (8) of subsection (b) or paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (c); and by striking paragraph (3). (o)Reports concerning access to customer communications or records(1)In generalIn January of each year, any judge who has issued an order under this section or a warrant to obtain records described in this section, or who has denied approval of an application under this section during the preceding year, shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts—(A)the fact that the order or warrant was applied for; (B)the type of records sought in the order or warrant;(C)whether the order or warrant was—(i)granted as applied for; (ii)granted as modified; or (iii)denied;(D)the subsection of this section under which the application for the order or warrant was filed;(E)the nature of the offense or criminal investigation that was the basis for the application for the order or warrant; (F)the name of each provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service served with the order or warrant, if so granted; and(G)the investigative or law enforcement agency that submitted the application.(2)Public reportIn June of each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall publish on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and include in the report required under section 2519(3)—(A) a full and complete report concerning the number of applications for orders or warrants requiring the disclosure of, during the preceding calendar year—(i)the contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage under subsection (a); and(ii)records concerning electronic communication service or remote computer service under subsection (c);(B) the number of orders and warrants granted or denied under this section during the preceding calendar year; and (C)a detailed summary and analysis of each category of data required to be filed with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts under paragraph (1).(3)FormatNot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Administrator of General Services, the Electronic Public Access Public User Group, private entities offering electronic case management software, the National Center for State Courts, and the National American Indian Court Judges Association, publish a machine readable form that shall be used for any report required under paragraph (1). (4)RegulationsThe Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may issue binding regulations with respect to the content and form of the reports required under paragraph (1).. 3126.Reports concerning pen registers and trap and trace devices(a)In generalIn January of each year, any judge who has issued an order (or an extension thereof) under section 3123 that expired during the preceding year, or who has denied approval of an installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device during that year, shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts—(1)the fact that an order or extension was applied for;(2)the kind of order or extension applied for;(3)the fact that the order or extension was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied;(4)the period of installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized by the order, and the number and duration of any extensions of the order;(5)the offense specified in the order or application, or extension of an order;(6)the precise nature of the facilities affected and the precise nature of the information sought; and(7)the investigative or law enforcement agency that submitted the application.(b)Public reportIn June of each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall publish on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and include in the report required under section 2519(3)—(1)a full and complete report concerning—(A)the number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to this chapter; and(B)the number of orders and extensions granted or denied pursuant to this chapter during the preceding calendar year; and(2) a detailed summary and analysis of each category of data required to be reported under subsection (a).(c)FormatNot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Administrator of General Services, private entities offering electronic case management software, the National Center for State Courts, and the National American Indian Court Judges Association, publish a machine readable form that shall be used for any report required under subsection (a). (d)RegulationsThe Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may issue binding regulations with respect to the content and form of the reports required under subsection (a)..
Section 51
3126. Reports concerning pen registers and trap and trace devices In January of each year, any judge who has issued an order (or an extension thereof) under section 3123 that expired during the preceding year, or who has denied approval of an installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device during that year, shall report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts— the fact that an order or extension was applied for; the kind of order or extension applied for; the fact that the order or extension was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied; the period of installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device authorized by the order, and the number and duration of any extensions of the order; the offense specified in the order or application, or extension of an order; the precise nature of the facilities affected and the precise nature of the information sought; and the investigative or law enforcement agency that submitted the application. In June of each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall publish on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and include in the report required under section 2519(3)— a full and complete report concerning— the number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device pursuant to this chapter; and the number of orders and extensions granted or denied pursuant to this chapter during the preceding calendar year; and a detailed summary and analysis of each category of data required to be reported under subsection (a). Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Administrator of General Services, private entities offering electronic case management software, the National Center for State Courts, and the National American Indian Court Judges Association, publish a machine readable form that shall be used for any report required under subsection (a). The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may issue binding regulations with respect to the content and form of the reports required under subsection (a).
Section 52
601. Cell site simulators Chapter 205 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: Except as provided in subsection (d), it shall be unlawful— for any individual or entity to knowingly use a cell-site simulator in the United States; or for an element of the intelligence community to use a cell-site simulator outside the United States if the subject of the surveillance is a United States person. Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity to use a cell-site simulator outside the United States. Any individual or entity that violates subsection (a)(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000. Except as provided in paragraph (2), no information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a)(1), and no evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. Information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a)(1) by a person, and evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation trial, hearing, or other proceeding described in paragraph (1) of this subsection relating to the alleged violation of subsection (a)(1) in connection with such use. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity under a warrant issued— in accordance with this subparagraph; and using the procedures described in, and in accordance with the requirements for executing and returning a warrant under, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant and execution and return procedures and, in the case of a court-martial or other proceeding under chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), issued under section 846 of that title and in accordance with the requirements for executing and returning such a warrant, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A court may issue a warrant described in clause (i) (except, with respect to a State court, to the extent use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity is prohibited by the law of the State) only if the law enforcement agency— demonstrates that other investigative procedures, including electronic location tracking methods that solely collect records of the investigative target— have been tried and have failed; or reasonably appear to be— unlikely to succeed if tried; or too dangerous; specifies the likely area of effect of the cell-site simulator to be used and the time that the cell-site simulator will be in operation; certifies that the requested area of effect and time of operation are the narrowest reasonably possible to obtain the necessary information; and demonstrates that the requested use of a cell-site simulator would be in compliance with applicable provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. In considering an application for a warrant described in clause (i), the court shall— consider— the number of individuals impacted; the nature of any communications to be obtained; and the type of activities in which users of an electronic device are engaged; direct the law enforcement agency of the governmental entity to take steps to ensure heightened protections for constitutionally protected activities and to minimize the collection of information relating to individuals who are not the subject of the warrant; weigh the need of the government to enforce the law and apprehend criminals against the likelihood and impact of any potential negative side effects, including those disclosed by the government under subparagraph (C); and not grant a request for a warrant that would put public safety at risk or unreasonably inconvenience the community. No warrant described in clause (i) may authorize the use of a cell site simulator for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event for longer than 30 days. A court may grant extensions of a warrant described in clause (i), but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with clause (i) and the court considering the factors described in clause (iii) and determining the requirements under clause (ii) are met. The period of an extension of a warrant shall be no longer than the authorizing judge determines necessary to achieve the purposes for which the extension was granted, nor in any event for longer than 30 days. Each warrant described in clause (i), and each extension thereof, shall contain a provision that the authorization to use the cell site simulator shall be executed as soon as practicable and shall terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in 30 days. The 30-day periods described in clauses (iv), (v)(II), and (vi) shall begin on the earlier of— the date on which a law enforcement agency first begins to use the cell site simulator as authorized by the warrant, or extension thereof; or the date that is 10 days after the warrant, or extension thereof, is issued. Subject to clause (ii), subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, or use of a cell-site simulator as part of assistance provided by a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force to such a law enforcement agency, if— the governmental entity reasonably determines an emergency exists that— involves— immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime; or an immediate threat to a national security interest; and requires use of a cell-site simulator before a warrant described in subparagraph (A) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and except in an instance in which the governmental entity is trying to locate a lost or missing person, locate someone believed to have been abducted or kidnaped, or find victims, dead or alive, in an area where a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other mass casualty event has taken place— there are grounds upon which a warrant described in subparagraph (A) could be entered to authorize such use; and the governmental entity applies for a warrant described in subparagraph (A) approving such use not later than 48 hours after such use begins, and takes such steps to expedite the consideration of such application as may be possible. A law enforcement agency of a governmental entity shall immediately terminate use of a cell-site simulator under clause (i) of this subparagraph at the earlier of the time the information sought is obtained or the time the application for a warrant described in subparagraph (A) is denied. If an application for a warrant described in clause (i)(II)(bb) is denied— any information or evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator shall be subject to subsection (c); the attorney for the governmental entity submitting the application shall— retain, until the date that is 1 year after the date of the denial, a single copy of any information or evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator for potential use by a person about whose electronic device the government obtained information with the cell site simulator, which may not be used for any other purpose; and promptly destroy any other copies of such information or evidence; and the applicable law enforcement agency shall serve notice in accordance with subparagraph (D). In any application for a warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator under subparagraph (A) or (B), the governmental entity shall include the following: A disclosure of any potential disruption of the ability of the subject of the surveillance or bystanders to use commercial mobile radio services or private mobile services, including using advanced communications services, to make or receive, as applicable— emergency calls (including 9–1–1 calls); calls to the universal telephone number within the United States for the purpose of the national suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline system under designated under paragraph (4) of section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 251(e)); calls to the nationwide toll-free number for the poison control centers established under section 1271 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300d–71); calls using telecommunications relay services; or any other communications or transmissions. A certification that the specific model of the cell-site simulator to be used has been inspected by a third party that is an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission to verify the accuracy of the disclosure under clause (i). A disclosure of the methods and precautions that will be used to minimize disruption, including— any limit on the length of time the cell-site simulator can be in continuous operation; and any user-defined limit on the transmission range of the cell-site simulator. A disclosure as to whether the cell-site simulator will be used in an area or at a gathering where constitutionally protected activity, including speech or religious observance, will occur. A disclosure as to whether sensitive matters, such as attorney-client communications, political campaign or political party deliberations, medical information, or communications among elected political representatives of a State or the Federal Government, will be implicated. A disclosure as to the estimated number of individuals whose communications, electronic device, or location information will be implicated. Notice regarding the use of a cell-site simulator shall include an inventory, containing— the fact of the entry of the warrant or the application; the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or disapproved use of a cell-site simulator, or the denial of the application; whether, during the period— information about their electronic device was, or was not, obtained by the government; their location was, or was not, tracked; and their communications were, or were not, intercepted; and confirmation that all information unrelated to the individual towards whom the warrant was directed has been destroyed. The court issuing a warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator may also require that notice be provided to other persons not named in the application, whose electronic devices the governmental entity obtained information with the cell site simulator. Use of a cell-site simulator by an element of the intelligence community shall not be subject to subsection (a)(1) if it is conducted in a manner that is in accordance with title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) (including testing or training authorized under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 105(g) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(g)) (including such testing or training conducted in conjunction with a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force), if any information obtained during such testing or training (including metadata) is destroyed after its use for such testing or training). Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator in order to engage, in good-faith, in research or teaching by a person that is not— a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity; an element of the intelligence community; or acting as an agent thereof. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator in the performance of protective duties pursuant to section 3056 of this title or as otherwise authorized by law. No information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator under the authority under subparagraph (A), and no evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. Nothing in subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be construed to prohibit the United States Secret Service from using a cell-site simulator in accordance with a provision of this section other than subparagraph (A). Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a contraband interdiction system if the correctional facility or the entity operating the contraband interdiction system for the benefit of the correctional facility— has— taken reasonable steps to restrict transmissions by the contraband interdiction system to cellular devices physically located within the property of the correctional facility; posted signs around the correctional facility informing visitors and staff that the correctional facility employs such a contraband interdiction system; and complied with any relevant regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission and, as applicable, policies issued by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration; annually tests and evaluates compliance with subparagraph (A) in accordance with best practices, which shall be issued by the Federal Communications Commission; and not later than 10 business days after identifying an issue relating to the use of the contraband interdiction system, whether in the course of normal business operations or conducting testing and evaluation, submits to the Federal Communications Commission a report describing the issues identified and the steps taken to address the issues. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity in the normal course of official duties that is not targeted against the communications of any particular person or persons, under procedures approved by the Attorney General, solely to— test the capability of electronic equipment, if— it is not reasonable to obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; the test is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to determine to capability of the equipment; any information obtained during such testing (including metadata) is retained and used only for the purpose of determining the capability of the equipment, is disclosed only to test personnel, and is destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the test; and the test is for a period of not longer than 90 days, unless the law enforcement agency obtains the prior approval of the Attorney General; or train law enforcement personnel in the use of electronic surveillance equipment, if— it is not reasonable to— obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; train persons in the course of otherwise authorized law enforcement activities; or train persons in the use of such equipment without engaging in surveillance; such surveillance is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to train the personnel in the use of the equipment; and any information obtained during such training (including metadata) is destroyed after its use for such training. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by the Federal Communications Commission, or an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission, in order to test the cell-site simulator. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt a State or local government from complying with regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, including the requirement to obtain authorization to transmit on spectrum regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. The use of a cell-site simulator under subsection (d)(1)(B) of this section (which shall not include such a use by a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force providing assistance to a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity under such subsection (d)(1)(B)), under section 105(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)), or under clause (i) or (ii) of section 102(a)(1)(A) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1)(A)) may only be carried out lawfully using a specific model of a cell-site simulator for which the disclosures required under clauses (i) and (ii) of subsection (d)(1)(C) were included with respect to the specific model in connection with— for use by an element of the intelligence community under title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), an application for an order under such Act that was approved; or for use by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, an application for a warrant— under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that was approved by a judge of the judicial district in which the law enforcement agency intends to use the cell-site simulator; or using State warrant procedures that was approved by a judge of the State in which the law enforcement agency intends to use the cell-site simulator. The Attorney General shall adopt specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention, provide for the destruction, and prohibit the dissemination, of information obtained through the use of a cell-site simulator under an exception under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d) that pertains to any person who is not an authorized subject of the use. The Attorney General shall make publicly available on the website of the Department of Justice the procedures adopted under paragraph (1) and any revisions to such procedures. If a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity or element of the intelligence community acquires information pertaining to a person who is not an authorized subject of the use of a cell-site simulator under an exception under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d), the law enforcement agency or element of the intelligence community shall— minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of the information in accordance with the procedures adopted under paragraph (1); and destroy the information (including metadata) at the earliest possible opportunity. Any information acquired through the operation of a cell-site simulator, or derived from such information, including the fact that the information was obtained or derived, as the case may be, from a cell-site simulator, shall be disclosed to the defendant in any action in which the information is introduced into evidence. Information collected under this section may only include information identifying nearby electronic devices communicating with the cell-site simulator and the strength and direction of transmissions from those electronic devices. In the case of any interception of a wire or electronic communication by the cell-site simulator— with respect to an interception by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, the provisions of chapter 119 shall apply in addition to the provisions of this section; and with respect to an interception by an element of the intelligence community targeted against a United States person or person located in the United States, the element of the intelligence community may only conduct the surveillance using the cell-site simulator in accordance with an order authorizing the use issued in accordance with title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), in addition to complying with the provisions of this section. If a cell-site simulator is to be used by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity to locate or track the movement of a person or object, the provisions of section 3117 and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply in addition to the provisions of this section. For purposes of applying section 3117 and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the use of a cell-site simulator, a Federal court may authorize such use within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if— the use commences within that jurisdiction; or at the time the application is presented to the court, the governmental entity certifies that it has probable cause to believe that the target is physically located within that jurisdiction. Any person subject to an unlawful operation of a cell-site simulator may bring a civil action for appropriate relief (including declaratory and injunctive relief, actual damages, statutory damages of not more than $500 for each violation, and attorney fees) against the person, including a governmental entity, that conducted that unlawful operation. If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this section, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination. As used in this section— the terms defined in section 2711 have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section; the term advanced communications services has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153); the term cell-site simulator means any device that functions as or simulates a base station for commercial mobile services or private mobile services in order to identify, locate, or intercept transmissions from cellular devices for purposes other than providing ordinary commercial mobile services or private mobile services; the term commercial mobile radio service has the meaning given that term in section 20.3 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto; the term contraband interdiction system means any device that functions as or simulates a base station for commercial mobile services or private mobile services for purposes of identifying, locating, or intercepting transmissions from contraband cellular devices in correctional facilities; the term derived means, with respect to information or evidence, that the government would not have originally possessed the information or evidence but for the use of a cell-site simulator, and regardless of any claim that the information or evidence is attenuated from the surveillance would inevitably have been discovered, or was subsequently reobtained through other means; the term electronic communication has the meaning given that term in section 2510; the term electronic device has the meaning given the term computer in section 1030(e); the term emergency call has the meaning given that term in section 6001 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (47 U.S.C. 1401); the term intelligence community has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003); the term mitigation means the deletion of all information collected about a person who is not the subject of the warrant or investigation; the term private mobile service has the meaning given that term in section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 332); the term telecommunications relay service has the meaning given that term in section 225 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 225); and the term United States person has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended— in section 101 (50 U.S.C. 1801), as amended by section 203 of this Act, by adding at the end the following: Cell-site simulator has the meaning given that term in section 3119 of title 18, United States Code. in section 102(a) (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)), by adding at the end the following: The Government may only use a cell-site simulator pursuant to the authority under clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(A) without obtaining an order under this title authorizing such use if the Government has implemented measures that are reasonably likely to limit the collection activities to— means of communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 101(a); or property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 101(a). in section 105 (50 U.S.C. 1805), by adding at the end the following: A judge having jurisdiction under section 103 may issue an order under this section that authorizes the use of a cell-site simulator only if the applicant— demonstrates that other investigative procedures, including electronic location tracking methods that solely collect records of the investigative target— have been tried and have failed; or reasonably appear to be— unlikely to succeed if tried; or too dangerous; specifies the likely area of effect of the cell-site simulator to be used and the time that the cell-site simulator will be in operation; certifies that the requested area of effect and time of operation are the narrowest reasonably possible to obtain the necessary information; specifies the procedures in place to ensure that information unrelated to the target of the application will be promptly destroyed; and demonstrates that the requested use of a cell-site simulator would be in compliance with applicable provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. In any application for an order under this section authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator, the applicant shall include the following: A disclosure of any potential disruption of the ability of the subject of the surveillance or bystanders to use commercial mobile radio services or private mobile services, including using advanced communications services, to make or receive, as applicable— emergency calls (including 9–1–1 calls); calls to the universal telephone number within the United States for the purpose of the national suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline system under designated under paragraph (4) of section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 251(e)); calls to the nationwide toll-free number for the poison control centers established under section 1271 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300d–71); calls using telecommunications relay services; or any other communications or transmissions. A certification that the specific model of the cell-site simulator to be used has been inspected by a third party that is an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission to verify the accuracy of the disclosure under paragraph (1). A disclosure of the methods and precautions that will be used to minimize disruption, including— any limit on the length of time the cell-site simulator can be in continuous operation; and any user-defined limit on the transmission range of the cell-site simulator. A disclosure as to whether the cell-site simulator will be used in an area or at a gathering where constitutionally protected activity, including speech or religious observation, will occur. A disclosure as to whether sensitive matters, such as attorney-client communications, political campaign or political party deliberations, medical information, or communications among elected political representatives of a State or the Federal Government, will be implicated. A disclosure as to the estimated number of individuals whose communications, devices, or location information will be implicated. In considering an application for an order under this section that authorizes the use of a cell-site simulator, the court shall— consider— the number of individuals impacted; the nature of any communications to be obtained; and the type of activities in which users of an electronic device (as defined in section 3119(k) of title 18, United States Code) are engaged; direct the Government to take steps to ensure heightened protections for constitutionally protected activities and to minimize the collection of any information relating to individuals for whom the Government has not established probable cause as to their status as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; weigh the need of the Government to obtain the information sought against the likelihood and impact of any potential negative side effects, including those disclosed by the Government under paragraph (2); and not grant a request for an order that would put public safety at risk or unreasonably inconvenience the community. Section 3127 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— in paragraph (3) by striking but such term does not include any and inserting except such term does not include any cell-site simulator, as that term is defined in section 3119, or; and in paragraph (4) by striking of any communication and inserting of any communication, except such term does not include any cell-site simulator, as that term is defined in section 3119. In this subsection, the term covered Federal entity means— a law enforcement agency of a department or agency of the Federal Government; and an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)). The Inspector General of the Department of Justice, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall annually submit to Congress a joint report, and publish an unclassified version of the report on the website of each such inspector general, on— the overall compliance of covered Federal entities with this title and the amendments made by this title; the number of applications by covered Federal entities for use of a cell-site simulator that were applied for and the number that were granted; the number of emergency uses of a cell-site simulator under section 3119(d)(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, as added by this title; the number of such emergency uses for which a court subsequently issued a warrant authorizing the use and the number of such emergency uses in which an application for a warrant was denied; the number of devices that were targeted with a cell-site simulator, which shall be provided separately for targeting conducted pursuant to a warrant or court order and targeting conducted pursuant to an authority to use a cell-site simulator without a warrant or order; the number of devices that were not the target of the use of a cell-site simulator about which information was obtained with the cell-site simulator, which shall— be provided separately for use conducted pursuant to a warrant or court order and use conducted pursuant to an authority to use a cell-site simulator without a warrant or order; and include the number of such devices about which the information was not destroyed as a result of the minimization requirements under section 3119(f) of title 18, United States Code, as added by this section, which shall be provided separately for use conducted pursuant to a warrant or court order and use conducted pursuant to an authority to use a cell-site simulator without a warrant or order; which components of a law enforcement agency of a department or agency of the Federal Government are using cell-site simulators and how many are available to that component; and instances in which a law enforcement agency of a department or agency of the Federal Government made cell-site simulators available to a State or unit of local government. Each report submitted under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall initiate any proceeding that may be necessary to promulgate or modify regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission to implement this title and the amendments made by this title. Nothing in this title or an amendment made by this title shall be construed to expand or contract the authority of the Federal Communications Commission. Except as provided in paragraph (2), subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, and the amendments made by such subsections, shall apply on and after the date that is 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act. In this paragraph, the term cell-site simulator has the meaning given that term in section 3119 of title 18, United States Code, as added by subsection (a). For any model of a cell-site simulator in use before the date of enactment of this Act, including such use in a contraband interdiction system at a correctional facility, if the Attorney General certifies that additional time is necessary to obtain independent tests of the model of cell-site simulator, subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, and the amendments made by such subsections, shall apply to the use of the model of cell-site simulator on and after the date that is 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act. 3119.Cell-site simulators(a)General prohibition of use(1)In generalExcept as provided in subsection (d), it shall be unlawful— (A)for any individual or entity to knowingly use a cell-site simulator in the United States; or(B)for an element of the intelligence community to use a cell-site simulator outside the United States if the subject of the surveillance is a United States person.(2)Rule of constructionNothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity to use a cell-site simulator outside the United States.(b)PenaltyAny individual or entity that violates subsection (a)(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000.(c)Prohibition of use as evidence(1)In generalExcept as provided in paragraph (2), no information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a)(1), and no evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.(2)Exception for enforcementInformation acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a)(1) by a person, and evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation trial, hearing, or other proceeding described in paragraph (1) of this subsection relating to the alleged violation of subsection (a)(1) in connection with such use. (d)Exceptions(1)In general(A)Warrant(i)In generalSubsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity under a warrant issued— (I)in accordance with this subparagraph; and(II)using the procedures described in, and in accordance with the requirements for executing and returning a warrant under, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant and execution and return procedures and, in the case of a court-martial or other proceeding under chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), issued under section 846 of that title and in accordance with the requirements for executing and returning such a warrant, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President) by a court of competent jurisdiction.(ii)RequirementsA court may issue a warrant described in clause (i) (except, with respect to a State court, to the extent use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity is prohibited by the law of the State) only if the law enforcement agency— (I)demonstrates that other investigative procedures, including electronic location tracking methods that solely collect records of the investigative target— (aa)have been tried and have failed; or (bb)reasonably appear to be— (AA)unlikely to succeed if tried; or (BB)too dangerous; (II)specifies the likely area of effect of the cell-site simulator to be used and the time that the cell-site simulator will be in operation; (III)certifies that the requested area of effect and time of operation are the narrowest reasonably possible to obtain the necessary information; and(IV)demonstrates that the requested use of a cell-site simulator would be in compliance with applicable provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. (iii)ConsiderationsIn considering an application for a warrant described in clause (i), the court shall—(I)consider— (aa)the number of individuals impacted; (bb)the nature of any communications to be obtained; and (cc)the type of activities in which users of an electronic device are engaged; (II)direct the law enforcement agency of the governmental entity to take steps to ensure heightened protections for constitutionally protected activities and to minimize the collection of information relating to individuals who are not the subject of the warrant; (III)weigh the need of the government to enforce the law and apprehend criminals against the likelihood and impact of any potential negative side effects, including those disclosed by the government under subparagraph (C); and(IV)not grant a request for a warrant that would put public safety at risk or unreasonably inconvenience the community. (iv)Period of initial authorizationNo warrant described in clause (i) may authorize the use of a cell site simulator for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event for longer than 30 days.(v)Extensions(I)In generalA court may grant extensions of a warrant described in clause (i), but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with clause (i) and the court considering the factors described in clause (iii) and determining the requirements under clause (ii) are met.(II)Period of extensionThe period of an extension of a warrant shall be no longer than the authorizing judge determines necessary to achieve the purposes for which the extension was granted, nor in any event for longer than 30 days.(vi)Termination provisionEach warrant described in clause (i), and each extension thereof, shall contain a provision that the authorization to use the cell site simulator shall be executed as soon as practicable and shall terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in 30 days. (vii)Start of 30-day periodsThe 30-day periods described in clauses (iv), (v)(II), and (vi) shall begin on the earlier of— (I)the date on which a law enforcement agency first begins to use the cell site simulator as authorized by the warrant, or extension thereof; or (II)the date that is 10 days after the warrant, or extension thereof, is issued. (B)Emergency(i)In generalSubject to clause (ii), subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, or use of a cell-site simulator as part of assistance provided by a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force to such a law enforcement agency, if—(I)the governmental entity reasonably determines an emergency exists that—(aa)involves— (AA)immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; (BB)conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime; or(CC)an immediate threat to a national security interest; and(bb)requires use of a cell-site simulator before a warrant described in subparagraph (A) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and(II)except in an instance in which the governmental entity is trying to locate a lost or missing person, locate someone believed to have been abducted or kidnaped, or find victims, dead or alive, in an area where a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other mass casualty event has taken place— (aa)there are grounds upon which a warrant described in subparagraph (A) could be entered to authorize such use; and(bb)the governmental entity applies for a warrant described in subparagraph (A) approving such use not later than 48 hours after such use begins, and takes such steps to expedite the consideration of such application as may be possible.(ii)Termination of emergency use(I)In generalA law enforcement agency of a governmental entity shall immediately terminate use of a cell-site simulator under clause (i) of this subparagraph at the earlier of the time the information sought is obtained or the time the application for a warrant described in subparagraph (A) is denied.(II)Warrant deniedIf an application for a warrant described in clause (i)(II)(bb) is denied— (aa)any information or evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator shall be subject to subsection (c); (bb)the attorney for the governmental entity submitting the application shall—(AA)retain, until the date that is 1 year after the date of the denial, a single copy of any information or evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator for potential use by a person about whose electronic device the government obtained information with the cell site simulator, which may not be used for any other purpose; and(BB)promptly destroy any other copies of such information or evidence; and(cc)the applicable law enforcement agency shall serve notice in accordance with subparagraph (D). (C)Disclosures required in applicationIn any application for a warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator under subparagraph (A) or (B), the governmental entity shall include the following:(i)A disclosure of any potential disruption of the ability of the subject of the surveillance or bystanders to use commercial mobile radio services or private mobile services, including using advanced communications services, to make or receive, as applicable— (I)emergency calls (including 9–1–1 calls); (II)calls to the universal telephone number within the United States for the purpose of the national suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline system under designated under paragraph (4) of section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 251(e)); (III)calls to the nationwide toll-free number for the poison control centers established under section 1271 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300d–71); (IV)calls using telecommunications relay services; or(V)any other communications or transmissions.(ii)A certification that the specific model of the cell-site simulator to be used has been inspected by a third party that is an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission to verify the accuracy of the disclosure under clause (i). (iii)A disclosure of the methods and precautions that will be used to minimize disruption, including— (I)any limit on the length of time the cell-site simulator can be in continuous operation; and (II)any user-defined limit on the transmission range of the cell-site simulator. (iv)A disclosure as to whether the cell-site simulator will be used in an area or at a gathering where constitutionally protected activity, including speech or religious observance, will occur. (v)A disclosure as to whether sensitive matters, such as attorney-client communications, political campaign or political party deliberations, medical information, or communications among elected political representatives of a State or the Federal Government, will be implicated.(vi)A disclosure as to the estimated number of individuals whose communications, electronic device, or location information will be implicated. (D)Notice(i)In generalNotice regarding the use of a cell-site simulator shall include an inventory, containing—(I)the fact of the entry of the warrant or the application;(II)the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or disapproved use of a cell-site simulator, or the denial of the application; (III)whether, during the period— (aa)information about their electronic device was, or was not, obtained by the government; (bb)their location was, or was not, tracked; and (cc)their communications were, or were not, intercepted; and(IV)confirmation that all information unrelated to the individual towards whom the warrant was directed has been destroyed. (ii)Provision of notice to other partiesThe court issuing a warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator may also require that notice be provided to other persons not named in the application, whose electronic devices the governmental entity obtained information with the cell site simulator. (2)Foreign intelligence surveillanceUse of a cell-site simulator by an element of the intelligence community shall not be subject to subsection (a)(1) if it is conducted in a manner that is in accordance with title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) (including testing or training authorized under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 105(g) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(g)) (including such testing or training conducted in conjunction with a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force), if any information obtained during such testing or training (including metadata) is destroyed after its use for such testing or training).(3)ResearchSubsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator in order to engage, in good-faith, in research or teaching by a person that is not— (A)a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity; (B)an element of the intelligence community; or (C)acting as an agent thereof.(4)Protective services(A)In generalSubsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator in the performance of protective duties pursuant to section 3056 of this title or as otherwise authorized by law.(B)Prohibition on use as evidenceNo information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator under the authority under subparagraph (A), and no evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.(C)No bar to other authorized useNothing in subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be construed to prohibit the United States Secret Service from using a cell-site simulator in accordance with a provision of this section other than subparagraph (A). (5)Contraband interdiction by correctional facilitiesSubsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a contraband interdiction system if the correctional facility or the entity operating the contraband interdiction system for the benefit of the correctional facility—(A)has—(i)taken reasonable steps to restrict transmissions by the contraband interdiction system to cellular devices physically located within the property of the correctional facility; (ii)posted signs around the correctional facility informing visitors and staff that the correctional facility employs such a contraband interdiction system; and(iii)complied with any relevant regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission and, as applicable, policies issued by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration; (B)annually tests and evaluates compliance with subparagraph (A) in accordance with best practices, which shall be issued by the Federal Communications Commission; and (C)not later than 10 business days after identifying an issue relating to the use of the contraband interdiction system, whether in the course of normal business operations or conducting testing and evaluation, submits to the Federal Communications Commission a report describing the issues identified and the steps taken to address the issues.(6)Testing and training by law enforcementSubsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity in the normal course of official duties that is not targeted against the communications of any particular person or persons, under procedures approved by the Attorney General, solely to—(A)test the capability of electronic equipment, if—(i)it is not reasonable to obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance;(ii)the test is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to determine to capability of the equipment;(iii)any information obtained during such testing (including metadata) is retained and used only for the purpose of determining the capability of the equipment, is disclosed only to test personnel, and is destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the test; and(iv)the test is for a period of not longer than 90 days, unless the law enforcement agency obtains the prior approval of the Attorney General; or(B)train law enforcement personnel in the use of electronic surveillance equipment, if—(i)it is not reasonable to—(I)obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance;(II)train persons in the course of otherwise authorized law enforcement activities; or(III)train persons in the use of such equipment without engaging in surveillance;(ii)such surveillance is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to train the personnel in the use of the equipment; and(iii)any information obtained during such training (including metadata) is destroyed after its use for such training.(7)FCC TestingSubsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by the Federal Communications Commission, or an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission, in order to test the cell-site simulator.(8)Rule of constructionNothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt a State or local government from complying with regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, including the requirement to obtain authorization to transmit on spectrum regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.(e)Limit on certain use not conducted pursuant to warrants and ordersThe use of a cell-site simulator under subsection (d)(1)(B) of this section (which shall not include such a use by a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force providing assistance to a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity under such subsection (d)(1)(B)), under section 105(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)), or under clause (i) or (ii) of section 102(a)(1)(A) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1)(A)) may only be carried out lawfully using a specific model of a cell-site simulator for which the disclosures required under clauses (i) and (ii) of subsection (d)(1)(C) were included with respect to the specific model in connection with—(1)for use by an element of the intelligence community under title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), an application for an order under such Act that was approved; or(2)for use by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, an application for a warrant— (A)under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that was approved by a judge of the judicial district in which the law enforcement agency intends to use the cell-site simulator; or (B)using State warrant procedures that was approved by a judge of the State in which the law enforcement agency intends to use the cell-site simulator. (f)Minimization(1)In generalThe Attorney General shall adopt specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention, provide for the destruction, and prohibit the dissemination, of information obtained through the use of a cell-site simulator under an exception under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d) that pertains to any person who is not an authorized subject of the use.(2)PublicationThe Attorney General shall make publicly available on the website of the Department of Justice the procedures adopted under paragraph (1) and any revisions to such procedures. (3)Use by agenciesIf a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity or element of the intelligence community acquires information pertaining to a person who is not an authorized subject of the use of a cell-site simulator under an exception under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d), the law enforcement agency or element of the intelligence community shall— (A)minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of the information in accordance with the procedures adopted under paragraph (1); and(B)destroy the information (including metadata) at the earliest possible opportunity.(g)Disclosure to defendantAny information acquired through the operation of a cell-site simulator, or derived from such information, including the fact that the information was obtained or derived, as the case may be, from a cell-site simulator, shall be disclosed to the defendant in any action in which the information is introduced into evidence.(h)Scope of collection(1)Authorized useInformation collected under this section may only include information identifying nearby electronic devices communicating with the cell-site simulator and the strength and direction of transmissions from those electronic devices.(2)Compliance with wiretapping requirements to obtain contentsIn the case of any interception of a wire or electronic communication by the cell-site simulator—(A)with respect to an interception by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, the provisions of chapter 119 shall apply in addition to the provisions of this section; and(B)with respect to an interception by an element of the intelligence community targeted against a United States person or person located in the United States, the element of the intelligence community may only conduct the surveillance using the cell-site simulator in accordance with an order authorizing the use issued in accordance with title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), in addition to complying with the provisions of this section. (3)Compliance with tracking device requirements(A)In generalIf a cell-site simulator is to be used by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity to locate or track the movement of a person or object, the provisions of section 3117 and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply in addition to the provisions of this section.(B)CourtFor purposes of applying section 3117 and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the use of a cell-site simulator, a Federal court may authorize such use within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if— (i)the use commences within that jurisdiction; or (ii)at the time the application is presented to the court, the governmental entity certifies that it has probable cause to believe that the target is physically located within that jurisdiction. (i)Civil actionAny person subject to an unlawful operation of a cell-site simulator may bring a civil action for appropriate relief (including declaratory and injunctive relief, actual damages, statutory damages of not more than $500 for each violation, and attorney fees) against the person, including a governmental entity, that conducted that unlawful operation. (j)Administrative disciplineIf a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this section, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination. (k)DefinitionsAs used in this section—(1)the terms defined in section 2711 have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section; (2)the term advanced communications services has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153); (3)the term cell-site simulator means any device that functions as or simulates a base station for commercial mobile services or private mobile services in order to identify, locate, or intercept transmissions from cellular devices for purposes other than providing ordinary commercial mobile services or private mobile services; (4)the term commercial mobile radio service has the meaning given that term in section 20.3 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto; (5)the term contraband interdiction system means any device that functions as or simulates a base station for commercial mobile services or private mobile services for purposes of identifying, locating, or intercepting transmissions from contraband cellular devices in correctional facilities; (6)the term derived means, with respect to information or evidence, that the government would not have originally possessed the information or evidence but for the use of a cell-site simulator, and regardless of any claim that the information or evidence is attenuated from the surveillance would inevitably have been discovered, or was subsequently reobtained through other means; (7)the term electronic communication has the meaning given that term in section 2510; (8)the term electronic device has the meaning given the term computer in section 1030(e); (9)the term emergency call has the meaning given that term in section 6001 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (47 U.S.C. 1401); (10)the term intelligence community has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003); (11)the term mitigation means the deletion of all information collected about a person who is not the subject of the warrant or investigation; (12)the term private mobile service has the meaning given that term in section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 332); (13)the term telecommunications relay service has the meaning given that term in section 225 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 225); and(14)the term United States person has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).. (r)Cell-site simulator has the meaning given that term in section 3119 of title 18, United States Code.; (5)The Government may only use a cell-site simulator pursuant to the authority under clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(A) without obtaining an order under this title authorizing such use if the Government has implemented measures that are reasonably likely to limit the collection activities to— (A)means of communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 101(a); or (B)property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 101(a).; and (k)(1)A judge having jurisdiction under section 103 may issue an order under this section that authorizes the use of a cell-site simulator only if the applicant—(A)demonstrates that other investigative procedures, including electronic location tracking methods that solely collect records of the investigative target— (i)have been tried and have failed; or (ii)reasonably appear to be— (I)unlikely to succeed if tried; or (II)too dangerous; (B)specifies the likely area of effect of the cell-site simulator to be used and the time that the cell-site simulator will be in operation; (C)certifies that the requested area of effect and time of operation are the narrowest reasonably possible to obtain the necessary information;(D)specifies the procedures in place to ensure that information unrelated to the target of the application will be promptly destroyed; and (E)demonstrates that the requested use of a cell-site simulator would be in compliance with applicable provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. (2)In any application for an order under this section authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator, the applicant shall include the following:(A)A disclosure of any potential disruption of the ability of the subject of the surveillance or bystanders to use commercial mobile radio services or private mobile services, including using advanced communications services, to make or receive, as applicable— (i)emergency calls (including 9–1–1 calls); (ii)calls to the universal telephone number within the United States for the purpose of the national suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline system under designated under paragraph (4) of section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 251(e)); (iii)calls to the nationwide toll-free number for the poison control centers established under section 1271 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300d–71); (iv)calls using telecommunications relay services; or(v)any other communications or transmissions.(B)A certification that the specific model of the cell-site simulator to be used has been inspected by a third party that is an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission to verify the accuracy of the disclosure under paragraph (1). (C)A disclosure of the methods and precautions that will be used to minimize disruption, including— (i)any limit on the length of time the cell-site simulator can be in continuous operation; and (ii)any user-defined limit on the transmission range of the cell-site simulator. (D)A disclosure as to whether the cell-site simulator will be used in an area or at a gathering where constitutionally protected activity, including speech or religious observation, will occur. (E)A disclosure as to whether sensitive matters, such as attorney-client communications, political campaign or political party deliberations, medical information, or communications among elected political representatives of a State or the Federal Government, will be implicated.(F)A disclosure as to the estimated number of individuals whose communications, devices, or location information will be implicated. (3)In considering an application for an order under this section that authorizes the use of a cell-site simulator, the court shall—(A)consider— (i)the number of individuals impacted; (ii)the nature of any communications to be obtained; and (iii)the type of activities in which users of an electronic device (as defined in section 3119(k) of title 18, United States Code) are engaged; (B)direct the Government to take steps to ensure heightened protections for constitutionally protected activities and to minimize the collection of any information relating to individuals for whom the Government has not established probable cause as to their status as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (C)weigh the need of the Government to obtain the information sought against the likelihood and impact of any potential negative side effects, including those disclosed by the Government under paragraph (2); and(D)not grant a request for an order that would put public safety at risk or unreasonably inconvenience the community..
Section 53
3119. Cell-site simulators Except as provided in subsection (d), it shall be unlawful— for any individual or entity to knowingly use a cell-site simulator in the United States; or for an element of the intelligence community to use a cell-site simulator outside the United States if the subject of the surveillance is a United States person. Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity to use a cell-site simulator outside the United States. Any individual or entity that violates subsection (a)(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000. Except as provided in paragraph (2), no information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a)(1), and no evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. Information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator in violation of subsection (a)(1) by a person, and evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation trial, hearing, or other proceeding described in paragraph (1) of this subsection relating to the alleged violation of subsection (a)(1) in connection with such use. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity under a warrant issued— in accordance with this subparagraph; and using the procedures described in, and in accordance with the requirements for executing and returning a warrant under, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant and execution and return procedures and, in the case of a court-martial or other proceeding under chapter 47 of title 10 (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), issued under section 846 of that title and in accordance with the requirements for executing and returning such a warrant, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A court may issue a warrant described in clause (i) (except, with respect to a State court, to the extent use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity is prohibited by the law of the State) only if the law enforcement agency— demonstrates that other investigative procedures, including electronic location tracking methods that solely collect records of the investigative target— have been tried and have failed; or reasonably appear to be— unlikely to succeed if tried; or too dangerous; specifies the likely area of effect of the cell-site simulator to be used and the time that the cell-site simulator will be in operation; certifies that the requested area of effect and time of operation are the narrowest reasonably possible to obtain the necessary information; and demonstrates that the requested use of a cell-site simulator would be in compliance with applicable provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. In considering an application for a warrant described in clause (i), the court shall— consider— the number of individuals impacted; the nature of any communications to be obtained; and the type of activities in which users of an electronic device are engaged; direct the law enforcement agency of the governmental entity to take steps to ensure heightened protections for constitutionally protected activities and to minimize the collection of information relating to individuals who are not the subject of the warrant; weigh the need of the government to enforce the law and apprehend criminals against the likelihood and impact of any potential negative side effects, including those disclosed by the government under subparagraph (C); and not grant a request for a warrant that would put public safety at risk or unreasonably inconvenience the community. No warrant described in clause (i) may authorize the use of a cell site simulator for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event for longer than 30 days. A court may grant extensions of a warrant described in clause (i), but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with clause (i) and the court considering the factors described in clause (iii) and determining the requirements under clause (ii) are met. The period of an extension of a warrant shall be no longer than the authorizing judge determines necessary to achieve the purposes for which the extension was granted, nor in any event for longer than 30 days. Each warrant described in clause (i), and each extension thereof, shall contain a provision that the authorization to use the cell site simulator shall be executed as soon as practicable and shall terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in 30 days. The 30-day periods described in clauses (iv), (v)(II), and (vi) shall begin on the earlier of— the date on which a law enforcement agency first begins to use the cell site simulator as authorized by the warrant, or extension thereof; or the date that is 10 days after the warrant, or extension thereof, is issued. Subject to clause (ii), subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, or use of a cell-site simulator as part of assistance provided by a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force to such a law enforcement agency, if— the governmental entity reasonably determines an emergency exists that— involves— immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime; or an immediate threat to a national security interest; and requires use of a cell-site simulator before a warrant described in subparagraph (A) can, with due diligence, be obtained; and except in an instance in which the governmental entity is trying to locate a lost or missing person, locate someone believed to have been abducted or kidnaped, or find victims, dead or alive, in an area where a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other mass casualty event has taken place— there are grounds upon which a warrant described in subparagraph (A) could be entered to authorize such use; and the governmental entity applies for a warrant described in subparagraph (A) approving such use not later than 48 hours after such use begins, and takes such steps to expedite the consideration of such application as may be possible. A law enforcement agency of a governmental entity shall immediately terminate use of a cell-site simulator under clause (i) of this subparagraph at the earlier of the time the information sought is obtained or the time the application for a warrant described in subparagraph (A) is denied. If an application for a warrant described in clause (i)(II)(bb) is denied— any information or evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator shall be subject to subsection (c); the attorney for the governmental entity submitting the application shall— retain, until the date that is 1 year after the date of the denial, a single copy of any information or evidence derived from use of the cell-site simulator for potential use by a person about whose electronic device the government obtained information with the cell site simulator, which may not be used for any other purpose; and promptly destroy any other copies of such information or evidence; and the applicable law enforcement agency shall serve notice in accordance with subparagraph (D). In any application for a warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator under subparagraph (A) or (B), the governmental entity shall include the following: A disclosure of any potential disruption of the ability of the subject of the surveillance or bystanders to use commercial mobile radio services or private mobile services, including using advanced communications services, to make or receive, as applicable— emergency calls (including 9–1–1 calls); calls to the universal telephone number within the United States for the purpose of the national suicide prevention and mental health crisis hotline system under designated under paragraph (4) of section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 251(e)); calls to the nationwide toll-free number for the poison control centers established under section 1271 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300d–71); calls using telecommunications relay services; or any other communications or transmissions. A certification that the specific model of the cell-site simulator to be used has been inspected by a third party that is an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission to verify the accuracy of the disclosure under clause (i). A disclosure of the methods and precautions that will be used to minimize disruption, including— any limit on the length of time the cell-site simulator can be in continuous operation; and any user-defined limit on the transmission range of the cell-site simulator. A disclosure as to whether the cell-site simulator will be used in an area or at a gathering where constitutionally protected activity, including speech or religious observance, will occur. A disclosure as to whether sensitive matters, such as attorney-client communications, political campaign or political party deliberations, medical information, or communications among elected political representatives of a State or the Federal Government, will be implicated. A disclosure as to the estimated number of individuals whose communications, electronic device, or location information will be implicated. Notice regarding the use of a cell-site simulator shall include an inventory, containing— the fact of the entry of the warrant or the application; the date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or disapproved use of a cell-site simulator, or the denial of the application; whether, during the period— information about their electronic device was, or was not, obtained by the government; their location was, or was not, tracked; and their communications were, or were not, intercepted; and confirmation that all information unrelated to the individual towards whom the warrant was directed has been destroyed. The court issuing a warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator may also require that notice be provided to other persons not named in the application, whose electronic devices the governmental entity obtained information with the cell site simulator. Use of a cell-site simulator by an element of the intelligence community shall not be subject to subsection (a)(1) if it is conducted in a manner that is in accordance with title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) (including testing or training authorized under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 105(g) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(g)) (including such testing or training conducted in conjunction with a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force), if any information obtained during such testing or training (including metadata) is destroyed after its use for such testing or training). Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator in order to engage, in good-faith, in research or teaching by a person that is not— a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity; an element of the intelligence community; or acting as an agent thereof. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator in the performance of protective duties pursuant to section 3056 of this title or as otherwise authorized by law. No information acquired through the use of a cell-site simulator under the authority under subparagraph (A), and no evidence derived therefrom, may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. Nothing in subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be construed to prohibit the United States Secret Service from using a cell-site simulator in accordance with a provision of this section other than subparagraph (A). Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a contraband interdiction system if the correctional facility or the entity operating the contraband interdiction system for the benefit of the correctional facility— has— taken reasonable steps to restrict transmissions by the contraband interdiction system to cellular devices physically located within the property of the correctional facility; posted signs around the correctional facility informing visitors and staff that the correctional facility employs such a contraband interdiction system; and complied with any relevant regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission and, as applicable, policies issued by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration; annually tests and evaluates compliance with subparagraph (A) in accordance with best practices, which shall be issued by the Federal Communications Commission; and not later than 10 business days after identifying an issue relating to the use of the contraband interdiction system, whether in the course of normal business operations or conducting testing and evaluation, submits to the Federal Communications Commission a report describing the issues identified and the steps taken to address the issues. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity in the normal course of official duties that is not targeted against the communications of any particular person or persons, under procedures approved by the Attorney General, solely to— test the capability of electronic equipment, if— it is not reasonable to obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; the test is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to determine to capability of the equipment; any information obtained during such testing (including metadata) is retained and used only for the purpose of determining the capability of the equipment, is disclosed only to test personnel, and is destroyed before or immediately upon completion of the test; and the test is for a period of not longer than 90 days, unless the law enforcement agency obtains the prior approval of the Attorney General; or train law enforcement personnel in the use of electronic surveillance equipment, if— it is not reasonable to— obtain the consent of the persons incidentally subjected to the surveillance; train persons in the course of otherwise authorized law enforcement activities; or train persons in the use of such equipment without engaging in surveillance; such surveillance is limited in extent and duration to that necessary to train the personnel in the use of the equipment; and any information obtained during such training (including metadata) is destroyed after its use for such training. Subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the use of a cell-site simulator by the Federal Communications Commission, or an accredited testing laboratory recognized by the Federal Communications Commission, in order to test the cell-site simulator. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt a State or local government from complying with regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, including the requirement to obtain authorization to transmit on spectrum regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. The use of a cell-site simulator under subsection (d)(1)(B) of this section (which shall not include such a use by a component of the Department of Defense or an Armed Force providing assistance to a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity under such subsection (d)(1)(B)), under section 105(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)), or under clause (i) or (ii) of section 102(a)(1)(A) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)(1)(A)) may only be carried out lawfully using a specific model of a cell-site simulator for which the disclosures required under clauses (i) and (ii) of subsection (d)(1)(C) were included with respect to the specific model in connection with— for use by an element of the intelligence community under title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), an application for an order under such Act that was approved; or for use by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, an application for a warrant— under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that was approved by a judge of the judicial district in which the law enforcement agency intends to use the cell-site simulator; or using State warrant procedures that was approved by a judge of the State in which the law enforcement agency intends to use the cell-site simulator. The Attorney General shall adopt specific procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention, provide for the destruction, and prohibit the dissemination, of information obtained through the use of a cell-site simulator under an exception under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d) that pertains to any person who is not an authorized subject of the use. The Attorney General shall make publicly available on the website of the Department of Justice the procedures adopted under paragraph (1) and any revisions to such procedures. If a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity or element of the intelligence community acquires information pertaining to a person who is not an authorized subject of the use of a cell-site simulator under an exception under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (d), the law enforcement agency or element of the intelligence community shall— minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of the information in accordance with the procedures adopted under paragraph (1); and destroy the information (including metadata) at the earliest possible opportunity. Any information acquired through the operation of a cell-site simulator, or derived from such information, including the fact that the information was obtained or derived, as the case may be, from a cell-site simulator, shall be disclosed to the defendant in any action in which the information is introduced into evidence. Information collected under this section may only include information identifying nearby electronic devices communicating with the cell-site simulator and the strength and direction of transmissions from those electronic devices. In the case of any interception of a wire or electronic communication by the cell-site simulator— with respect to an interception by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity, the provisions of chapter 119 shall apply in addition to the provisions of this section; and with respect to an interception by an element of the intelligence community targeted against a United States person or person located in the United States, the element of the intelligence community may only conduct the surveillance using the cell-site simulator in accordance with an order authorizing the use issued in accordance with title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), in addition to complying with the provisions of this section. If a cell-site simulator is to be used by a law enforcement agency of a governmental entity to locate or track the movement of a person or object, the provisions of section 3117 and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply in addition to the provisions of this section. For purposes of applying section 3117 and rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the use of a cell-site simulator, a Federal court may authorize such use within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if— the use commences within that jurisdiction; or at the time the application is presented to the court, the governmental entity certifies that it has probable cause to believe that the target is physically located within that jurisdiction. Any person subject to an unlawful operation of a cell-site simulator may bring a civil action for appropriate relief (including declaratory and injunctive relief, actual damages, statutory damages of not more than $500 for each violation, and attorney fees) against the person, including a governmental entity, that conducted that unlawful operation. If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this section, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination. As used in this section— the terms defined in section 2711 have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section; the term advanced communications services has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153); the term cell-site simulator means any device that functions as or simulates a base station for commercial mobile services or private mobile services in order to identify, locate, or intercept transmissions from cellular devices for purposes other than providing ordinary commercial mobile services or private mobile services; the term commercial mobile radio service has the meaning given that term in section 20.3 of title 47, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto; the term contraband interdiction system means any device that functions as or simulates a base station for commercial mobile services or private mobile services for purposes of identifying, locating, or intercepting transmissions from contraband cellular devices in correctional facilities; the term derived means, with respect to information or evidence, that the government would not have originally possessed the information or evidence but for the use of a cell-site simulator, and regardless of any claim that the information or evidence is attenuated from the surveillance would inevitably have been discovered, or was subsequently reobtained through other means; the term electronic communication has the meaning given that term in section 2510; the term electronic device has the meaning given the term computer in section 1030(e); the term emergency call has the meaning given that term in section 6001 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (47 U.S.C. 1401); the term intelligence community has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003); the term mitigation means the deletion of all information collected about a person who is not the subject of the warrant or investigation; the term private mobile service has the meaning given that term in section 332 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 332); the term telecommunications relay service has the meaning given that term in section 225 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 225); and the term United States person has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
Section 54
701. Protection of car data from warrantless searches Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: In this chapter: The term access— means any retrieval of covered vehicle data, regardless of— whether the data is obtained as the information is being produced or from digital storage; and where the vehicle data is stored or transmitted, including by wire or radio; and does not include data covered by chapter 119 of this title or section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804). The term consent— means an affirmative, express, and voluntary agreement that— states that the person providing the consent is providing consent to a government official to access the digital contents, access credential, or online account information, or other information being sought; specifies the type of content, access credential, or online account information the person is providing access to; specifies the time period of the covered vehicle data to be accessed; informs the person providing consent that consent is optional and that the government official attempting to obtain consent must otherwise acquire a warrant if consent is not obtained; does not involve sanctions or the threat of sanctions for withholding consent; and uses clear, simple, and comprehensible language that is presented in a way that is accessible to the person providing consent; and does not include consent obtained through agreement to a generic privacy policy. The term covered vehicle data— means all onboard and telematics data generated by, processed by, or stored on a noncommercial vehicle using computing, storage and communication systems installed, attached to, or carried in the vehicle, including diagnostic data, entertainment system data, navigation data, images or data captured by onboard sensors, or cameras, including images or data used to support automated features or autonomous driving, internet access, and communication to and from vehicle occupants; includes data gathered by event data recorders; and does not include— automotive software installed by the manufacturer, as defined by applicable industry standards or regulations; any data subject to chapter 119 of this title or section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804); or data that is collected from outside the vehicle, including speed data and geolocation data, for purposes of traffic, law enforcement, or toll collection. The term event data recorder has the meaning given the term in section 563.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on March 5, 2019). The term investigative or law enforcement officer means any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof and any Tribal justice official, who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for a violation of Federal or State law. The term noncommercial vehicle has the meaning given the term non-CMV in section 383.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the United States. The term vehicle operator means— a person who controls the operation of a vehicle at the time consent is sought; and with respect to a vehicle that is not classified as a highly autonomous vehicle by the Secretary of Transportation, the driver of the vehicle. Except as provided in subsection (b), an investigative or law enforcement officer may not access covered vehicle data unless pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the procedures described in rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction, or as otherwise provided in this chapter or sections 104 and 303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804, 1823). An investigative or law enforcement officer may access covered vehicle data if— the vehicle operator provides prior consent to such access; and no passenger 14 years of age or older objects to the access. If the vehicle operator cannot be located with reasonable effort, the vehicle owner or, in the case of a leased vehicle, the lessee, may provide consent under this paragraph. No individual may provide or withhold consent under this paragraph or object to another individual accessing covered vehicle data if the individual— is the vehicle operator who is in unlawful possession of the vehicle; or is a passenger who unlawfully obtained access to the vehicle. Consent provided under this paragraph shall be in writing unless— the person providing the consent requests that the consent be made orally; and the request for consent and the consent are recorded. If the vehicle operator is not the owner of the vehicle and provides consent under this paragraph, the consent is valid only with respect to covered vehicle data generated during the lawful possession and use of the vehicle by the vehicle operator. An investigative or law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, may access covered vehicle data if— such officer reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists that— involves immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; and requires access to covered vehicle data before such officer can, with due diligence, obtain a warrant; there are grounds upon which a warrant could be granted to authorize such access; and an application for a warrant approving such access is submitted to a court within 48 hours after the access has occurred or begins to occur. If an application for a warrant submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A)(iii) is denied, any covered vehicle data accessed under this paragraph shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter. In addition to the exceptions in paragraphs (1) and (2), data recorded or transmitted by an event data recorder may be accessed from a noncommercial vehicle if authorized by paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of section 24302(b) of the Driver Privacy Act of 2015 (49 U.S.C. 30101 note). Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require the transmission or storage of data that is not otherwise transmitted or stored, or the retrieval of data that is not generally retrievable. If any covered vehicle data has been acquired in violation of this chapter, no part of such information and no evidence derived therefrom may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. No data described in section 2731(b)(3) may be used to establish probable cause. Section 24302 of the Driver Privacy Act of 2015 (49 U.S.C. 30101 note) is amended— in subsection (b), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking Data and inserting Except as provided in subsection (c), data; and by adding at the end the following: An investigative or law enforcement officer may only access or retrieve data recorded or transmitted by an event data recorder described in subsection (a) in accordance with chapter 124 of title 18, United States Code. The table of chapters for part 1 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: 124Accessing vehicle data.Sec. 2730. Definitions. 2731. Prohibition on access to vehicle data. 2732. Prohibition on use of acquired information as evidence. 2730.DefinitionsIn this chapter:(1)AccessThe term access—(A)means any retrieval of covered vehicle data, regardless of—(i)whether the data is obtained as the information is being produced or from digital storage; and(ii)where the vehicle data is stored or transmitted, including by wire or radio; and(B)does not include data covered by chapter 119 of this title or section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804). (2)ConsentThe term consent—(A)means an affirmative, express, and voluntary agreement that—(i)states that the person providing the consent is providing consent to a government official to access the digital contents, access credential, or online account information, or other information being sought;(ii)specifies the type of content, access credential, or online account information the person is providing access to;(iii)specifies the time period of the covered vehicle data to be accessed; (iv)informs the person providing consent that consent is optional and that the government official attempting to obtain consent must otherwise acquire a warrant if consent is not obtained;(v)does not involve sanctions or the threat of sanctions for withholding consent; and (vi)uses clear, simple, and comprehensible language that is presented in a way that is accessible to the person providing consent; and(B)does not include consent obtained through agreement to a generic privacy policy.(3)Covered vehicle dataThe term covered vehicle data—(A)means all onboard and telematics data generated by, processed by, or stored on a noncommercial vehicle using computing, storage and communication systems installed, attached to, or carried in the vehicle, including diagnostic data, entertainment system data, navigation data, images or data captured by onboard sensors, or cameras, including images or data used to support automated features or autonomous driving, internet access, and communication to and from vehicle occupants;(B)includes data gathered by event data recorders; and(C)does not include—(i)automotive software installed by the manufacturer, as defined by applicable industry standards or regulations;(ii)any data subject to chapter 119 of this title or section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804); or(iii)data that is collected from outside the vehicle, including speed data and geolocation data, for purposes of traffic, law enforcement, or toll collection. (4)Event data recorderThe term event data recorder has the meaning given the term in section 563.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on March 5, 2019).(5)Investigative or law enforcement officerThe term investigative or law enforcement officer means any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof and any Tribal justice official, who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for a violation of Federal or State law.(6)Noncommercial vehicleThe term noncommercial vehicle has the meaning given the term non-CMV in section 383.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.(7)StateThe term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the United States.(8)Vehicle operatorThe term vehicle operator means—(A)a person who controls the operation of a vehicle at the time consent is sought; and(B)with respect to a vehicle that is not classified as a highly autonomous vehicle by the Secretary of Transportation, the driver of the vehicle. 2731.Prohibition on access to vehicle data(a)In generalExcept as provided in subsection (b), an investigative or law enforcement officer may not access covered vehicle data unless pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the procedures described in rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction, or as otherwise provided in this chapter or sections 104 and 303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804, 1823).(b)Exceptions(1)Consent(A)In generalAn investigative or law enforcement officer may access covered vehicle data if—(i)the vehicle operator provides prior consent to such access; and(ii)no passenger 14 years of age or older objects to the access.(B)Vehicle ownerIf the vehicle operator cannot be located with reasonable effort, the vehicle owner or, in the case of a leased vehicle, the lessee, may provide consent under this paragraph.(C)Unlawful possessionNo individual may provide or withhold consent under this paragraph or object to another individual accessing covered vehicle data if the individual—(i)is the vehicle operator who is in unlawful possession of the vehicle; or(ii)is a passenger who unlawfully obtained access to the vehicle.(D)Oral consentConsent provided under this paragraph shall be in writing unless—(i)the person providing the consent requests that the consent be made orally; and(ii)the request for consent and the consent are recorded.(E)Consent of vehicle operatorIf the vehicle operator is not the owner of the vehicle and provides consent under this paragraph, the consent is valid only with respect to covered vehicle data generated during the lawful possession and use of the vehicle by the vehicle operator. (2)Emergency(A)In generalAn investigative or law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, may access covered vehicle data if—(i)such officer reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists that—(I)involves immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; and(II)requires access to covered vehicle data before such officer can, with due diligence, obtain a warrant;(ii)there are grounds upon which a warrant could be granted to authorize such access; and(iii)an application for a warrant approving such access is submitted to a court within 48 hours after the access has occurred or begins to occur.(B)DenialIf an application for a warrant submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A)(iii) is denied, any covered vehicle data accessed under this paragraph shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter.(3)Event data recorder for motor vehicle safetyIn addition to the exceptions in paragraphs (1) and (2), data recorded or transmitted by an event data recorder may be accessed from a noncommercial vehicle if authorized by paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of section 24302(b) of the Driver Privacy Act of 2015 (49 U.S.C. 30101 note).(4)Rule of constructionNothing in this section shall be interpreted to require the transmission or storage of data that is not otherwise transmitted or stored, or the retrieval of data that is not generally retrievable. 2732.Prohibition on use of acquired information as evidence(a)In generalIf any covered vehicle data has been acquired in violation of this chapter, no part of such information and no evidence derived therefrom may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.(b)Probable causeNo data described in section 2731(b)(3) may be used to establish probable cause.. (c)Investigative or law enforcement officersAn investigative or law enforcement officer may only access or retrieve data recorded or transmitted by an event data recorder described in subsection (a) in accordance with chapter 124 of title 18, United States Code.. 124.Accessing vehicle data2730.
Section 55
2730. Definitions In this chapter: The term access— means any retrieval of covered vehicle data, regardless of— whether the data is obtained as the information is being produced or from digital storage; and where the vehicle data is stored or transmitted, including by wire or radio; and does not include data covered by chapter 119 of this title or section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804). The term consent— means an affirmative, express, and voluntary agreement that— states that the person providing the consent is providing consent to a government official to access the digital contents, access credential, or online account information, or other information being sought; specifies the type of content, access credential, or online account information the person is providing access to; specifies the time period of the covered vehicle data to be accessed; informs the person providing consent that consent is optional and that the government official attempting to obtain consent must otherwise acquire a warrant if consent is not obtained; does not involve sanctions or the threat of sanctions for withholding consent; and uses clear, simple, and comprehensible language that is presented in a way that is accessible to the person providing consent; and does not include consent obtained through agreement to a generic privacy policy. The term covered vehicle data— means all onboard and telematics data generated by, processed by, or stored on a noncommercial vehicle using computing, storage and communication systems installed, attached to, or carried in the vehicle, including diagnostic data, entertainment system data, navigation data, images or data captured by onboard sensors, or cameras, including images or data used to support automated features or autonomous driving, internet access, and communication to and from vehicle occupants; includes data gathered by event data recorders; and does not include— automotive software installed by the manufacturer, as defined by applicable industry standards or regulations; any data subject to chapter 119 of this title or section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804); or data that is collected from outside the vehicle, including speed data and geolocation data, for purposes of traffic, law enforcement, or toll collection. The term event data recorder has the meaning given the term in section 563.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on March 5, 2019). The term investigative or law enforcement officer means any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof and any Tribal justice official, who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for a violation of Federal or State law. The term noncommercial vehicle has the meaning given the term non-CMV in section 383.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. The term State means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the United States. The term vehicle operator means— a person who controls the operation of a vehicle at the time consent is sought; and with respect to a vehicle that is not classified as a highly autonomous vehicle by the Secretary of Transportation, the driver of the vehicle.
Section 56
2731. Prohibition on access to vehicle data Except as provided in subsection (b), an investigative or law enforcement officer may not access covered vehicle data unless pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the procedures described in rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction, or as otherwise provided in this chapter or sections 104 and 303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804, 1823). An investigative or law enforcement officer may access covered vehicle data if— the vehicle operator provides prior consent to such access; and no passenger 14 years of age or older objects to the access. If the vehicle operator cannot be located with reasonable effort, the vehicle owner or, in the case of a leased vehicle, the lessee, may provide consent under this paragraph. No individual may provide or withhold consent under this paragraph or object to another individual accessing covered vehicle data if the individual— is the vehicle operator who is in unlawful possession of the vehicle; or is a passenger who unlawfully obtained access to the vehicle. Consent provided under this paragraph shall be in writing unless— the person providing the consent requests that the consent be made orally; and the request for consent and the consent are recorded. If the vehicle operator is not the owner of the vehicle and provides consent under this paragraph, the consent is valid only with respect to covered vehicle data generated during the lawful possession and use of the vehicle by the vehicle operator. An investigative or law enforcement officer, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, may access covered vehicle data if— such officer reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists that— involves immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person; and requires access to covered vehicle data before such officer can, with due diligence, obtain a warrant; there are grounds upon which a warrant could be granted to authorize such access; and an application for a warrant approving such access is submitted to a court within 48 hours after the access has occurred or begins to occur. If an application for a warrant submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A)(iii) is denied, any covered vehicle data accessed under this paragraph shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter. In addition to the exceptions in paragraphs (1) and (2), data recorded or transmitted by an event data recorder may be accessed from a noncommercial vehicle if authorized by paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of section 24302(b) of the Driver Privacy Act of 2015 (49 U.S.C. 30101 note). Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to require the transmission or storage of data that is not otherwise transmitted or stored, or the retrieval of data that is not generally retrievable.
Section 57
2732. Prohibition on use of acquired information as evidence If any covered vehicle data has been acquired in violation of this chapter, no part of such information and no evidence derived therefrom may be used, received in evidence, or otherwise disseminated in any investigation, trial, hearing, or other proceeding by, in, or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. No data described in section 2731(b)(3) may be used to establish probable cause.
Section 58
801. Enhanced annual reports by Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Section 603(a)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1873(a)(1)) is amended— in subparagraph (E), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; in subparagraph (F), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and by adding at the end the following: the number of certifications by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court pursuant to section 103(j); the number of petitions to certify a question made by an amicus curiae pursuant to section 103(i)(7)(A); the number of hearings or rehearings by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc pursuant to section 103(a)(2), disaggregated by hearings or rehearings by such court en banc pursuant to clause (i) or (ii) of such section; and the number of times amici curiae have been appointed pursuant to section 103(i)(2). (G)the number of certifications by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court pursuant to section 103(j);(H)the number of petitions to certify a question made by an amicus curiae pursuant to section 103(i)(7)(A); (I)the number of hearings or rehearings by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc pursuant to section 103(a)(2), disaggregated by hearings or rehearings by such court en banc pursuant to clause (i) or (ii) of such section; and(J)the number of times amici curiae have been appointed pursuant to section 103(i)(2)..
Section 59
802. Enhanced annual reports by Director of National Intelligence Subsection (b) of section 603 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1873(b)) is amended— in paragraph (2)(C), by striking the semicolon and inserting ; and; by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (7) as paragraphs (6) through (10), respectively; by inserting after paragraph (2) the following: a description of the subject matter of each of the certifications provided under section 702(h); statistics revealing the number of persons and identifiers targeted under section 702(a), disaggregated by certification under which the person or identifier was targeted; the total number of directives issued pursuant to section 702(i)(1), disaggregated by each type of electronic communication service provider described in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 701(b)(4); by adding at the end the following: the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of United States persons regardless of whether the identities of the United States persons were openly included or masked; the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by this Act containing the identities of United States persons regardless of whether the identities of the United States persons were openly included or masked; the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were masked; the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by this Act containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were masked; the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were openly included; and the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by this Act containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were openly included; the number of queries conducted in an effort to find communications or information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information that required a warrant pursuant to section 302; and the number of queries conducted in an effort to find communications or information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information that did not require a warrant pursuant to section 302; and the number of criminal proceedings in which the Federal Government or a government of a State or political subdivision thereof entered into evidence or otherwise used or disclosed in a criminal proceeding any information obtained or derived from an acquisition conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, outside the authorities provided by this Act. Subsection (d) of such section is amended— by striking paragraph (2); and by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2). Subsection (d)(1) of such section is amended by striking paragraphs (3), (5), or (6) and inserting paragraph (6), (8), or (9). (3)a description of the subject matter of each of the certifications provided under section 702(h);(4)statistics revealing the number of persons and identifiers targeted under section 702(a), disaggregated by certification under which the person or identifier was targeted;(5)the total number of directives issued pursuant to section 702(i)(1), disaggregated by each type of electronic communication service provider described in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 701(b)(4);; and (11)(A)the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of United States persons regardless of whether the identities of the United States persons were openly included or masked;(B)the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by this Act containing the identities of United States persons regardless of whether the identities of the United States persons were openly included or masked;(C)the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were masked;(D)the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by this Act containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were masked;(E)the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection pursuant to section 702 containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were openly included; and(F)the total number of disseminated intelligence reports derived from collection not authorized by this Act containing the identities of United States persons in which the identities of the United States persons were openly included;(12)(A)the number of queries conducted in an effort to find communications or information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information that required a warrant pursuant to section 302; and(B)the number of queries conducted in an effort to find communications or information of or about 1 or more United States persons or persons reasonably believed to be located in the United States at the time of the query or the time of the communication or creation of the information that did not require a warrant pursuant to section 302; and(13)the number of criminal proceedings in which the Federal Government or a government of a State or political subdivision thereof entered into evidence or otherwise used or disclosed in a criminal proceeding any information obtained or derived from an acquisition conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), or successor order, outside the authorities provided by this Act..
Section 60
803. Annual reporting on accuracy and completeness of applications Section 603 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1873) is amended— by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and by inserting after subsection (d) the following: In April each year, the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and publish on the website of the Department of Justice, subject to a declassification review, a report setting forth, with respect to the preceding calendar year, the following: A summary of all accuracy or completeness reviews of applications for court orders submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under this Act. The total number of such applications reviewed for accuracy or completeness. The total number of material errors or omissions identified during such reviews. The total number of nonmaterial errors or omissions identified during such reviews. The total number of instances in which facts contained in an application were not supported by documentation that existed in the applicable file being reviewed at the time of the review. An explanation for any increase or decrease in the number of errors identified under subparagraphs (C) and (D), and in the event of an increase in the number of errors, a description of any action taken by the Department to improve compliance and accuracy. In addition to conducting audits under section 401 of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall— periodically assess the reports required by paragraph (1); and as determined by the Inspector General, report any risks identified through such assessments to the appropriate committees of Congress. In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress has the meaning given that term in section 101. (e)Annual report by Attorney General on accuracy and completeness of applications(1)Report requiredIn April each year, the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and publish on the website of the Department of Justice, subject to a declassification review, a report setting forth, with respect to the preceding calendar year, the following: (A)A summary of all accuracy or completeness reviews of applications for court orders submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under this Act. (B)The total number of such applications reviewed for accuracy or completeness.(C)The total number of material errors or omissions identified during such reviews.(D)The total number of nonmaterial errors or omissions identified during such reviews.(E)The total number of instances in which facts contained in an application were not supported by documentation that existed in the applicable file being reviewed at the time of the review.(F)An explanation for any increase or decrease in the number of errors identified under subparagraphs (C) and (D), and in the event of an increase in the number of errors, a description of any action taken by the Department to improve compliance and accuracy. (2)Inspector General risk assessmentIn addition to conducting audits under section 401 of the Government Surveillance Reform Act of 2023, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall—(A)periodically assess the reports required by paragraph (1); and(B)as determined by the Inspector General, report any risks identified through such assessments to the appropriate committees of Congress.(3)Definition of appropriate committees of CongressIn this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress has the meaning given that term in section 101..
Section 61
804. Allowing more granular aggregate reporting by recipients of foreign intelligence surveillance orders Subsection (a) of section 604 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1874) is amended— by striking paragraphs (1) through (3) and inserting the following: A semiannual report that aggregates the number of orders, directives, or national security letters with which the person was required to comply into separate categories of— the number of national security letters received, reported— for the first 1000 national security letters received, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and for more than 1000 national security letters received, the precise number of national security letters received; the number of customer selectors targeted by national security letters, reported— for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the precise number of customer selectors targeted; the number of orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for contents— reported— for the first 1000 orders and directives received, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and for more than 1000 orders and directives received, the precise number of orders received; and disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702; the number of customer selectors targeted under orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for contents— reported— for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the precise number of customer selectors targeted; and disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702; the number of orders or directives received under this Act for noncontents— reported— for the first 1000 orders or directives received, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and for more than 1000 orders or directives received, the precise number of orders received; and disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702; and the number of customer selectors targeted under orders or directives under this Act for noncontents— reported— for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the precise number of customer selectors targeted; and disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702. by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (2). Such section is amended— by redesignating subsections (b) through (d) as subsections (c) through (e), respectively; and by inserting after subsection (a) the following: A person who publicly reports information under subsection (a) may also publicly report, using a semiannual report, information relating to the previous 180 days that indicates whether the person was or was not required to comply with an order, directive, or national security letter issued under each of sections 105, 402, and 702 and the provisions listed in section 603(f)(3). Subsection (c) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (b)(1) of this section, is amended— in paragraph (1), by striking or (2); by striking paragraph (2); by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2); and in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking (4) and inserting (2). (1)A semiannual report that aggregates the number of orders, directives, or national security letters with which the person was required to comply into separate categories of—(A)the number of national security letters received, reported—(i)for the first 1000 national security letters received, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and(ii)for more than 1000 national security letters received, the precise number of national security letters received;(B)the number of customer selectors targeted by national security letters, reported—(i)for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and(ii)for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the precise number of customer selectors targeted;(C)the number of orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for contents—(i)reported—(I)for the first 1000 orders and directives received, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and(II)for more than 1000 orders and directives received, the precise number of orders received; and(ii)disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702;(D)the number of customer selectors targeted under orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for contents—(i)reported—(I)for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and(II)for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the precise number of customer selectors targeted; and(ii)disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702;(E)the number of orders or directives received under this Act for noncontents—(i)reported—(I)for the first 1000 orders or directives received, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and(II)for more than 1000 orders or directives received, the precise number of orders received; and(ii)disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702; and(F)the number of customer selectors targeted under orders or directives under this Act for noncontents—(i)reported—(I)for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in bands of 200 starting with 1–200; and(II)for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the precise number of customer selectors targeted; and(ii)disaggregated by whether the order or directive was issued under section 105, 402, or 702.; and (b)Additional disclosuresA person who publicly reports information under subsection (a) may also publicly report, using a semiannual report, information relating to the previous 180 days that indicates whether the person was or was not required to comply with an order, directive, or national security letter issued under each of sections 105, 402, and 702 and the provisions listed in section 603(f)(3)..
Section 62
805. Report on use of foreign intelligence surveillance authorities regarding protected activities and protected classes Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board shall make publicly available and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the use of activities and protected classes described in subsection (b) in— applications for orders made by the United States Government under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and investigations for which such orders are sought. The activities and protected classes described in this subsection are the following: Activities and expression protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Race, ethnicity, national origin, and religious affiliation. In addition to the report made publicly available and submitted under subsection (a), the Board may submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified annex.
Section 63
806. Publication of estimates regarding communications collected under certain provisions of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall publish a good faith estimate of— the number of United States persons whose communications are collected under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a); or the number of communications collected under such section to which a party is a person located in the United States at the time of communication.
Section 64
807. Enhanced reporting of assessments of compliance with emergency order requirements under certain provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Section 105(e)(6) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)(6)) is amended by striking shall assess compliance and inserting shall not less frequently than annually assess compliance. Section 108(a)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)(2)) is amended— in subparagraph (C), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; in subparagraph (D), by striking section 301(e). and inserting section 304(e); and; and by adding at the end the following: the annual assessment conducted pursuant to section 105(e)(6). Section 304(e)(6) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(e)(6)) is amended by striking shall assess compliance and inserting shall not less frequently than annually assess compliance. Section 306 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1826) is amended— in paragraph (3), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; in paragraph (4), by striking the period and inserting ; and; and by adding at the end the following: the annual assessment conducted pursuant to section 304(e)(6). (E)the annual assessment conducted pursuant to section 105(e)(6).. (5)the annual assessment conducted pursuant to section 304(e)(6)..
Section 65
901. Severability If any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such a provision or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of and amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provision or amendment held to be unconstitutional to any other person or circumstance, shall not be affected thereby.
Section 66
902. Limited delays in implementation The Attorney General may, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence as may be appropriate, delay implementation of a provision of this Act or an amendment made by this Act for a period of not more than 1 year upon a showing to the appropriate committees of Congress that the delay is necessary— to develop and implement technical systems needed to comply with the provision or amendment; or to hire or train personnel needed to comply with the provision or amendment.