S257-119

Passed Senate

To improve the resilience of critical supply chains, and for other purposes.

119th Congress Introduced Jan 27, 2025

Legislative Progress

Passed Senate
Introduced Committee Passed
Apr 28, 2025

Reported by Mr. Cruz, with amendments

Apr 28, 2025 (inferred)

Passed Senate (inferred from es version)

Jan 27, 2025

Ms. Cantwell (for herself, Mrs. Blackburn, and Ms. Blunt Rochester) …

Jan 27, 2025

Ms. Cantwell (for herself, Mrs. Blackburn, Ms. Blunt Rochester, and …

Summary

What This Bill Does

The Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025 creates a new program within the Department of Commerce to monitor and strengthen America's supply chains for critical goods like semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and defense materials. It establishes an interagency working group to identify vulnerabilities, assess which industries and materials are most critical to national security, and develop strategies to reduce dependence on adversarial nations (particularly China) while encouraging domestic and allied manufacturing.

Who Benefits and How

US manufacturers of critical goods stand to gain the most, as the bill directs the Commerce Department to promote domestic production and help companies relocate manufacturing from China to the US or allied nations. Semiconductor manufacturers, AI companies, quantum computing firms, and advanced materials producers would be specifically designated as critical emerging technology sectors eligible for government support and attention. Defense contractors and critical infrastructure providers would benefit from increased government focus on supply chain resilience and potential surge capacity programs. Taxpayers also benefit slightly since the bill prohibits new appropriations, requiring the program to operate within existing budgets.

Who Bears the Burden and How

US companies that currently rely on Chinese supply chains face increased scrutiny and pressure to diversify away from nonmarket economies, which will likely increase their costs in the short term. The Department of Commerce receives significant new responsibilities without additional funding, forcing them to reallocate existing resources. Chinese manufacturers and suppliers of critical goods will see reduced access to US markets as the bill explicitly aims to decrease American reliance on countries designated as nonmarket economies or national security risks.

Key Provisions

  • Requires the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis to designate which industries, supply chains, and goods are "critical" to national security within 120 days, with public comment and updates every 4 years
  • Establishes a Supply Chain Resilience Working Group comprising 10 federal agencies (State, Defense, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, Agriculture, Interior, HHS, National Intelligence, and SBA) to coordinate crisis response
  • Mandates annual reports to Congress identifying supply chain vulnerabilities, threats from adversarial nations, domestic manufacturing capacity, and strategies to build resilience
  • Defines "emerging technologies" to include AI, quantum computing, semiconductors, blockchain, additive manufacturing, robotics, and advanced materials
  • Sunsets the entire program after 10 years from enactment
Model: claude-opus-4-5-20251101
Generated: Dec 25, 2025 20:19

Evidence Chain:

This summary is derived from the structured analysis below. See "Detailed Analysis" for per-title beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

Primary Purpose

Establishes a framework within the Department of Commerce to assess, monitor, and strengthen critical supply chains and emerging technologies to protect against disruptions from natural disasters, pandemics, geopolitical conflicts, and adversarial nations.

Policy Domains

Manufacturing Trade National Security Technology Supply Chain Management Commerce

Legislative Strategy

"Centralize supply chain vulnerability assessment and crisis response in Commerce Department; create interagency coordination mechanism; encourage domestic manufacturing and allied sourcing; reduce dependence on adversarial nations (particularly China, given nonmarket economy designation)"

Likely Beneficiaries

  • US manufacturers of critical goods and production equipment
  • Defense contractors and critical infrastructure providers
  • Allied nations' manufacturers (nearshoring opportunities)
  • Department of Commerce (expanded authority and mandate)

Likely Burden Bearers

  • Companies relying on Chinese/nonmarket economy supply chains (increased scrutiny, potential compliance burdens)
  • Taxpayers (administrative costs for new programs, though Section 5 prohibits new appropriations)
  • Small businesses potentially unable to diversify supply chains as quickly as larger firms

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Manufacturing Supply Chain Management National Security
Actor Mappings
"the_secretary"
→ Secretary of Commerce (per Section 7)
"the_secretary_of_state"
→ Secretary of State
"the_assistant_secretary"
→ Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis
"the_secretary_of_homeland_security"
→ Secretary of Homeland Security
"the_united_states_trade_representative"
→ United States Trade Representative
Domains
Supply Chain Management National Security Manufacturing
Actor Mappings
"the_secretary"
→ Secretary of Commerce
"the_working_group"
→ Supply Chain Resilience Working Group (interagency)
"the_assistant_secretary"
→ Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis
Domains
Commerce Government Operations
Actor Mappings
"the_assistant_secretary"
→ Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis

Note: Multiple 'Secretaries' referenced throughout: Secretary of Commerce (default), Secretary of Homeland Security (Section 2), Secretary of State (Section 2), but 'The Secretary' always means Secretary of Commerce per Section 7(20)

Key Definitions

Terms defined in this bill

14 terms
"Appropriate committees of Congress" §7(1)

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; Committee on Energy and Commerce and Committee on Homeland Security of the House

"Ally or key international partner nation" §7(2)

A country that (A) shares common strategic interests with the US and is aligned on critical supply chain resilience, OR (B) is NOT designated by the Department of Commerce as a nonmarket economy or by the US Trade Representative as a priority foreign country for trade enforcement

"Assistant Secretary" §7(3)

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis

"Covered nongovernmental representative" §7(4)

A representative of labor, consumer, academic, or nonprofit organization

"Critical and emerging technology" §7(5)

Any technology included in the National Critical and Emerging Technologies List or identified by the Assistant Secretary

"Critical good" §7(6)

A good designated by the Assistant Secretary as critical (Section 3(d))

"Critical industry" §7(7)

An industry designated by the Assistant Secretary as critical (Section 3(d))

"Critical supply chain" §7(8)

A supply chain designated by the Assistant Secretary as critical (Section 3(d))

"Domestic enterprise" §7(9)

A business entity organized under US law with principal place of business in the US

"Domestic manufacturer" §7(10)

A person that manufactures a good in the US

"Emerging technology" §7(11)

A technology included in the National Emerging Technologies List (per NDAA)

"Resilient critical supply chain" §7(19)

A critical supply chain that can sustain critical industry production and access to critical goods during a supply chain shock

"Secretary" §7(20)

Secretary of Commerce

"Supply chain shock" §7(22)

Event causing severe disruption to supply chain: natural disaster, pandemic, biological threat, cyber attack, geopolitical conflict, terrorist attack, trade disruption from adversarial country, or presidential emergency declaration

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology