S2342-119

Reported

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

119th Congress Introduced Jul 17, 2025

Summary

What This Bill Does

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 authorizes classified intelligence spending, CIA Retirement and Disability Fund appropriations, compensation authority, and reprogramming limits, then adds a large management and oversight package for the Intelligence Community. It requires reviews of commercial messaging-app policies, gives the National Security Agency authority to produce and disseminate intelligence products, limits procurement of risky telecommunications equipment, reforms the Department of Homeland Security intelligence office, creates dissemination procedures for nonpublic information about U.S. persons, requires FBI case-data reporting, and prohibits discrimination in intelligence employment. The bill also rewrites parts of the ODNI structure by changing DNI responsibilities, reforming the National Intelligence Council, transferring or redesigning counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and biosecurity functions, and limiting certain management funds. It adds reports and operational requirements focused on Chinese Communist Party wealth, Chinese military biotechnology companies, PRC investments, Russian shadow-fleet sanctions, Mexico counternarcotics work, Sudan foreign-adversary influence, Iranian enrichment, and warnings to U.S. persons targeted by Iranian lethal plotting. Technology sections create an Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund, biotechnology talent programs, genomic-data security policy, synthetic DNA and RNA procurement controls, advanced nuclear assessments, outbound-investment intelligence-gap reviews, AI Security Center duties, high-impact AI rules, and critical-technology information sharing. Later titles address classification, security clearances, inspectors general, whistleblower urgent concerns, anomalous health incidents, COVID-origin declassification, counterintelligence briefings, visa denials for foreign intelligence officers, diplomatic tour limits, national-security waivers for intelligence facilities, CFIUS real estate near intelligence sites, voting-system cybersecurity testing, Church Committee records, Energy Department foreign-material acquisitions, and access limits for foreign nationals at sensitive laboratories.

Who Benefits and How

Intelligence Community agencies benefit from authorized fiscal year 2026 funding, transfer rules, technology bridge funding, AI-security authority, and clearer roles for NSA, CIA, FBI, DHS intelligence functions, and ODNI components. Congressional intelligence committees benefit from recurring classified schedules, budget controls, foreign-adversary reports, FBI case-data reports, procurement notifications, declassification notices, and inspector general urgent-concern channels. U.S. persons threatened by Iranian plots benefit from a statutory duty-to-warn focus that pushes intelligence agencies to notify Americans facing lethal Iranian threats. Intelligence Community whistleblowers benefit from stronger inspector general and urgent-concern protections that preserve lawful disclosures to oversight bodies. Election officials benefit from voting-system cybersecurity testing and coordinated vulnerability disclosure requirements. Domestic synthetic DNA suppliers and biotechnology-security programs benefit because the bill steers procurement and intelligence attention toward secure domestic supply chains and away from Chinese military biotechnology companies. Security clearance applicants and inactive clearance holders benefit from process-parity and inactive-clearance provisions that can reduce avoidable workforce friction.

Who Bears the Burden and How

The Director of National Intelligence must restructure ODNI roles, manage intelligence task forces, implement technology and AI requirements, deliver foreign-threat reports, and oversee multiple transfers or repeals of intelligence offices. CIA, FBI, NSA, DHS intelligence office, and other Intelligence Community agencies must absorb new reporting, procurement, dissemination, clearance, counterintelligence, declassification, and whistleblower-process duties. Chinese military biotechnology companies face procurement restrictions and more intelligence scrutiny when intelligence agencies assess contracting or supply-chain exposure. Russian shadow fleet operators, Iranian intelligence operatives, and other foreign adversary actors face additional reporting, sanctions-support, monitoring, and warning mechanisms. Foreign intelligence officers and certain diplomatic personnel face visa, tour-limit, travel-protocol, and agent-policy restrictions. Federal laboratories and nuclear facilities must enforce new restrictions on admittance by certain foreign nationals and handle Energy Department material-acquisition reporting.

Key Provisions

  • Authorizes fiscal year 2026 intelligence funding, CIA retirement funding, compensation authority, and limits on transfers and reprogramming.
  • Requires management reforms for ODNI, the National Intelligence Council, the National Counterterrorism Center, DHS intelligence functions, CIA biosecurity work, FBI counterintelligence roles, and national intelligence task forces.
  • Directs reports and intelligence activity on Chinese biotechnology companies, CCP leadership wealth, PRC investments, Russian shadow fleet sanctions, Mexico counternarcotics planning, Sudan foreign-adversary influence, Iranian enrichment, and Iranian lethal plotting against U.S. persons.
  • Creates or expands technology-security tools covering the Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund, biotechnology talent, genomic-data protection, synthetic DNA and RNA procurement, advanced nuclear technologies, outbound investment, public AI models, high-impact AI, and critical emerging technology sharing.
  • Requires clearance, classification, declassification, anomalous-health-incident, COVID-origin, inspector general, and whistleblower reforms that give Congress more oversight evidence.
  • Restricts procurement, visas, diplomatic tours, travel protocols, foreign-agent policy, CFIUS real estate near intelligence sites, voting-system cybersecurity handling, and foreign access to sensitive Energy facilities.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Authorizes fiscal year 2026 intelligence programs while restructuring intelligence offices, tightening oversight and procurement rules, adding foreign-adversary reporting, strengthening AI and biotechnology security work, and expanding whistleblower, declassification, clearance, election-security, and duty-to-warn protections.

Key Policy Areas

National Security, Intelligence, Technology, Government Oversight

Primary Purpose

Authorizes fiscal year 2026 intelligence programs while restructuring intelligence offices, tightening oversight and procurement rules, adding foreign-adversary reporting, strengthening AI and biotechnology security work, and expanding whistleblower, declassification, clearance, election-security, and duty-to-warn protections.

Policy Domains

National Security Intelligence Technology Government Oversight

Bill provisions

Identified Gains
  • Intelligence Community agencies
  • Congressional intelligence committees
  • U.S. persons threatened by Iranian plots
  • Intelligence Community whistleblowers
  • Election officials
  • Domestic synthetic DNA suppliers
  • Security clearance applicants
  • AI Security Center
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rs
AI Security Center: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Election officials: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Security clearance applicants: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Intelligence Community agencies: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Domestic synthetic DNA suppliers: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Congressional intelligence committees: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Intelligence Community whistleblowers: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
U.S. persons threatened by Iranian plots: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Identified Costs
  • Director of National Intelligence
  • Central Intelligence Agency
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation
  • National Security Agency
  • DHS intelligence office
  • Chinese military biotechnology companies
  • Russian shadow fleet operators
  • Iranian intelligence operatives
  • Foreign intelligence officers
  • Federal laboratories
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rs
Federal laboratories: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
DHS intelligence office: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
National Security Agency: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Central Intelligence Agency: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Foreign intelligence officers: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Russian shadow fleet operators: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Federal Bureau of Investigation: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Iranian intelligence operatives: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Director of National Intelligence: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Chinese military biotechnology companies: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Legislative Progress

Reported
Introduced Committee Passed
Jul 29, 2025

By Senator Cotton from Select Committee on Intelligence filed written …

Jul 17, 2025

Mr. Cotton, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, reported the …

Jul 17, 2025

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. …

Jul 17, 2025

Select Committee on Intelligence. Original measure reported to Senate by …

Jul 17, 2025

Introduced in Senate

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Government
448 mentions across 107 clauses
+218 positive -230 negative

AI Security Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Congressional intelligence committees

Positive-direction: AI Security Center, Congressional intelligence committees, Intelligence Community agencies

Negative-direction: Central Intelligence Agency, DHS intelligence office, Director of National Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal laboratories, Foreign intelligence officers, Iranian intelligence operatives, National Security Agency

Pharmaceuticals
57 mentions across 33 clauses
+24 positive -33 negative

Chinese military biotechnology companies, Domestic synthetic DNA suppliers

Positive-direction: Domestic synthetic DNA suppliers

Negative-direction: Chinese military biotechnology companies

Government Employees
27 mentions across 27 clauses
+27 positive

Intelligence Community whistleblowers, Security clearance applicants

Transportation
9 mentions across 9 clauses
-9 negative

Russian shadow fleet operators

General Public
8 mentions across 8 clauses
+8 positive

U.S. persons threatened by Iranian plots

State & Local Government
6 mentions across 6 clauses
+6 positive

Election officials

107/124
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
National Security Intelligence Technology Government Oversight
Actor Mappings
"cia"
→ Central Intelligence Agency
"dni"
→ Director of National Intelligence
"fbi"
→ Federal Bureau of Investigation
"nsa"
→ National Security Agency

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology