DETERRENT Act
Analysis under review: This bill has generated analysis that may be too generic or incomplete. Clause-level evidence remains available below.
Summary
The DETERRENT Act overhauls how colleges and universities report foreign money. It lowers the reporting threshold to ,000 for gifts and contracts from ordinary foreign sources, and requires disclosure of ALL gifts from countries of concern (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) regardless of amount. Contracts with countries or entities of concern are banned unless the Secretary of Education grants a waiver, which requires interagency consultation with defense and intelligence agencies. Universities must establish compliance officer positions, maintain searchable public databases of foreign gifts, and share all reports with FBI, CIA, DNI, and other national security agencies within 30 days. Faculty and staff at major research universities must individually disclose foreign gifts over minimal value and all contracts with countries of concern. Violations carry escalating fines: first offense up to the value of the undisclosed gift or 10% of federal funding; repeat offenders face double penalties and potential loss of all Title IV federal student aid eligibility for at least 2 years. A GAO study must evaluate enforcement coordination.
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Strengthens disclosure requirements for foreign gifts and contracts at institutions of higher education, prohibits contracts with foreign countries and entities of concern (e.g., China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), and creates enforcement mechanisms including substantial fines and loss of federal funding eligibility.
Who Benefits
- US national security agencies
- Research security establishment
- US-allied research institutions
Who Bears Costs
- Universities with foreign research funding
- University compliance offices
- Foreign-funded researchers
Key Policy Areas
{'domain': 'Education', 'evidence': 'Amends Higher Education Act of 1965 Section 117 on foreign gift disclosure'}, {'domain': 'Defense', 'evidence': 'Targets foreign countries of concern per 10 USC 4872 (China, Russia, etc.); espionage prevention'}, {'domain': 'Foreign Affairs', 'evidence': 'Interagency intel sharing with FBI, CIA, DNI, State, Defense, Commerce, DHS, DOE, NSF, NIH'}
Primary Purpose
Strengthens disclosure requirements for foreign gifts and contracts at institutions of higher education, prohibits contracts with foreign countries and entities of concern (e.g., China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), and creates enforcement mechanisms including substantial fines and loss of federal funding eligibility.
Policy Domains
Legislative Strategy
"Weaponizes federal funding eligibility as enforcement lever: universities that repeatedly violate disclosure rules lose access to Title IV student aid"
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
In CommitteeMr. Tillis (for himself, Mr. Cassidy, Mrs. Blackburn, Mrs. Capito, …
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, …
Introduced in Senate
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
Institutions of higher education, Major research universities (>M federal research funding), Non-compliant universities
DOJ and Department of Education, Department of Education, US national security agencies (FBI, CIA, DNI)
Positive-direction: US national security agencies (FBI, CIA, DNI)
Negative-direction: DOJ and Department of Education, Department of Education
Chinese academic institutions and Confucius Institutes, Foreign governments and entities providing university funding
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "the_secretary"
- → Secretary of Education
- "the_secretary"
- → Secretary of Education
- "the_secretary"
- → Secretary of Education
- "the_attorney_general"
- → Attorney General
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
Foreign governments, foreign legal entities, entities controlled by foreign sources, non-citizen natural persons, international organizations, foreign political organizations, agents of foreign principals
Any covered nation under 10 USC 4872 (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), plus countries the Secretary determines detrimental to US national security
Per 42 USC 19221(a), plus entities on the DOD list under the McCain NDAA
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology