HR881-119

Passed House

To establish Department of Homeland Security funding restrictions on institutions of higher education that have a relationship with Confucius Institutes, and for other purposes.

119th Congress Introduced May 8, 2025

Summary

What This Bill Does

The DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act restricts DHS funding for colleges and universities with certain China-linked relationships. It defines Chinese entities of concern to include Chinese universities or colleges involved in military-civil fusion, the Chinese defense industrial base, the Chinese defense science administration, Central Military Commission funding, support for Chinese security or intelligence organizations, undermining the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, Uyghur detention or forced labor, election disinformation or propaganda, or affiliation with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A relationship includes contracts, agreements, in-kind donations, or gifts from a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern. Beginning with the first fiscal year after 12 months from enactment, DHS must make institutions with relationships to a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entity of concern ineligible for DHS funds unless the relationship is terminated. DHS may grant one-year waivers after consulting the Director of National Intelligence if safeguards exist and the relationship is in U.S. national security interests or presents no direct or indirect national security risk. DHS must notify Congress before waivers take effect and provide outreach and technical assistance to institutions.

Who Benefits and How

Universities without covered China-linked relationships benefit because they face less competition for DHS funds from institutions with Confucius Institute or Chinese entity ties. U.S. research-security officials benefit from a funding lever to pressure institutions to sever or safeguard risky relationships. DHS grant managers benefit from statutory criteria for evaluating Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents, and Chinese entity relationships. Congress benefits from waiver notifications and justifications. Institutions that terminate covered relationships benefit by regaining eligibility for DHS funding.

Who Bears the Burden and How

Universities with Confucius Institute relationships risk losing DHS funds unless they terminate the relationship or obtain a waiver. Confucius Institutes in the United States face higher barriers to maintaining campus relationships. Chinese universities with defense, security, surveillance, election interference, Uyghur forced-labor, or Chinese Academy of Sciences ties become funding-risk triggers for U.S. institutions. The Secretary of Homeland Security must administer eligibility restrictions, waivers, outreach, technical assistance, and congressional notifications. The Director of National Intelligence must be consulted on waiver decisions.

Key Provisions

  • Defines Chinese entities of concern using military-civil fusion, defense, security, Taiwan, Uyghur, election-interference, and Chinese Academy of Sciences criteria.
  • Defines relationships to include contracts, agreements, in-kind donations, and gifts from Confucius Institutes or Chinese entities of concern.
  • Requires DHS funding ineligibility for institutions with covered relationships beginning after a 12-month transition.
  • Restores DHS funding eligibility when an institution terminates the covered relationship.
  • Authorizes one-year waivers after DHS consults the Director of National Intelligence and finds safeguards plus national-security grounds.
  • Requires congressional notification and justification before waivers or renewals take effect.
  • Requires DHS outreach and technical assistance for higher education institutions.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Makes higher education institutions with relationships to Confucius Institutes, the Thousand Talents Program, or specified Chinese entities of concern ineligible for Department of Homeland Security funds unless they terminate the relationship or receive a one-year national-security waiver after DHS consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, with congressional notification and DHS outreach and technical assistance.

Key Policy Areas

Education, National Security, Homeland Security

Primary Purpose

Makes higher education institutions with relationships to Confucius Institutes, the Thousand Talents Program, or specified Chinese entities of concern ineligible for Department of Homeland Security funds unless they terminate the relationship or receive a one-year national-security waiver after DHS consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, with congressional notification and DHS outreach and technical assistance.

Policy Domains

Education National Security Homeland Security

House resolution provisions

Identified Gains
  • Universities without covered China-linked relationships
  • U.S. research-security officials
  • DHS grant managers
  • Congressional oversight committees
  • Institutions terminating covered relationships
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rfs
DHS grant managers: ,
U.S. research-security officials: ,
Congressional oversight committees: ,
Institutions terminating covered relationships: ,
Universities without covered China-linked relationships: ,
Identified Costs
  • Universities with Confucius Institute relationships
  • Confucius Institutes in the United States
  • Chinese universities with defense ties
  • Secretary of Homeland Security
  • Director of National Intelligence
  • Higher education compliance offices
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rfs
Secretary of Homeland Security: ,
Director of National Intelligence: ,
Higher education compliance offices: ,
Chinese universities with defense ties: ,
Confucius Institutes in the United States: ,
Universities with Confucius Institute relationships: ,

Legislative Progress

Passed House
Introduced Committee Passed
May 8, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland …

May 8, 2025 (inferred)

Passed House (inferred from eh version)

May 5, 2025

Additional sponsors: Mr. Luttrell and Mr. Joyce of Pennsylvania

May 5, 2025

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the …

Jan 31, 2025

Mr. Pfluger (for himself, Mr. Garbarino, Mr. Evans of Colorado, …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Education
20 mentions across 5 clauses
+5 positive -15 negative

Chinese universities with defense ties, Confucius Institutes in the United States, Universities with Confucius Institute relationships

Positive-direction: Universities without covered China-linked relationships

Negative-direction: Chinese universities with defense ties, Confucius Institutes in the United States, Universities with Confucius Institute relationships

Government
10 mentions across 5 clauses
-10 negative

Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of Homeland Security

2/2
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown
House Roll #120

On Passage

DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act

Passed
266 Yea 153 Nay 14 Not Voting
May 7, 2025

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Education National Security Homeland Security
Actor Mappings
"dni"
→ Director of National Intelligence
"secretary"
→ Secretary of Homeland Security

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology