To establish Department of Homeland Security funding restrictions on institutions of higher education that have a relationship with Confucius Institutes, and for other purposes.
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
Passed HouseReceived; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland …
Passed House (inferred from eh version)
Additional sponsors: Mr. Luttrell and Mr. Joyce of Pennsylvania
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the …
Mr. Pfluger (for himself, Mr. Garbarino, Mr. Evans of Colorado, …
On Passage
DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act
Summary
What This Bill Does
This bill cuts off Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding to any college or university that has a relationship with a Chinese government-funded Confucius Institute, the Thousand Talents Program, or any Chinese university involved in military or intelligence activities. The funding ban takes effect 12 months after the bill becomes law, giving schools time to sever these ties.
Who Benefits and How
U.S. national security agencies benefit from reduced Chinese government presence on American campuses, limiting potential espionage and intellectual property theft at institutions receiving DHS grants. Universities without Chinese partnerships gain a competitive advantage when applying for DHS research funding, as schools with existing Confucius Institutes must either terminate those relationships or lose eligibility. Non-Chinese international academic programs may see increased demand as schools seek alternative cultural exchange partners.
Who Bears the Burden and How
Universities with existing Confucius Institute partnerships face a difficult choice: terminate relationships with Chinese institutions or forfeit all DHS funding, which supports homeland security research, cybersecurity programs, and emergency management training. Chinese cultural and academic exchange programs will see significantly reduced presence on U.S. campuses. Academic researchers collaborating with Chinese institutions may have ongoing projects disrupted if their university is deemed to have a "relationship" with a Chinese entity of concern.
Key Provisions
- Funding Ban: Beginning one year after enactment, DHS cannot provide funds to any college or university with a relationship with a Confucius Institute, Thousand Talents Program, or "Chinese entity of concern"
- Broad Definition of "Chinese Entity of Concern": Includes any Chinese university involved in military-civil fusion, defense work, supporting Chinese intelligence/police organizations, undermining U.S.-Taiwan relations, or aiding Uyghur detention
- Relationship Definition: Covers contracts, agreements, in-kind donations, or gifts from these Chinese entities
- Waiver Authority: DHS Secretary can grant one-year waivers (renewable annually) for schools with "robust safeguards" if the relationship serves national security interests or poses no security risk
- Congressional Oversight: Secretary must notify Congress 30 days before any waiver takes effect and submit annual reports on implementation
Evidence Chain:
This summary is derived from the structured analysis below. See "Detailed Analysis" for per-title beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
Primary Purpose
Prohibits Department of Homeland Security funding to colleges and universities that maintain relationships with Confucius Institutes, Thousand Talents Program, or Chinese entities of concern
Policy Domains
Legislative Strategy
"Use DHS funding as leverage to compel US universities to sever ties with Chinese government-sponsored academic programs deemed national security threats"
Likely Beneficiaries
- US national security agencies (reduced foreign intelligence access)
- Non-Chinese foreign academic partnerships (competitive advantage)
- Universities without Chinese partnerships (competitive advantage for DHS grants)
Likely Burden Bearers
- Universities with existing Confucius Institute partnerships (lose DHS funding unless they terminate relationships)
- Chinese cultural and academic exchange programs (reduced US presence)
- Academic researchers collaborating with Chinese institutions (restricted partnerships)
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "the_director"
- → Director of National Intelligence
- "the_secretary"
- → Secretary of Homeland Security
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
Any university or college in the People's Republic of China that is involved in military-civil fusion, defense industrial base, receives military funding, supports Chinese security/intelligence organizations, undermines US-Taiwan relations, aids detention of Uyghur Muslims, interferes in US elections, or is affiliated with Chinese Academy of Sciences
A cultural institute funded by the Government of the People's Republic of China
Has the meaning given in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002)
With respect to an institution of higher education, any contract awarded, agreement entered into, or any in-kind donation or gift received from a Confucius Institute or Chinese entity of concern
Any technological or educational program funded or administered by the Chinese Communist Party's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology