HR8290-119

What This Bill Does

The Exchange Rate Accountability Act of 2026 amends the Bretton Woods Agreements Act to create a U.S. review and opposition process for certain International Monetary Fund quota increases. At least seven days before consideration of a quota increase for a foreign IMF member that is one of the 10 largest IMF shareholders, the Treasury Secretary must report to House Financial Services and Senate Foreign Relations with a determination on three criteria. The member must not appear to have violated Article VIII obligations in the prior 12 months based on public data; must maintain transparent exchange-rate policies and practices and publish credible balance-of-payments data; and, if it recorded a current-account surplus, must not have persistently managed its exchange rate against the U.S. dollar to prevent effective balance-of-payments adjustment or gain unfair competitive advantage in international trade. If the member fails any criterion, Treasury must instruct the U.S. Governor of the IMF to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the quota increase. The President may waive the opposition requirement by reporting to Congress that the waiver is important to the U.S. national interest and explaining why. The bill clarifies that quota proposal consideration does not include consent to an authorized amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement and sunsets the section after seven years.

Who Benefits and How

Congressional financial-services and foreign-relations committees benefit from advance Treasury reports on IMF quota increases for major shareholders. U.S. manufacturers and exporters benefit if the United States opposes quota increases for countries that manipulate exchange rates or publish unreliable external data. Treasury international finance officials benefit from a statutory framework for evaluating exchange-rate and balance-of-payments criteria. U.S. trade enforcement advocates benefit from a tool linking IMF governance support to currency and trade behavior. IMF transparency advocates benefit from stronger incentives for major shareholders to publish credible balance-of-payments data. The U.S. IMF Governor benefits from clear voting instructions when criteria fail.

Who Bears the Burden and How

The Treasury Secretary must prepare determinations at least seven days before covered quota proposals and instruct opposition when criteria fail. Major IMF shareholders seeking quota increases face scrutiny over Article VIII compliance, exchange-rate transparency, balance-of-payments data, and current-account surplus behavior. The U.S. IMF Governor must oppose covered quota increases when Treasury determines a failure and no waiver applies. The President must justify any national-interest waiver to Congress. IMF staff and member governments may face delays or opposition in quota negotiations. Countries accused of unfair exchange-rate management may face reputational and governance costs.

Key Provisions

• Requires Treasury reports before IMF quota increases for top-10 IMF shareholders.
• Requires determinations on Article VIII compliance, exchange-rate transparency, credible balance-of-payments data, and exchange-rate management for trade advantage.
• Directs the U.S. IMF Governor to oppose quota increases when a covered member fails any criterion.
• Allows a presidential national-interest waiver with a report to Congress.
• Clarifies proposal consideration and sunsets the section after seven years.