HR7873-119

In Committee

Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act of 2026

119th Congress Introduced Mar 9, 2026

Summary

What This Bill Does

The Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act authorizes the State, Commerce, and Energy Departments to prioritize and facilitate U.S. energy exports and projects that diversify Taiwan's energy supply. They may work with U.S. LNG producers, exporters, infrastructure companies, Taiwanese authorities, and private stakeholders; address export and storage barriers; support investment and U.S. technology exports; and assess Taiwan's LNG import capacity.

Within one year, the National Academy of Sciences must assess opportunities and methods to increase U.S. LNG exports to Taiwan, including possible redirection of exports then flowing to China. The study does not itself redirect a shipment or alter export licenses or private contracts.

State, coordinating with Defense and Energy, may seek to engage Taiwanese ministries on grid, LNG terminal, storage, control-system, physical-security, redundancy, continuity, training, workforce, and emergency-response resilience. State may establish a U.S.-Taiwan Energy Security Center in the United States using universities and private-sector expertise and may provide technical assistance. Assistance must flow through the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with Taiwan, and remains subject to regular foreign-assistance notification requirements.

State must brief Congress within 180 days. It must also report within 180 days and annually for three years on actions, export and investment barriers, infrastructure-security cooperation, capacity-building effectiveness, and recommendations. Reports are unclassified but may contain a classified annex. The Act also adds critical-energy-infrastructure protection to existing Taiwan training authority.

Congressional findings and a nonbinding sense of Congress encourage Taiwan to retain nuclear power and consider Gen III+ and small modular reactors, and encourage U.S. assistance and cooperation. They do not require Taiwan to restart a plant or purchase U.S. reactors.

The Transportation Secretary may provide Federal insurance or reinsurance for vessels carrying critical energy, humanitarian, or other goods to Taiwan or another U.S. strategic partner facing coercive maritime threats after consulting Defense, State, and the Director of National Intelligence and making a necessity or deterrence finding. A specified existing statutory condition does not apply to those vessels.

The bill preserves the U.S. One China Policy. It does not appropriate a stated amount, mandate an LNG export, require private sellers to redirect cargo from China, compel creation of the energy center, guarantee insurance, or change Taiwan's sovereign energy policy.

Who Benefits and How

Taiwan's energy users, grid and terminal operators, emergency planners, and government agencies may gain diversified supplies, cybersecurity, infrastructure assistance, training, and insured maritime access. U.S. LNG, nuclear, cybersecurity, engineering, university, shipping, and energy-technology organizations may gain export, project, research, and service opportunities. Congress gains recurring implementation information.

Who Bears the Burden and How

State, Commerce, Energy, Defense, Transportation, the intelligence community, the National Academy, and the American Institute in Taiwan must coordinate assessments, notifications, briefings, and reports. Federal taxpayers bear the contingent risk of maritime insurance and technical assistance. Chinese LNG buyers could face reduced supply if private exports are redirected. Taiwan agencies and infrastructure operators bear participation and implementation work, but most substantive cooperation remains discretionary.

Key Provisions

  • Authorizes prioritization of U.S. energy exports to Taiwan.
  • Authorizes support for LNG storage and energy projects.
  • Requires an LNG redirection assessment within one year.
  • Authorizes grid and terminal cybersecurity cooperation.
  • Authorizes physical resilience and continuity planning.
  • Authorizes a U.S.-Taiwan Energy Security Center.
  • Routes assistance through the American Institute in Taiwan.
  • Requires a congressional briefing within 180 days.
  • Requires annual reports for three years.
  • Adds critical-energy protection to existing training authority.
  • Encourages nuclear cooperation through nonbinding language.
  • Authorizes maritime insurance for threatened strategic commerce.
  • Preserves the One China Policy.
  • Mandates no export, center, reactor purchase, or insurance policy.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Authorizes mostly discretionary U.S. diplomatic, commercial, technical, cybersecurity, infrastructure, academic, and maritime-insurance support for Taiwan's energy resilience, requires export and implementation assessments and reports, encourages nuclear cooperation, and preserves the One China Policy.

Key Policy Areas

Taiwan Energy Security, United States Energy Exports, Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Nuclear Energy Cooperation, Maritime War-Risk Insurance

Primary Purpose

Authorizes mostly discretionary U.S. diplomatic, commercial, technical, cybersecurity, infrastructure, academic, and maritime-insurance support for Taiwan's energy resilience, requires export and implementation assessments and reports, encourages nuclear cooperation, and preserves the One China Policy.

Policy Domains

Taiwan Energy Security United States Energy Exports Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Nuclear Energy Cooperation Maritime War-Risk Insurance

Sections 2 through 7 findings, discretionary export facilitation, mandatory LNG assessment, resilience cooperation, technical assistance, energy center, briefings and reports, training, nuclear policy, maritime insurance, and One China construction

Identified Gains
  • Energy consumers in Taiwan
  • Taiwan electric grid operators
  • Taiwan liquefied natural gas terminal operators
  • United States liquefied natural gas producers
  • United States energy technology exporters
  • United States cybersecurity firms
  • United States nuclear technology companies
  • Vessel operators serving threatened strategic partners
  • Universities participating in the energy security center
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
Energy consumers in Taiwan: , , , , , ,
Taiwan electric grid operators: , , , , , ,
United States cybersecurity firms: , , , , , ,
United States energy technology exporters: , , , , , ,
United States nuclear technology companies: , , , , , ,
United States liquefied natural gas producers: , , , , , ,
Taiwan liquefied natural gas terminal operators: , , , , , ,
Vessel operators serving threatened strategic partners: , , , , , ,
Universities participating in the energy security center: , , , , , ,
Identified Costs
  • Department of State energy security staff
  • Department of Energy export staff
  • Department of Commerce trade staff
  • Department of Defense resilience staff
  • Department of Transportation insurance staff
  • National Academy of Sciences researchers
  • Federal taxpayers exposed to maritime insurance risk
  • Chinese buyers affected by possible LNG redirection
  • Taiwan ministries coordinating resilience activities
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
Department of Energy export staff: , , , , , ,
Department of Commerce trade staff: , , , , , ,
Department of Defense resilience staff: , , , , , ,
National Academy of Sciences researchers: , , , , , ,
Department of State energy security staff: , , , , , ,
Department of Transportation insurance staff: , , , , , ,
Chinese buyers affected by possible LNG redirection: , , , , , ,
Federal taxpayers exposed to maritime insurance risk: , , , , , ,
Taiwan ministries coordinating resilience activities: , , , , , ,

Legislative Progress

In Committee
Introduced Committee Passed
Mar 9, 2026

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition …

Mar 9, 2026

Introduced in House

Mar 9, 2026

Mr. Harrigan (for himself, Mr. Olszewski, and Mr. Lawler) introduced …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Government
21 mentions across 8 clauses
+4 positive -13 negative ~2 mixed ?2 uncertain

Congressional energy committees, Congressional foreign affairs committees, Department of Commerce trade staff

Positive-direction: Congressional energy committees, Congressional foreign affairs committees

Negative-direction: Department of Commerce trade staff, Department of Defense maritime security staff, Department of Defense resilience staff, Department of Energy export staff, Department of State energy security staff, Department of Transportation insurance staff

Oil & Gas
9 mentions across 5 clauses
+6 positive -1 negative ?2 uncertain

Chinese buyers affected by possible LNG redirection, Taiwan liquefied natural gas terminal operators, United States liquefied natural gas producers

Positive-direction: Taiwan liquefied natural gas terminal operators, United States liquefied natural gas producers

Negative-direction: Chinese buyers affected by possible LNG redirection

Energy
8 mentions across 6 clauses
+6 positive ?2 uncertain

Energy consumers in Taiwan, Public users of Taiwan energy reports, United States energy technology exporters

Utilities
4 mentions across 4 clauses
+3 positive ?1 uncertain

Taiwan electric grid operators

Nuclear Energy
3 mentions across 1 clause
?3 uncertain

Taiwan civilian nuclear operators, Taiwan nuclear energy regulators, United States nuclear technology companies

Technology
2 mentions across 2 clauses
+2 positive

United States cybersecurity firms

Taxation
2 mentions across 2 clauses
-2 negative

Federal taxpayers exposed to maritime insurance risk, Federal taxpayers financing technical assistance

Financial Services
2 mentions across 1 clause
-1 negative ~1 mixed

Commercial marine insurers, Private war-risk insurance providers

8/11
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Taiwan Energy Security United States Energy Exports Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Nuclear Energy Cooperation Maritime War-Risk Insurance
Actor Mappings
"ait"
→ American Institute in Taiwan channeling technical assistance
"state_secretary"
→ Secretary of State leading energy diplomacy and resilience assistance
"energy_secretary"
→ Energy Secretary coordinating exports, technology, and resilience
"national_academy"
→ National Academy of Sciences conducting the LNG assessment
"defense_secretary"
→ Defense Secretary coordinating infrastructure and insurance security judgments
"commerce_secretary"
→ Commerce Secretary coordinating commercial export support
"taiwan_authorities"
→ Taiwan ministries and infrastructure officials participating in cooperation
"transportation_secretary"
→ Transportation Secretary deciding maritime insurance

Note: {'scope_ids': ['taiwan_energy_resilience'], 'description': 'The bill promotes possible redirection of U.S. LNG from China and broad resilience cooperation but leaves exports, engagement, the center, technical assistance, and insurance discretionary; mandatory duties are principally assessments, notifications, briefings, and reports, and the One China Policy remains unchanged.'}

Key Definitions

Terms defined in this bill

3 terms
"asymmetric threat" §asymmetric_threat

Cyberattack, sabotage, economic coercion, or another unconventional threat designed to disrupt critical infrastructure.

"United States-Taiwan Energy Security Center" §energy_security_center

A discretionary U.S.-based joint center using university and private-sector expertise for energy-security and resilience cooperation.

"strategic commerce insurance" §strategic_vessel_insurance

Discretionary Federal insurance or reinsurance for vessels carrying critical energy, humanitarian, or other goods to Taiwan or another strategic partner facing coercive maritime threats.

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology