Countering China’s Control of the Caucasus Act
Summary
What This Bill Does
The Countering China's Control of the Caucasus Act requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to submit a classified report as appropriate within 180 days on Russian and Chinese intelligence penetration in Georgia. The report must protect intelligence sources and methods, examine each country's intelligence elements and assets, and assess where Russian and Chinese influence or cooperation may intersect.
Within the same 180-day period, the Secretary of State must submit a detailed strategy for United States relations with Georgia. The strategy must set bilateral objectives reflecting Georgia's domestic political environment; identify tools, resources, and funding; assess whether Georgia should remain a top Europe and Eurasia funding recipient; determine whether continued United States investment is warranted; and evaluate the Georgian government's commitment to trade with the United States and Europe and to projects receiving United States support. The strategy is submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.
The preferred enrolled-House text sends the materials to the Senate Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations committees and the corresponding House Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations committees. The later modified clause adds the two appropriations committees to the earlier recipient list.
Who Benefits and How
Congressional foreign-affairs, intelligence, armed-services, and appropriations committees benefit from a coordinated evidentiary record for evaluating Georgia policy and funding. State Department policy planners gain a required framework for deciding bilateral objectives and investment. United States intelligence and defense officials gain an interagency venue for aligning assessments of Russian and Chinese activity.
Who Bears the Burden and How
State Department Georgia-policy staff must prepare both the intelligence report and the detailed strategy within 180 days. ODNI and Defense intelligence analysts must contribute assessments while protecting sources and methods. Georgian government officials and recipients of United States-supported projects face scrutiny that could affect future funding or investment. Russian and Chinese intelligence assets in Georgia face increased exposure risk. Congressional committee staff must securely review classified material.
Key Provisions
- Requires a coordinated report within 180 days on Russian intelligence penetration in Georgia.
- Requires the same report to examine Chinese intelligence elements and assets.
- Requires analysis of intersections between Russian and Chinese influence or cooperation.
- Protects intelligence sources and methods and permits classified reporting.
- Requires a detailed strategy for bilateral ties reflecting Georgia's domestic political environment.
- Requires decisions on tools, funding, continued investment, and Georgia's regional aid priority.
- Requires assessment of Georgia's commitment to trade with the United States and Europe.
- Adds House and Senate appropriations committees to the foreign-affairs, intelligence, and armed-services recipients.
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Requires a coordinated classified intelligence report on Russian and Chinese activity in Georgia and a State Department strategy assessing bilateral ties, regional funding, investment, trade alignment, and continued United States support.
Key Policy Areas
Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Georgia, Russia, China, Foreign Assistance
Primary Purpose
Requires a coordinated classified intelligence report on Russian and Chinese activity in Georgia and a State Department strategy assessing bilateral ties, regional funding, investment, trade alignment, and continued United States support.
Policy Domains
Section 2 intelligence report and Georgia strategy
Identified Gains
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation- Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
- House Foreign Affairs Committee staff
- Congressional intelligence committee staff
- Congressional armed-services committee staff
- Congressional appropriations committee staff
- State Department Georgia-policy planners
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation
Identified Costs
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation- State Department Georgia-report staff
- ODNI counterintelligence analysts
- Defense regional intelligence analysts
- Georgian government funding recipients
- Russian intelligence assets in Georgia
- Chinese intelligence assets in Georgia
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation
Sponsors
Joe Wilson
R-SC | Primary Sponsor
Legislative Progress
In CommitteeReceived in the Senate and Read twice and referred to …
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign …
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without …
On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, …
Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules …
DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate …
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H3967-3968)
Mr. Mast moved to suspend the rules and pass the …
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Introduced in House
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
Congressional intelligence committee staff, Defense regional intelligence analysts, House Appropriations Committee staff
Positive-direction: Congressional intelligence committee staff, House Appropriations Committee staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee staff, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
Negative-direction: Defense regional intelligence analysts, ODNI counterintelligence analysts, State Department Georgia-report staff
Chinese intelligence assets in Georgia, Georgian government funding recipients, Russian intelligence assets in Georgia
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "dni"
- → Director of National Intelligence
- "secretary"
- → Secretary of State
- "defense_secretary"
- → Secretary of Defense
- "relevant_committees"
- → Named House and Senate foreign-affairs, intelligence, armed-services, and appropriations committees
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
The named Senate Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations committees plus the corresponding House Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations committees.
The coordinated classified report examining Russian and Chinese intelligence elements, assets, influence, and cooperation in Georgia.
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology