HR7635-119

In Committee

CHARGE Act

119th Congress Introduced Feb 20, 2026

Summary

What This Bill Does

The CHARGE Act prohibits importing an energy-storage system with remote-monitoring capability when that monitoring technology is owned by, licensed by, or otherwise controlled through the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or an entity under their control. The restriction targets systems whose remote access could expose U.S. energy infrastructure to manipulation or disruption.

Customs and Border Protection must issue implementing regulations within 60 days and create methods to identify covered systems and enforce the import ban. Beginning within 180 days, CBP must review the market annually and may recommend additional restrictions. A person who knowingly violates the prohibition may face up to five years in prison, a fine of up to $250,000, or both for each shipment.

The Department of Commerce, in consultation with the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, must report within 180 days on covered Chinese systems already operating in the United States, their remote-control features, associated grid risks, and possible mitigation. The report may include a classified annex, and the reporting requirement terminates after six years.

Who Benefits and How

Electric utilities, grid operators, and electricity customers benefit from reduced exposure to foreign remote control of newly imported storage systems. Domestic and other non-PRC energy-storage suppliers gain an opportunity to replace products barred from import. Public-safety and national-security agencies benefit from a clearer inventory and risk assessment of affected systems already deployed.

Who Bears the Burden and How

Importers and utilities procuring covered PRC-linked storage systems must change suppliers, verify technology ownership and licensing, and absorb possible replacement or delay costs. PRC-linked storage manufacturers lose access to the U.S. import market for covered products. CBP must write regulations, inspect shipments, investigate ownership, and conduct annual reviews. Commerce, Energy, and Homeland Security staff must inventory deployed systems and report risks to Congress.

Key Provisions

  • Prohibits imports of energy-storage systems using covered PRC-linked remote-monitoring technology.
  • Requires CBP regulations and enforcement mechanisms within 60 days.
  • Requires annual CBP market reviews beginning within 180 days.
  • Imposes criminal penalties per shipment for knowing violations.
  • Directs Commerce to identify covered systems already operating in the United States.
  • Requires assessment of remote-control functions, grid risks, and mitigation options.
  • Permits a classified annex for sensitive findings.
  • Ends the congressional reporting mandate after six years.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Prohibits imports of energy-storage systems whose remote-monitoring technology is owned or licensed by the People's Republic of China or Chinese Communist Party-controlled entities and directs federal enforcement, review, and reporting.

Key Policy Areas

Energy Security, Electric Grid, Trade Restrictions, China, Customs Enforcement, Cybersecurity

Primary Purpose

Prohibits imports of energy-storage systems whose remote-monitoring technology is owned or licensed by the People's Republic of China or Chinese Communist Party-controlled entities and directs federal enforcement, review, and reporting.

Policy Domains

Energy Security Electric Grid Trade Restrictions China Customs Enforcement Cybersecurity

Sections 2 and 3 PRC energy-storage findings and import controls

Identified Gains
  • Electric utilities reducing foreign remote-access risk
  • U.S. electric-grid operators
  • Electricity customers exposed to grid disruption
  • Domestic energy-storage suppliers
  • Non-PRC energy-storage suppliers
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
U.S. electric-grid operators: ,
Non-PRC energy-storage suppliers:
Domestic energy-storage suppliers:
Electricity customers exposed to grid disruption:
Electric utilities reducing foreign remote-access risk: ,
Identified Costs
  • Importers of covered PRC-linked storage systems
  • PRC-linked energy-storage manufacturers
  • Utilities procuring covered storage systems
  • CBP import-enforcement staff
  • Commerce energy-security analysts
  • Energy Department grid-security staff
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
CBP import-enforcement staff:
Commerce energy-security analysts:
Energy Department grid-security staff:
PRC-linked energy-storage manufacturers:
Utilities procuring covered storage systems:
Importers of covered PRC-linked storage systems:

Legislative Progress

In Committee
Introduced Committee Passed
Feb 20, 2026

Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.

Feb 20, 2026

Introduced in House

Feb 20, 2026

Mr. Steube introduced the following bill; which was referred to …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Utilities
5 mentions across 2 clauses
+2 positive -1 negative ?2 uncertain

Electric utilities reducing foreign remote-access risk, Electric utilities using PRC-linked storage systems, U.S. electric-grid operators

Positive-direction: Electric utilities reducing foreign remote-access risk, U.S. electric-grid operators

Negative-direction: Utilities procuring covered storage systems

Energy
5 mentions across 2 clauses
+2 positive -2 negative ?1 uncertain

Domestic energy-storage suppliers, Importers of covered PRC-linked storage systems, Non-PRC energy-storage suppliers

Positive-direction: Domestic energy-storage suppliers, Non-PRC energy-storage suppliers

Negative-direction: Importers of covered PRC-linked storage systems, PRC-linked energy-storage manufacturers

Government
3 mentions across 1 clause
-3 negative

CBP import-enforcement staff, Commerce energy-security analysts, Energy Department grid-security staff

2/3
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Energy Security Electric Grid Trade Restrictions China Customs Enforcement Cybersecurity
Actor Mappings
"cbp"
→ U.S. Customs and Border Protection
"commerce"
→ Department of Commerce reporting on deployed covered systems
"importer"
→ Person importing an energy-storage system with remote-monitoring capability
"covered_owner"
→ PRC, Chinese Communist Party, or entity under their control

Key Definitions

Terms defined in this bill

3 terms
"covered PRC-linked technology" §3(a)

Remote-monitoring technology owned or licensed by the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party, or an entity they control.

"energy storage system" §3(g)(2)

Equipment capable of receiving electric energy, storing it, and delivering it later for electricity use.

"remote monitoring capability" §3(g)(3)

Technology that permits monitoring or control of an energy-storage system from a remote location.

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology