HR7257-119

Reported

SECURE Grid Act

119th Congress Introduced Jan 27, 2026

Summary

What This Bill Does

The SECURE Grid Act amends state energy security plan requirements under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. It defines a local distribution system as electric-utility energy infrastructure operating at 100 kilovolts or less. State plans must consider suppliers of equipment for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, not only owners and operators of energy infrastructure.

The bill expands required hazard coverage. State energy security plans must address physical threats and vulnerabilities including weather-related threats, physical attacks on local distribution systems and the bulk-power system, and supply-chain risks for generation, transmission, and distribution equipment. Plans must also address cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, including threats to local distribution systems that may affect the bulk-power system.

GAO must report to the House Energy and Commerce Committee and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee by September 30, 2030. The report must evaluate whether state energy security plans help states identify, assess, and mitigate risks; plan for, respond to, and recover from energy disruptions; recommend improvements; identify actions DOE can take to improve coordination with states; describe federal financial assistance used for plans; analyze section 366 implementation; and describe state use of DOE assistance. The report may be public except protected information.

Who Benefits and How

State energy offices benefit from clearer statutory direction and future GAO recommendations on security planning. Electric utilities operating local distribution systems benefit because distribution-level risks are explicitly included in state plans. Energy consumers benefit if planning reduces outage risk from physical attacks, weather events, cyber threats, or equipment supply disruptions. Electricity equipment suppliers benefit because supply-chain risks are named in planning and may receive more attention. Cybersecurity firms serving the energy sector benefit from a larger role in distribution-system risk planning. Congressional energy committees benefit from a 2030 GAO oversight report.

Who Bears the Burden and How

State energy office staff must update security plans to address local distribution systems, equipment suppliers, physical attacks, weather threats, supply-chain risks, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities. DOE State Energy Program staff must coordinate with states and provide assistance under section 366. Electric utilities may need to share local distribution-system vulnerability information. Equipment suppliers may face more scrutiny in state energy security plans. GAO energy audit staff must evaluate plan efficacy, federal assistance, DOE coordination, and implementation by 2030.

Key Provisions

  • Defines local distribution system as electric utility infrastructure at 100 kilovolts or less.
  • Requires state plans to consider electricity generation, transmission, and distribution equipment suppliers.
  • Requires coverage of weather threats and physical attacks on local distribution systems and the bulk-power system.
  • Requires coverage of supply-chain risks for electricity equipment.
  • Requires coverage of cybersecurity threats to local distribution systems that may affect the bulk-power system.
  • Requires a GAO report by September 30, 2030 on plan efficacy, federal assistance, DOE coordination, and state use of assistance.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Requires state energy security plans to cover local electric distribution systems, distribution cybersecurity, physical attacks, weather threats, and supply-chain risks for electricity equipment, and requires a GAO report by September 30, 2030 on state plan effectiveness, federal assistance, DOE coordination, and state use of technical assistance.

Key Policy Areas

Energy Security, Electric Grid, Cybersecurity, Federal Reporting

Primary Purpose

Requires state energy security plans to cover local electric distribution systems, distribution cybersecurity, physical attacks, weather threats, and supply-chain risks for electricity equipment, and requires a GAO report by September 30, 2030 on state plan effectiveness, federal assistance, DOE coordination, and state use of technical assistance.

Policy Domains

Energy Security Electric Grid Cybersecurity Federal Reporting

House resolution provisions

Identified Gains
  • State energy offices
  • Electric utilities operating local distribution systems
  • Energy consumers
  • Electricity equipment suppliers
  • Cybersecurity firms serving the energy sector
  • Congressional energy committees
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rh
Energy consumers: , ,
State energy offices: , ,
Congressional energy committees: , ,
Electricity equipment suppliers: , ,
Cybersecurity firms serving the energy sector: , ,
Electric utilities operating local distribution systems: , ,
Identified Costs
  • State energy office staff
  • DOE State Energy Program staff
  • Electric utilities
  • Equipment suppliers
  • GAO energy audit staff
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rh
Electric utilities: , ,
Equipment suppliers: , ,
GAO energy audit staff: , ,
State energy office staff: , ,
DOE State Energy Program staff: , ,

Legislative Progress

Reported
Introduced Committee Passed
May 11, 2026

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 561.

May 11, 2026

Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Energy and Commerce. H. …

May 11, 2026

Additional sponsors: Mr. Balderson, Mr. James, and Mr. Onder

May 11, 2026

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the …

Feb 4, 2026

Subcommittee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held

Feb 4, 2026

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

Jan 27, 2026

Introduced in House

Jan 27, 2026

Referred to the Subcommittee on Energy.

Jan 27, 2026

Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Jan 27, 2026

Mr. Latta (for himself and Ms. Matsui) introduced the following …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Energy
11 mentions across 4 clauses
+4 positive -7 negative

DOE State Energy Program staff, Energy consumers, State energy offices

State energy offices faces effects in multiple directions

Positive-direction: Energy consumers

Negative-direction: DOE State Energy Program staff

Utilities
3 mentions across 3 clauses
-3 negative

Electric utilities operating local distribution systems

Technology
3 mentions across 3 clauses
+3 positive

Energy-sector cybersecurity firms

Congressional Committees
2 mentions across 1 clause
+2 positive

House Energy and Commerce Committee members, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee members

Government
1 mention across 1 clause
-1 negative

GAO energy audit staff

3/3
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Energy Security Electric Grid Cybersecurity Federal Reporting
Actor Mappings
"doe"
→ Department of Energy
"gao"
→ Government Accountability Office

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology