HR7208-119

In Committee

PROTECT the Grid Act

119th Congress Introduced Jan 22, 2026

Summary

What This Bill Does

The PROTECT the Grid Act focuses on foreign-adversary-controlled software for high-wattage connected devices. Its findings describe electric vehicle chargers, dryers, smart air conditioners, water heaters, ovens, and other connected appliances as potential remote-control points for manipulating power demand. It highlights risks from companies under foreign adversary jurisdiction or direction, especially the People's Republic of China, including political oversight, data-access laws, consumer-data collection, foreign-controlled major appliance market share, and MaDIoT-style demand manipulation that could cause frequency imbalances, cascading failures, blackouts, and critical infrastructure disruption. The bill defines high-wattage IoT devices as internet-connected devices capable of consuming or controlling more than 500 watts, and defines foreign adversary-controlled applications through covered entities tied to covered nations under title 10. Within 270 days, Commerce, in coordination with relevant federal officials, must report to congressional committees on deployment of high-wattage IoT devices, risks from foreign-adversary-controlled applications in consumer products, national-security and grid impacts, and public comments from industry experts, domestic producers, importers, consumer groups, and stakeholders. Recommendations may include applying Executive Order 13873 ICTS supply-chain authorities to IoT devices, restrictions or conditions on transactions involving foreign-adversary-controlled applications, federal procurement restrictions, certification or labeling requirements, and other measures.

Who Benefits and How

Electric grid operators, household energy consumers, domestic appliance producers, U.S. cybersecurity officials, critical-infrastructure owners, and congressional oversight committees benefit from a focused assessment of whether foreign-controlled smart appliance applications could destabilize the grid. Domestic manufacturers may benefit if procurement, certification, labeling, or transaction restrictions disadvantage foreign-adversary-controlled apps. Consumers benefit if the report leads to clearer labeling or safer device ecosystems.

Who Bears the Burden and How

Commerce Department staff, relevant federal officials, importers, smart appliance vendors, IoT platform operators, foreign-adversary-controlled application providers, and federal procurement offices must participate in the risk review, comments, mitigation analysis, and possible follow-on restrictions. Companies tied to covered nations face scrutiny of applications controlling high-wattage devices. Consumer product makers may face certification, labeling, transaction, or procurement conditions if Commerce recommends them.

Key Provisions

  • Defines high-wattage IoT devices as internet-connected devices consuming or controlling more than 500 watts.
  • Defines foreign-adversary-controlled applications through covered entities tied to covered nations.
  • Requires a Commerce report within 270 days on grid and critical-infrastructure risks from foreign-adversary-controlled applications.
  • Requires consideration of device deployment, consumer product risks, national-security impacts, cascading failures, and stakeholder input.
  • Authorizes recommendations for ICTS transaction restrictions, federal procurement restrictions, certification, labeling, and other mitigations.
  • Frames smart appliance demand manipulation as a national-security and electric-grid stability risk.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Requires the Commerce Secretary, within 270 days and in coordination with relevant federal officials, to report to Congress on national-security risks from foreign-adversary-controlled applications that can control high-wattage IoT devices such as EV chargers and smart appliances, including grid-manipulation risks, critical-infrastructure impacts, public and industry input, and mitigation options such as ICTS transaction restrictions, federal procurement limits, and certification or labeling requirements.

Key Policy Areas

Energy, Technology, National Security

Primary Purpose

Requires the Commerce Secretary, within 270 days and in coordination with relevant federal officials, to report to Congress on national-security risks from foreign-adversary-controlled applications that can control high-wattage IoT devices such as EV chargers and smart appliances, including grid-manipulation risks, critical-infrastructure impacts, public and industry input, and mitigation options such as ICTS transaction restrictions, federal procurement limits, and certification or labeling requirements.

Policy Domains

Energy Technology National Security

Substantive provisions

Identified Gains
  • Electric grid operators
  • Household energy consumers
  • Domestic appliance producers
  • U.S. cybersecurity officials
  • Critical-infrastructure owners
  • Congressional oversight committees
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
Electric grid operators: , ,
Household energy consumers: , ,
Domestic appliance producers: , ,
U.S. cybersecurity officials: , ,
Critical-infrastructure owners: , ,
Congressional oversight committees: , ,
Identified Costs
  • Commerce Department staff
  • IoT platform operators
  • Foreign-adversary application providers
  • Smart appliance importers
  • Federal procurement offices
  • Consumer product makers
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
IoT platform operators: , ,
Consumer product makers: , ,
Commerce Department staff: , ,
Smart appliance importers: , ,
Federal procurement offices: , ,
Foreign-adversary application providers: , ,

Legislative Progress

In Committee
Introduced Committee Passed
Jan 23, 2026

Referred to the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection.

Jan 22, 2026

Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in …

Jan 22, 2026

Introduced in House

Jan 22, 2026

Mr. Crenshaw introduced the following bill; which was referred to …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Government
5 mentions across 3 clauses
+1 positive -4 negative

Commerce Department staff, Congressional oversight committees, Federal procurement offices

Positive-direction: Congressional oversight committees

Negative-direction: Commerce Department staff, Federal procurement offices

Technology
4 mentions across 3 clauses
+1 positive -3 negative

Foreign-adversary application providers, IoT platform operators, U.S. cybersecurity officials

Positive-direction: U.S. cybersecurity officials

Negative-direction: Foreign-adversary application providers, IoT platform operators

Utilities
3 mentions across 3 clauses
+3 positive

Critical-infrastructure owners, Electric grid operators

Manufacturing
3 mentions across 2 clauses
+2 positive -1 negative

Consumer product makers, Domestic appliance producers

Positive-direction: Domestic appliance producers

Negative-direction: Consumer product makers

Consumers
1 mention across 1 clause
+1 positive

Household energy consumers

Trade
1 mention across 1 clause
-1 negative

Smart appliance importers

3/5
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Energy Technology National Security

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology