HR708-119

Passed House

To establish in the Department of Homeland Security a working group relating to countering terrorist, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security threats posed to the United States by the Chinese Communist Party, and for other purposes.

119th Congress Introduced Jan 23, 2025

Summary

What This Bill Does

The SHIELD Against CCP Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a Department of Homeland Security working group within 180 days to counter terrorist, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party. The Secretary appoints a Director who reports to the Secretary on administrative, operational, and security matters. DHS must provide enough employees for the working group and at least one employee dedicated to privacy-law compliance. The working group may accept detailees from the intelligence community or other federal agencies with relevant expertise, with or without reimbursement.

The working group must examine, assess, and report on DHS efforts to counter CCP threats. The listed threat areas include exploitation of the U.S. immigration system through identity theft, visa processes, unlawful border crossings, human smuggling, and human trafficking; predatory economic and trade practices such as counterfeit and pirated goods, forced labor, labor exploitation, customs fraud, and theft of intellectual property and technology; direct or indirect support for transnational criminal organizations trafficking fentanyl, precursors, or other controlled substances through the border, international mail, or express consignments; and Chinese Money Laundering Organizations moving proceeds. The working group must account for DHS resources, evaluate program efficacy, build on other DHS evaluations, identify policy and process gaps, facilitate coordination among DHS offices and components, review information with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis from federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and fusion-center partners, and share threat information as appropriate.

Who Benefits and How

DHS component offices, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, CBP border-security teams, CISA cybersecurity teams, Coast Guard port-security teams, TSA transportation-security teams, immigration-fraud investigators, customs-fraud investigators, state fusion centers, local law-enforcement partners, tribal public-safety partners, territorial security partners, and congressional homeland security overseers benefit because the bill centralizes CCP-threat assessment, resource accounting, gap identification, and information sharing across DHS and partner networks.

Who Bears the Burden and How

The Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS working group staff, the working group Director, DHS privacy-compliance staff, intelligence community detailees, federal agency detailees, DHS component program managers, and DHS resource-accounting staff bear implementation burdens. CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers, forced-labor importers, customs-fraud networks, fentanyl precursor traffickers, transnational criminal organizations, and Chinese money-laundering organizations face increased scrutiny because DHS must coordinate and report on threats tied to those activities.

Key Provisions

  • Requires DHS to establish a CCP-threat working group within 180 days.
  • Requires a Director appointed by the Homeland Security Secretary and reporting to the Secretary.
  • Requires sufficient staff and at least one privacy-law compliance employee.
  • Authorizes intelligence community and federal agency detailees with relevant expertise.
  • Requires assessment of CCP threats involving immigration exploitation, human smuggling, trafficking, forced labor, customs fraud, intellectual-property theft, fentanyl trafficking, and money laundering.
  • Requires DHS resource accounting, program-efficacy review, gap identification, and coordination among DHS components.
  • Requires information review and sharing with DHS Intelligence and Analysis, fusion centers, and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Creates a DHS working group within 180 days to assess, coordinate, and report on terrorist, cyber, border, port, transportation, trade, fentanyl, immigration, and money-laundering threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party, using DHS staff, privacy compliance personnel, and detailees from the intelligence community and other agencies.

Key Policy Areas

Homeland Security, China Policy, Cybersecurity, Border Security, Counterterrorism

Primary Purpose

Creates a DHS working group within 180 days to assess, coordinate, and report on terrorist, cyber, border, port, transportation, trade, fentanyl, immigration, and money-laundering threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party, using DHS staff, privacy compliance personnel, and detailees from the intelligence community and other agencies.

Policy Domains

Homeland Security China Policy Cybersecurity Border Security Counterterrorism

Substantive provisions

Identified Gains
  • DHS component offices
  • Office of Intelligence and Analysis
  • CBP border-security teams
  • CISA cybersecurity teams
  • Coast Guard port-security teams
  • TSA transportation-security teams
  • Immigration-fraud investigators
  • Customs-fraud investigators
  • State fusion centers
  • Local law-enforcement partners
  • Tribal public-safety partners
  • Territorial security partners
  • Congressional homeland security overseers
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
State fusion centers:
DHS component offices:
CISA cybersecurity teams:
CBP border-security teams:
Customs-fraud investigators:
Territorial security partners:
Tribal public-safety partners:
Local law-enforcement partners:
Coast Guard port-security teams:
Immigration-fraud investigators:
TSA transportation-security teams:
Office of Intelligence and Analysis:
Congressional homeland security overseers:
Identified Costs
  • Secretary of Homeland Security
  • DHS working group staff
  • Working group Director
  • DHS privacy-compliance staff
  • Intelligence community detailees
  • Federal agency detailees
  • DHS component program managers
  • DHS resource-accounting staff
  • CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers
  • Forced-labor importers
  • Customs-fraud networks
  • Fentanyl precursor traffickers
  • Transnational criminal organizations
  • Chinese money-laundering organizations
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: ih
Customs-fraud networks:
Forced-labor importers:
Working group Director:
DHS working group staff:
Federal agency detailees:
DHS privacy-compliance staff:
DHS resource-accounting staff:
DHS component program managers:
Fentanyl precursor traffickers:
Secretary of Homeland Security:
Intelligence community detailees:
Transnational criminal organizations:
Chinese money-laundering organizations:
CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers:

Legislative Progress

Passed House
Introduced Committee Passed
Mar 11, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland …

Mar 11, 2025 (inferred)

Passed House (inferred from eh version)

Jan 23, 2025

Mr. Strong (for himself, Mr. Suozzi, Mr. Higgins of Louisiana, …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Government
8 mentions across 1 clause
+4 positive -4 negative

CBP border-security teams, CISA cybersecurity teams, Coast Guard port-security teams

Positive-direction: CBP border-security teams, CISA cybersecurity teams, Coast Guard port-security teams, TSA transportation-security teams

Negative-direction: DHS privacy-compliance staff, DHS working group staff, Intelligence community detailees, Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Trade
2 mentions across 1 clause
-2 negative

CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers, Forced-labor importers

State & Local Government
1 mention across 1 clause
+1 positive

State fusion centers

General Public
1 mention across 1 clause
-1 negative

Fentanyl precursor traffickers

Finance
1 mention across 1 clause
-1 negative

Chinese money-laundering organizations

2/2
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Homeland Security China Policy Cybersecurity Border Security Counterterrorism
Actor Mappings
"ia"
→ DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
"ccp"
→ Chinese Communist Party
"dhs"
→ Department of Homeland Security

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology