To establish in the Department of Homeland Security a working group relating to countering terrorist, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security threats posed to the United States by the Chinese Communist Party, and for other purposes.
Summary
What This Bill Does
The SHIELD Against CCP Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a Department of Homeland Security working group within 180 days to counter terrorist, cybersecurity, border and port security, and transportation security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party. The Secretary appoints a Director who reports to the Secretary on administrative, operational, and security matters. DHS must provide enough employees for the working group and at least one employee dedicated to privacy-law compliance. The working group may accept detailees from the intelligence community or other federal agencies with relevant expertise, with or without reimbursement.
The working group must examine, assess, and report on DHS efforts to counter CCP threats. The listed threat areas include exploitation of the U.S. immigration system through identity theft, visa processes, unlawful border crossings, human smuggling, and human trafficking; predatory economic and trade practices such as counterfeit and pirated goods, forced labor, labor exploitation, customs fraud, and theft of intellectual property and technology; direct or indirect support for transnational criminal organizations trafficking fentanyl, precursors, or other controlled substances through the border, international mail, or express consignments; and Chinese Money Laundering Organizations moving proceeds. The working group must account for DHS resources, evaluate program efficacy, build on other DHS evaluations, identify policy and process gaps, facilitate coordination among DHS offices and components, review information with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis from federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and fusion-center partners, and share threat information as appropriate.
Who Benefits and How
DHS component offices, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, CBP border-security teams, CISA cybersecurity teams, Coast Guard port-security teams, TSA transportation-security teams, immigration-fraud investigators, customs-fraud investigators, state fusion centers, local law-enforcement partners, tribal public-safety partners, territorial security partners, and congressional homeland security overseers benefit because the bill centralizes CCP-threat assessment, resource accounting, gap identification, and information sharing across DHS and partner networks.
Who Bears the Burden and How
The Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS working group staff, the working group Director, DHS privacy-compliance staff, intelligence community detailees, federal agency detailees, DHS component program managers, and DHS resource-accounting staff bear implementation burdens. CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers, forced-labor importers, customs-fraud networks, fentanyl precursor traffickers, transnational criminal organizations, and Chinese money-laundering organizations face increased scrutiny because DHS must coordinate and report on threats tied to those activities.
Key Provisions
- Requires DHS to establish a CCP-threat working group within 180 days.
- Requires a Director appointed by the Homeland Security Secretary and reporting to the Secretary.
- Requires sufficient staff and at least one privacy-law compliance employee.
- Authorizes intelligence community and federal agency detailees with relevant expertise.
- Requires assessment of CCP threats involving immigration exploitation, human smuggling, trafficking, forced labor, customs fraud, intellectual-property theft, fentanyl trafficking, and money laundering.
- Requires DHS resource accounting, program-efficacy review, gap identification, and coordination among DHS components.
- Requires information review and sharing with DHS Intelligence and Analysis, fusion centers, and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Creates a DHS working group within 180 days to assess, coordinate, and report on terrorist, cyber, border, port, transportation, trade, fentanyl, immigration, and money-laundering threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party, using DHS staff, privacy compliance personnel, and detailees from the intelligence community and other agencies.
Key Policy Areas
Homeland Security, China Policy, Cybersecurity, Border Security, Counterterrorism
Primary Purpose
Creates a DHS working group within 180 days to assess, coordinate, and report on terrorist, cyber, border, port, transportation, trade, fentanyl, immigration, and money-laundering threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party, using DHS staff, privacy compliance personnel, and detailees from the intelligence community and other agencies.
Policy Domains
Substantive provisions
Identified Gains
- DHS component offices
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis
- CBP border-security teams
- CISA cybersecurity teams
- Coast Guard port-security teams
- TSA transportation-security teams
- Immigration-fraud investigators
- Customs-fraud investigators
- State fusion centers
- Local law-enforcement partners
- Tribal public-safety partners
- Territorial security partners
- Congressional homeland security overseers
Identified Costs
- Secretary of Homeland Security
- DHS working group staff
- Working group Director
- DHS privacy-compliance staff
- Intelligence community detailees
- Federal agency detailees
- DHS component program managers
- DHS resource-accounting staff
- CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers
- Forced-labor importers
- Customs-fraud networks
- Fentanyl precursor traffickers
- Transnational criminal organizations
- Chinese money-laundering organizations
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
Passed HouseReceived; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland …
Passed House (inferred from eh version)
Mr. Strong (for himself, Mr. Suozzi, Mr. Higgins of Louisiana, …
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
CBP border-security teams, CISA cybersecurity teams, Coast Guard port-security teams
Positive-direction: CBP border-security teams, CISA cybersecurity teams, Coast Guard port-security teams, TSA transportation-security teams
Negative-direction: DHS privacy-compliance staff, DHS working group staff, Intelligence community detailees, Office of Intelligence and Analysis
CCP-linked counterfeit-goods traffickers, Forced-labor importers
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "ia"
- → DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
- "ccp"
- → Chinese Communist Party
- "dhs"
- → Department of Homeland Security
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology