AI OVERWATCH Act
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
In CommitteeMr. Mast (for himself, Mr. Huizenga, Mr. Moolenaar, Mrs. Kim, …
Summary
What This Bill Does
The AI OVERWATCH Act restricts the export of advanced artificial intelligence chips to adversarial nations including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela. It requires the Commerce Department to issue licenses before any high-performance semiconductors can be sold to entities in these countries and gives Congress 30 days to block any proposed export.
Who Benefits and How
US national security interests benefit from maintaining America's technological advantage in AI computing power. US data center operators that meet strict security requirements can obtain "trusted person" status, allowing them to deploy chips in allied countries without individual licenses. Domestic semiconductor manufacturing could see increased demand as foreign markets close.
Who Bears the Burden and How
US semiconductor manufacturers like NVIDIA, AMD, and Intel lose access to the Chinese market, one of the largest for AI chips. Companies with existing export licenses to countries of concern see those licenses immediately terminated. The Commerce Department faces significant new regulatory and certification burdens. Chinese and Russian technology companies lose access to cutting-edge American AI hardware.
Key Provisions
- Requires export licenses for AI chips with specific performance thresholds (based on processing power, memory bandwidth) destined for countries of concern
- Terminates all existing export licenses to entities in countries of concern upon enactment
- Creates a "trusted United States person" exemption allowing qualifying US companies to deploy chips in allied countries
- Mandates 30-day congressional notification before any license can be approved, with Congress able to block exports via joint resolution
- Requires a multi-agency national security strategy assessing the implications of AI chip exports on US technological leadership
Evidence Chain:
This summary is derived from the structured analysis below. See "Detailed Analysis" for per-title beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
Primary Purpose
Restricts exports of advanced AI-capable integrated circuits (chips) to countries of concern including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela by establishing strict licensing requirements, congressional oversight, and a trusted US person exemption program.
Policy Domains
Legislative Strategy
"Tighten export controls on advanced AI chips to adversarial nations through mandatory licensing, congressional notification, and a trusted exporter program for allies"
Likely Beneficiaries
- US semiconductor manufacturers (protected domestic market)
- US data center operators and AI companies (priority access to chips)
- US national security apparatus (maintaining technological advantage)
- Allied nations data centers (potential exemption expansion)
Likely Burden Bearers
- Foreign entities in countries of concern (lose access to US AI chips)
- US chip manufacturers with existing China/Russia exports (licenses terminated)
- US companies seeking exports to countries of concern (extensive licensing requirements)
- Bureau of Industry and Security (new regulatory burden)
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "the_secretary"
- → Secretary of Commerce
- "operating_committee"
- → Operating Committee for Export Policy
- "the_under_secretary"
- → Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security
- "appropriate_congressional_committees"
- → Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House and Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate
The list set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations
Includes (A) Peoples Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macau), (B) Republic of Cuba, (C) Islamic Republic of Iran, (D) Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, (E) Russian Federation, and (F) Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under Maduro
An integrated circuit classified under ECCN 3A090, 4A090 or related numbers, or one with digital processing units meeting specific performance thresholds (TPP of 4,800+ or 2,400+ with performance density 1.6+, etc.) - excludes circuits not designed for data centers
The committee referred to in section 1763(c) of the John S. McCain NDAA for FY2019
As defined and calculated under ECCN 3A090 in the Commerce Control List (as of December 15, 2025)
A US person designated as such pursuant to subsection (d)(2), meeting security and ownership requirements
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology