HR6850-118

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Safe Landings Act.

2. Findings Congress finds the following: Given that the United States enjoys an exceptionally safe aviation system with an exceedingly low frequency of airline accidents, efforts to improve aviation safety should examine nonaccident safety incidents for all possible insights. Aviation safety should not be taken for granted, and even with so few accidents, the U.S. Aerospace System should proactively address safety concerns that emerge from our dynamic and evolving economic conditions, technology, aviation industry, and other factors. Preventing accidents from occurring in the airport runway environment remains an objective requiring continued effort, and incidents of runway confusion, defined as the subset of runway incursions in which an aircraft unintentionally takes off or lands on a taxiway or incorrect runway, should be carefully monitored, reviewed, and studied for insights to improve safety. While technology continues to advance and new opportunities to use technology to address safety risks in aviation are examined and pursued, the evolving role of technology and the expanding use of automation should not be used as justification to diminish attention to and prioritization of the human contribution to aviation safety. The aviation industry and the Government must ensure that training programs for flight crews and other personnel are appropriately evolving, that training standards and expectations remain rigorous, and that risks and concerns associated with the interaction between humans, technology, and automated systems are identified, studied, and addressed in a timely manner.

3. Implementation of NTSB recommendations The Administrator shall implement the recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board numbered as A–18–25 and issued on October 11, 2018, and, not later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue to Congress a report on the status of the implementation. In implementing this recommendation, the Administrator shall consider any relevant findings identified pursuant to section 334 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–254). The Administrator shall— collaborate with aircraft and avionics manufacturers, labor organizations representing pilots operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and software developers to develop the technology for a cockpit system that provides an alert to pilots when an airplane is not aligned with the intended runway surface; once such technology described in paragraph (1) is available, establish a requirement for the technology to be installed on aircraft operating under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, landing at airports within Class B and Class C airspace and certified under part 139 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations; in establishing the requirement as described in paragraph (2), consider any relevant findings identified pursuant to section 334 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–254); and not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, issue to Congress a report on the progress of the work described in paragraph (1).

4. Investigations for covered events Once implementation of section 3(a) of this Act is complete, the National Transportation Safety Board may initiate investigations of covered events to determine risk factors specific to the airport at which such an event occurred and other elements of the National Airspace System that may contribute to the cause of the event. The National Transportation Safety Board may also elect to consider multiple events in a single report as part of a special investigation or study to examine safety factors contributing to these events. The review and analysis shall examine factors present at the time of any covered event at such airport, including— challenges pilots perceive when flying into and out of the airport; challenges that air traffic controllers face when working at the airport; characteristics of the communications among and between groups of personnel whose work relates to the movement of aircraft into and out of the airport including pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance workers, dispatchers, and airline airport operations personnel; and physical characteristics of the airport and its facilities, such as the configuration of runways, taxiways, runway lighting, and construction activity. Individuals involved in any manner in an investigation described in this section may request that the Board take such action as appropriate to protect from public disclosure any information that readily identifies such individual. The Board may withhold the information if the Board determines that the information may be withheld under an exemption under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and the publication of such information is not in the public interest.

5. Study on human factors and aviation safety The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine shall, in collaboration with other relevant Federal institutions and agencies, conduct a study on the role of human factors in high-risk professions, including aviation. Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the National Academies shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Committee on Education and Workforce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate a report on the results of the study required under subsection (a), including best practices that can be implemented across all high-risk professions, including within the aviation industry, to reduce risk involved with human factors.

6. Task Force on Human Factors in Aviation Safety Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall convene a task force on human factors in aviation safety (in this section referred to as the Task Force). The Task Force shall consist of members appointed by the Administrator and having expertise in an operational or academic discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human errors in aviation. The number of members shall be determined by the Administrator to ensure sufficient representation of relevant operational and academic disciplines. Members of the Task Force shall be appointed for the length of the existence of the Task Force. The Task Force shall have an initial length of existence of 2 years. The Administrator may exercise an option to lengthen the duration of the existence of the Task Force for a period of 2 years. For purposes of subsection (b), disciplines may include air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic control, technical operations, aeronautical information, aircraft maintenance and mechanics psychology, linguistics, human-machine integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior and culture. No less than half of the members shall have expertise in aviation. The Task Force shall include members with expertise on human factors but whose experience and training are not in aviation specifically and who have not previously been engaged in work related to the Federal Aviation Administration or the aviation industry. The Task Force shall also include pilot labor organizations, certificated mechanic labor organizations, and the exclusive bargaining representative of the air traffic controllers certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States Code. Not more than 4 members may be employees of the Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board, excluding representatives of the labor representatives of employees of the air traffic control system. Not more than 2 members may be employees of the National Transportation Safety Board. The Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board members shall be non-voting. Any member who is an Federal Aviation Administration employee shall have expertise in safety. In coordination with the Research, Engineering, and Development Advisory Committee established under section 44508 of title 49, United States Code, the Task Force shall— not later than the date on which the Task Force is no longer in existence, produce a written report that— to the greatest extent possible, identifies the most significant human factors and the relative contribution of such factors to aviation safety risk; identifies new research priorities for research in human factors in aviation safety; reviews existing products by other working groups related to human factors in aviation safety including the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)’s work pertaining to flight crew responses to abnormal events; provides recommendations on potential revisions to any Federal Aviation Administration regulations and guidance pertaining to the certification of aircraft under part 25 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, including sections related to presumed pilot response times and assumptions about the reliability of pilot performance during unexpected, stressful events; reviews rules, regulations, or standards regarding flight crew rest and fatigue, as well as maintenance personnel rest and fatigue, that are used by a sample of international air carriers, including those deemed to be more stringent and less stringent than the current standards pertaining to United States air carriers, and identify risks to the National Airspace System from any such variation in standards across countries; reviews pilot training requirements and recommend any revisions necessary to ensure adequate understanding of automated systems on aircraft; reviews approach and landing misalignment and make any recommendations for improving these events; identifies ways to enhance instrument landing system maintenance schedules as well as other relevant technology systems that facilitate safe landings that are jointly used by air traffic controllers, pilots, and Federal Aviation Administration technicians, determines how a real-time smart system should be developed that informs the Air Traffic Control System, Airlines, and Airports about any changes in the state of runway and taxiway lights, and identifies how this system could be connected to the Federal Aviation Administration’s maintenance system; analyzes, with respect to human errors related to aviation safety of part 121 air carriers— fatigue and distraction during critical phases of work among pilots or other aviation personnel; tasks and workload; organizational culture; communication among personnel; adherence to safety procedures; mental fitness of personnel; and any other relevant factors that affect human performance or are the cause or potential cause of human error related to aviation safety; includes a tabulation of the number of accidents, incidents, or aviation safety database entries received in which an item identified under subparagraph (I) was a cause or potential cause of human error related to aviation safety; and includes a list of causes or potential causes of human error related to aviation safety about which the Administrator believes additional information is needed; and if the Secretary exercises the option described in subsection (c)(2)(B), not later than the date that is 2 years after the date of establishment of the Task Force, produce an interim report containing the information described in paragraph (1). To complete the report under subparagraphs (I) through (K) of subsection (g)(1), the Task Force shall consult with the National Transportation Safety Board and use all available data compiled and analysis conducted on safety incidents and irregularities collected during the relevant fiscal years from the following: Flight Operations Quality Assurance. Aviation Safety Action Program. Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing. The Aviation Safety Reporting System. Aviation safety recommendations and investigation findings of the National Transportation Safety Board. Other relevant programs or sources. The Task Force shall ensure that any data described in paragraph (1) has strong protections to protect employees from data being used to undertake punitive measures against the employee or personal liability. Section 1013 of title 5, United States Code, shall not apply to the Task Force.

8. Using instrument approach procedures as backups to visual approaches Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue a report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate that uses a representative sample of part 121 and part 129 air carriers to review the current range of air carrier practices in requiring the use of instrument approach procedures as a backup system for visual approaches and the extent to which operators require pilots to use approach procedures. Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall review and analyze the collected data from the report described in subsection (a) and issue guidance to air carriers on the most effective techniques and procedures to use instrument approach procedures as a backup system for visual approaches. Such guidance shall encourage the use of instruments to provide vertical and lateral guidance to mitigate the potential for a wrong surface alignment and to provide flight crews with more precise vertical and lateral deviation information.

9. NOTAM Modernization Initiative Section 2(c) of the NOTAM improvement Act of 2023 (49 U.S.C. 40101 note) is amended— in paragraph (3), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and by inserting after paragraph (3) the following: collaborating with avionics manufacturers and software developers in considering hardware and software for sending, assessing, and displaying NOTAMs; and (4)collaborating with avionics manufacturers and software developers in considering hardware and software for sending, assessing, and displaying NOTAMs; and .

10. GAO study on risks associated with the use of CVR data in foreign countries The Comptroller General shall take the lead in carrying out a study on the risks associated with the use of CVR data in investigations led by foreign governments or units of foreign governments. At minimum, this study shall— review past incidents in which CVR data was used by foreign governments or units of foreign governments in such a way that the National Transportation Safety Board found to depart from the National Transportation Safety Board’s standards and procedures for a safety investigation, including the use or circulation of CVR data for purposes other than determining the causes of an accident or safety incident, inappropriate release of data contained on a CVR, or the dissemination of information or conclusions based on a misinterpretation of data contained on a CVR; document the protections provided for cockpit voice recordings and transcripts by ICAO and other countries where United States-based air carriers operate; identify and assess the risks to United States flight crews, air carriers, manufacturers, and other stakeholders in the aviation industry associated with CVRs capable of recording more than 2 hours of data; and provide recommendations on measures to adopt to mitigate against such risks and ensure that any use of CVR data serves the sole purpose of a safety investigation, including recommendations for the United States to make to ICAO to mitigate these risks.

11. Transparency in aircraft maintenance and repair work Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall update the guidelines of the FAA for part 121 certificate holders in implementing a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) for their air carrier maintenance programs to include reporting no less than once every 6 months by certificate holders to the FAA of any failure to follow procedures in aircraft maintenance as well as any major alteration, complete overhaul, or repair of mechanical irregularities of each airframe, engine, propeller, and appliance. Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall issue an advisory with formatting guidelines for air carriers to report information as required under subsection (a). For each instance of a failure to follow procedures and for each major alteration, overhaul, or repair reported under the requirements of this section, the Administrator shall require certificate holders to include any name and any physical address where the work is carried out for each maintenance provider that performs work. In this section, the terms major alterations, airframe, propeller, and appliance have the meanings given such terms in part 1 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

12. Review of FAA’s Aviation Safety Inspection Program Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation shall initiate a review of the FAA’s August 2017 Flight Standards reorganization and its aviation safety inspection program. The review shall include an evaluation of— the FAA Flight Standards reorganization from a geographic-based system to a functional-based system; the implementation of the FAA’s Compliance Philosophy as it relates to safety inspections and enforcements; the FAA’s oversight system known as the Safety Assurance System (SAS); training for aviation safety inspector and operational research analysts on the Compliance Philosophy and SAS; and the impact of the FAA’s reorganization and SAS on the FAA’s ability to produce reliable estimates of aviation safety inspector and operational research analyst staffing needs. The Inspector General shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the results of its review and any recommendations to improve the aviation safety inspection program of the FAA.

13. Review of ICAO best available technologies and standards The Administrator shall conduct a study on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s best available technologies and standards. Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to Congress a report containing the timeline for the Federal Aviation Administrator to adopt the best available technologies and standards studied under subsection (a) and, if the Administrator determines the Administrator will not adopt any such technologies or standards, a justification as to the reason for not adopting.

14. Whistleblower protections audit Not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation shall conduct an audit of— existing whistleblower protections and standards and practices in place for the aviation industry; and the whistleblower program of the Federal Aviation Administration, including how such program has evolved since the most recent audit by the inspector general and whether there are any shortcomings or challenges for the program. Not later than 1 year after the publication of the results of the audit under subsection (a), the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall submit to the relevant committees of jurisdiction of Congress a report on the implementation plan for any recommendations from such audit and any reasons for not implementing any recommendation for which the Administrator will not implement.

15. Two pilot rule Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall issue such regulations as are necessary to require that all part 121 air carriers providing air transportation of passengers or cargo require a minimum of 2 pilots in the cockpit for any flight carrying such passengers or cargo.

16. Flight safety information protection Section 40123 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: The Administrator may not disclose under this section flight safety information, including flight safety information voluntarily reported by Federal Aviation Administration employees, and data provided from flight data recorders, service difficulty recorders, accident and incident data systems, airline required crew narrative reports and summaries, ADS–B, aircraft communication addressing and reporting systems, and ATC voice communications and recorded radar data. (c)Flight safety information protectionThe Administrator may not disclose under this section flight safety information, including flight safety information voluntarily reported by Federal Aviation Administration employees, and data provided from flight data recorders, service difficulty recorders, accident and incident data systems, airline required crew narrative reports and summaries, ADS–B, aircraft communication addressing and reporting systems, and ATC voice communications and recorded radar data. .

17. Knowledge safety experts The Administrator shall take such actions as are necessary to ensure that any advisory committee of the Federal Aviation Administration that provides recommendations on topics that relate to or impact the safety of passengers, aircraft, crew members, ground crew, airports, or any other safety aspect have representation from knowledge safety experts in addition to representation from trade industry experts.

18. Transparency in aviation industry The Administrator shall take such actions as are necessary to ensure that air carriers and other persons providing air transportation are prohibited from hiding information determined to be important by the Administrator in any investigation regarding aircraft incidents, including incidents that result in death or injury.

19. Definitions In this Act: The term Administrator means the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. The term covered event means— a category A or B runway incursion, as defined in Order 7050.1B of the Federal Aviation Administration (dated November 3, 2013); a landing on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area not designed as a runway at a public-use airport on land; descent by an aircraft below 300 feet above ground level on approach to a taxiway, incorrect runway, or other area not designed as a runway at a public-use airport on land; or a landing by an aircraft notwithstanding an instruction by air traffic control that the aircraft perform a missed approach or go-around. The term FAA means the Federal Aviation Administration. The term part 121 air carrier means an air carrier that holds a certificate issued under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. The term part 129 air carrier means an air carrier that holds a certificate issued under part 129 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.