HR6624-119

What This Bill Does

The Biological Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2025 states Congress's view that the People's Republic of China is trying to access and exploit sensitive U.S. data and intellectual property to modernize its military, intelligence, and security apparatuses, support human rights abuses, and develop dual-use technologies. It connects that threat to China's military-civil fusion strategy and laws requiring PRC citizens and organizations to cooperate with national security and intelligence work.

The operative provision amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. Within one year, the Secretary must require a license for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer to a foreign entity of concern of a digital sequence of synthetic DNA or RNA designed by humans or artificial intelligence systems. The bill exempts information already excluded under Export Administration Regulations section 734.3(b). It defines digital sequence, foreign country of concern, foreign entity of concern, and synthetic DNA or RNA.

Who Benefits and How

Department of Commerce export-control policymakers benefit from statutory definitions for synthetic DNA or RNA digital sequences. U.S. national security agencies benefit because sensitive synthetic-biology sequence data going to foreign entities of concern would face a license screen. U.S. biotechnology intellectual-property owners benefit from a new export-control barrier for digital sequence information. Defense Department planners benefit if synthetic-biology data is harder to transfer to PRC-linked entities. Human-rights advocates benefit if the license screen reduces access to tools that could support abuses. BIS export-control staff benefit from a specific statutory hook for licensing covered sequence transfers.

Who Bears the Burden and How

BIS export-control staff must create and administer the license requirement within one year. U.S. synthetic-biology exporters must determine whether digital DNA or RNA sequence transfers require licenses. DNA synthesis companies must screen transfers involving foreign entities of concern. AI-enabled biology platform operators must handle licensing risk for designed sequence files. Foreign entities of concern face a new barrier to accessing covered sequence information. University research compliance offices and research collaborations with foreign-country-of-concern links may need legal review before sharing covered data.

Key Provisions

• Requires congressional findings on PRC efforts to access U.S. data and intellectual property.
• Restricts synthetic-biology data transfers connected to military-civil fusion and PRC national-security laws.
• Adds a new Export Control Reform Act section on synthetic DNA or RNA digital sequences.
• Requires a license within one year for exports, reexports, or in-country transfers to foreign entities of concern.
• Expands export-control coverage to digital sequences designed by humans or artificial intelligence systems.
• Provides an exception for information described in Export Administration Regulations section 734.3(b).
• Defines digital sequence, foreign country of concern, foreign entity of concern, and synthetic DNA or RNA.