HR6465-119

What This Bill Does

The bill combines a policy statement with a funding restriction. Its findings cite the New START extension, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification network, Stockpile Stewardship, Russian threats after the invasion of Ukraine, and nuclear modernization by Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The policy section says the United States should lead negotiations on arms-control, disarmament, and risk-reduction agreements, including renewed United States-Russia inspections, a verifiable freeze on testing, production, and deployment, numerical ceilings on delivery systems and warheads, no-first-use policies or declaratory transparency, expanded IAEA access through the Security Council, limits on launch-on-warning posture, protections for nuclear command and control, hypersonic transparency, nuclear stockpile data exchanges, a fissile-material cutoff treaty, head-of-state nuclear summits, CTBT ratification, and restraint on new warhead designs. The operative funding section bars fiscal year 2026 and later funds, plus unobligated prior funds, from being used for any explosive nuclear weapons test that produces yield unless the President submits a stockpile-condition addendum and Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the test. Zero-yield stockpile stewardship is not limited.

Who Benefits and How

Arms-control advocates, nuclear-risk reduction organizations, and communities concerned about nuclear testing benefit from a statutory preference for negotiated freezes and a congressional approval requirement before yield-producing tests. Congress benefits by gaining a veto point over explosive nuclear testing. International nonproliferation institutions benefit if the United States pursues CTBT ratification, fissile-material limits, IAEA access, and data exchanges.

Who Bears the Burden and How

The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Defense, and any nuclear-test planners are barred from obligating funds for yield-producing tests unless the President files the required addendum and Congress approves a joint resolution. The President must justify any stockpile-condition change before testing. Diplomatic agencies would need to pursue a broad arms-control agenda if the policy is implemented.

Key Provisions

• States United States policy to pursue multilateral nuclear arms-control, disarmament, and risk-reduction negotiations.
• Directs policy attention to New START follow-on measures, nuclear-freeze agreements, warhead and delivery-system ceilings, no-first-use policy, IAEA access, NC3 protections, hypersonic transparency, and fissile-material limits.
• Encourages CTBT ratification and reciprocal commitments not to develop new nuclear warhead or bomb designs.
• Bars funds for explosive nuclear weapons tests with yield until the President submits a stockpile-condition addendum and Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the test.
• Protects zero-yield stockpile stewardship activities from the funding bar.