To require Transmission Organizations to allow bids from aggregators of certain retail customers, and for other purposes.
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
IntroducedMr. Casten introduced the following bill; which was referred to …
Summary
What This Bill Does
The REDUCE Act requires regional electricity grid operators (RTOs and ISOs) to allow demand response aggregators to participate in wholesale electricity markets, even if state laws currently prohibit such participation. Demand response aggregators are companies that pool together the ability of large commercial and industrial customers to reduce or shift their electricity use in response to grid needs. The bill overrides state restrictions and mandates that these aggregators can bid this "demand flexibility" into organized wholesale markets for any utility customers where the utility distributes more than 4 million megawatt-hours per year. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must issue final implementing rules within 12 months.
Who Benefits and How
Demand response aggregators are the primary beneficiaries, as this bill removes state-level barriers that currently block them from wholesale market participation in some states. These companies, along with energy technology firms that provide demand response platforms and software, gain guaranteed access to wholesale electricity markets worth billions of dollars. Industrial and commercial electricity customers with flexible loads also benefit by gaining the ability to monetize their load flexibility - for example, a factory that can shift production to off-peak hours or a warehouse with refrigeration that can reduce cooling during peak demand periods can now earn payments through aggregators for providing this flexibility to the grid.
Who Bears the Burden and How
Electric utilities in states that currently restrict aggregator participation face new competition for demand-side resources and must develop new systems to coordinate with aggregators accessing their retail customers. Regional grid operators (RTOs and ISOs) must update their market rules, bidding systems, and operational procedures to accommodate aggregator participation. State public utility commissions lose regulatory authority over whether aggregators can participate in wholesale markets - while this reduces their workload, it also removes their control over this aspect of electricity market regulation. FERC faces a mandatory 12-month deadline to complete a complex rulemaking process.
Key Provisions
- Preempts state laws or state commission rules that prohibit aggregators from bidding into organized wholesale electricity markets
- Applies only to retail customers served by utilities that distributed more than 4 million megawatt-hours in the previous fiscal year (excludes very small utilities)
- Requires each Transmission Organization (RTO/ISO) to allow aggregator bidding, provided the aggregator follows applicable market rules that don't contain state-level bidding prohibitions
- Mandates FERC to issue final implementing regulations within 12 months of enactment
- Represents a significant federal preemption of traditional state authority over retail electricity markets in favor of expanding wholesale market participation
Evidence Chain:
This summary is derived from the structured analysis below. See "Detailed Analysis" for per-title beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
Primary Purpose
Requires Transmission Organizations to allow demand response aggregators to participate in wholesale electricity markets, preempting state prohibitions
Policy Domains
Legislative Strategy
"Federalize demand response participation in wholesale markets by preempting state barriers and mandating aggregator access"
Likely Beneficiaries
- Demand response aggregators (companies that pool retail customer load flexibility)
- Technology companies offering demand response platforms
- Industrial and commercial customers with flexible loads
- Clean energy advocates (demand response reduces need for peaker plants)
Likely Burden Bearers
- State public utility commissions (lose authority over aggregator market participation)
- Incumbent utilities in states with aggregator restrictions (face new competition)
- RTOs/ISOs (must update market rules and systems)
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "ferc"
- → Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
- "utilities"
- → Electric utilities that distributed more than 4 million megawatt-hours in the previous fiscal year
- "aggregators"
- → Aggregators of retail customers that pool demand flexibility
- "state_commission"
- → State public utility commissions as defined in Federal Power Act section 3(15)
- "transmission_organization"
- → Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) operating organized wholesale electric markets
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
As defined in section 3(15) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 796(15))
The ability of retail customers to reduce, shift, or increase electricity consumption in response to market signals (implicit - refers to demand response capabilities)
Regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or independent system operators (ISOs) that operate organized wholesale electric markets
Utilities that distributed more than 4 million megawatt-hours in the previous fiscal year
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology