To amend title 31, United States Code, to establish the Life Sciences Research Security Board, and for other purposes.
Analysis under review: This bill has generated analysis that may be too generic or incomplete. Clause-level evidence remains available below.
Summary
What This Bill Does
The Risky Research Review Act establishes the Life Sciences Research Security Board as an independent agency within the Executive Branch. The Board's mission is to review and issue binding determinations on whether federal agencies may award funding for "high-risk life sciences research" -- defined as dual use research of concern involving high-consequence pathogens or gain of function research. The bill creates a comprehensive regulatory framework requiring agencies to obtain Board approval before funding such research, with attestation requirements under penalty of perjury, mandatory pause protocols if research circumstances change, and enforcement mechanisms including suspension, debarment, and security clearance revocation for noncompliance.
Who Benefits and How
The general public and national security interests benefit from a new independent oversight layer designed to prevent federally funded research from creating pandemic-capable pathogens or bioweapons without adequate risk-benefit review. Biosafety and biosecurity professionals benefit from institutional demand for their expertise, as the Board requires biosafety experts, national security experts, and life sciences scientists as members. Congressional oversight committees (Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, House Energy and Commerce) gain substantial new powers including access to all Board records, mandatory quarterly briefings, security clearances matching the Board's, and 30-day response requirements from the Board. Research institutions and universities that do not conduct high-risk life sciences research face no new burden and may benefit competitively if rivals' high-risk projects face delays or denials. The Board itself and its up to 25 staff members represent a new federal employment opportunity with compensation up to Executive Schedule Level II.
Who Bears the Burden and How
Federal agencies that fund life sciences research (NIH, DARPA, BARDA, DOE, DOD, USDA, etc.) face significant new compliance obligations: establishing attestation and certification processes, notifying the Board 30 days before any life sciences research award, maintaining auditable records, publishing preaward procedures, and designating full-time agency representatives to the Board. Research entities (universities, biotech companies, contract research organizations) seeking federal funding for life sciences research must attest under penalty of perjury whether their work constitutes high-risk life sciences research and disclose all funding sources. Those conducting high-risk research face a 120-day Board review timeline that could delay project starts, plus mandatory 24-hour pause requirements and 5-day written notification if circumstances change mid-research. False attestations trigger suspension and debarment proceedings. Researchers currently conducting federally funded gain-of-function or dual use research face potential retroactive review and funding suspension. The bill authorizes $30 million per year for fiscal years 2026-2035 ($300 million total) for Board operations.
Key Provisions
- Establishes a 9-member Life Sciences Research Security Board appointed by the President, including 5 life scientists, 2 national security experts, 1 biosafety expert, and an Executive Director confirmed by the Senate
- Defines "high-risk life sciences research" as dual use research of concern involving high-consequence pathogens or gain of function research, with an enumerated list of high-consequence pathogens (Ebola, Marburg, SARS-related coronaviruses, MERS-related coronaviruses, influenza A, Nipah, Hendra, Variola, Mpox, plague, hemorrhagic fever viruses, and others)
- Prohibits agencies from awarding federal funding for high-risk life sciences research without Board approval; Board determinations are binding
- Requires entities seeking federal life sciences research funding to attest under penalty of perjury whether their research is high-risk and disclose all funding sources
- Mandates 24-hour research pause and 5-day written notification if mid-project circumstances suggest research may have become high-risk
- Creates enforcement mechanisms: suspension/debarment for false attestations, inspector general referral and security clearance revocation for noncompliant agency employees, and public reporting of violations
- Grants the Board authority to review past and ongoing federally funded research, including classified research, and to temporarily suspend funding
- Includes an emergency research expedited review pathway with a 15-day timeline
- Authorizes $30 million annually for fiscal years 2026-2035
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Establishes the Life Sciences Research Security Board as an independent federal agency to review and issue binding determinations on whether agencies may award funding for high-risk life sciences research, including gain of function research and dual use research of concern involving high-consequence pathogens, creating a comprehensive pre-award review, attestation, enforcement, and oversight framework.
Key Policy Areas
Biosecurity, Science & Technology, Government Operations, National Security, Public Health
Primary Purpose
Establishes the Life Sciences Research Security Board as an independent federal agency to review and issue binding determinations on whether agencies may award funding for high-risk life sciences research, including gain of function research and dual use research of concern involving high-consequence pathogens, creating a comprehensive pre-award review, attestation, enforcement, and oversight framework.
Policy Domains
Whole Bill -- Life Sciences Research Security Board
Identified Gains
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation- General public (pandemic risk reduction through independent oversight of dangerous pathogen research)
- National security apparatus (reduced bioweapons proliferation risk)
- Biosafety and biosecurity professionals (new institutional demand for expertise)
- Congressional oversight committees (expanded access, briefings, and security clearances)
- Board members and staff (new federal employment, up to Executive Schedule Level II pay)
- Research institutions not conducting high-risk research (competitive advantage from rivals facing delays)
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation
Identified Costs
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation- Federal agencies funding life sciences research (NIH, DARPA, BARDA, DOE, DOD, USDA -- new compliance, attestation certification, notification, and record-keeping obligations)
- Research entities seeking federal funding (universities, biotech companies -- perjury-backed attestations, funding source disclosure, 120-day review delays)
- Researchers currently conducting gain-of-function or dual use research (potential retroactive review, funding suspension, mandatory research pauses)
- Federal taxpayers ($30 million/year authorized for Board operations, FY2026-2035)
- Agency employees overseeing research grants (personal liability: security clearance revocation, disciplinary action for noncompliance)
Contextual inference, no direct clause citation
Legislative Progress
IntroducedMr. Griffith introduced the following bill; which was referred to …
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
Biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratory operators, Biotechnology companies conducting gain-of-function research, Biotechnology companies receiving federal research grants
Positive-direction: Nongovernmental life sciences experts eligible for Board appointment
Negative-direction: Biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratory operators, Biotechnology companies conducting gain-of-function research, Biotechnology companies receiving federal research grants, Contract research organizations (CROs), Entities conducting ongoing federally funded research that may be high-risk, Federal contractors working on life sciences research, Gain-of-function research labs, Pharmaceutical companies conducting pathogen research, Pharmaceutical companies receiving federal research funding, Research entities with pending high-risk life sciences proposals, Researchers conducting life sciences research in foreign countries, Researchers working with enumerated high-consequence pathogens, Subcontractors and subawardees of federally funded research, Vaccine and therapeutic developers working with live pathogens
Agency employees responsible for research grant oversight, Congressional oversight committees, Federal agencies (must designate full-time employee as Board representative)
Positive-direction: Congressional oversight committees, House Energy and Commerce Committee, Life Sciences Research Security Board, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
Negative-direction: Agency employees responsible for research grant oversight, Federal agencies (must designate full-time employee as Board representative), Federal agencies funding life sciences research, Federal agencies funding life sciences research (NIH, DARPA, BARDA, DOE, DOD, USDA), Federal agencies seeking to fund high-risk life sciences research, Office of Government Ethics
Biosafety and biosecurity consulting firms, Compliance and regulatory affairs professionals, Life sciences and national security professionals eligible for Board staff
Universities and research institutions receiving federal life sciences funding, Universities and research institutions seeking federal funding
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "the_board"
- → Life Sciences Research Security Board (new independent agency)
- "the_director"
- → Director of the Office of Government Ethics (conflict of interest oversight)
- "the_president"
- → President of the United States (appoints Board members and Executive Director)
- "the_head_of_agency"
- → Head of any federal agency awarding life sciences research funding
- "the_executive_director"
- → Executive Director of the Board (confirmed by Senate, serves as chair)
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
Life sciences research that can reasonably be anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misapplied to do harm and pose significant threats to public health, safety, agriculture, or national security. Includes research that could increase transmissibility, virulence, toxicity, stability, or immune evasion of pathogens.
Amounts awarded by an agency pursuant to an intramural or extramural grant, cooperative agreement, interagency agreement, contract, or other instrument.
A research experiment that may enhance the transmissibility or virulence of a high-consequence pathogen.
A wild-type or synthetic pathogen likely capable of wide uncontrollable spread causing moderate to severe disease/mortality in humans, or specifically enumerated pathogens including Ebola, Marburg, SARS-related (Sarbecovirus), MERS-related (Merbecovirus), influenza A, Nipah, Hendra, Variola, Mpox, plague (Yersinia pestis), and others.
Life sciences research that is either (A) dual use research of concern involving a high-consequence pathogen, or (B) gain of function research.
A select agent or toxin identified under 42 CFR 73.3(b), 7 CFR 331.3(b), or 9 CFR 121.3(b) as in effect on date of enactment.
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
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