HR1736-119

Passed House

Generative AI Terrorism Risk Assessment Act

119th Congress Introduced Feb 27, 2025

Summary

What This Bill Does

The Generative AI Terrorism Risk Assessment Act directs DHS to assess how terrorists may use generative artificial intelligence. Congress states that foreign terrorist organizations' growing use of generative AI is a national-security threat that is not well understood and that DHS, with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, should recognize, assess, and address it. Within one year after enactment and annually for five years, the Homeland Security Secretary, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, must submit assessments to House and Senate homeland-security, intelligence, and commerce committees. Each assessment must analyze incidents from the prior calendar year in which a foreign terrorist organization or individual used or attempted to use generative AI to spread violent extremist messaging, radicalize or recruit people to violence, or enhance the ability to develop or deploy chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The assessment must recommend countermeasures, comply with privacy, civil-rights, and civil-liberties protections, be submitted in unclassified form with a possible classified annex, and have its unclassified portion posted publicly without FOIA-restricted material. DHS must brief committees within 30 days, review fusion-center information, disseminate relevant information through state and major urban area fusion centers and the National Network of Fusion Centers, and receive threat information from ODNI, FBI, intelligence-community members, and other relevant agencies.

Who Benefits and How

Congressional homeland-security committees, congressional intelligence committees, congressional commerce committees, DHS intelligence analysts, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, state fusion centers, major urban area fusion centers, National Network of Fusion Centers members, state homeland-security officials, local counterterrorism officers, and the public benefit from a recurring, partly public threat picture on generative-AI-enabled extremist messaging, recruitment, and CBRN risks.

Who Bears the Burden and How

The Department of Homeland Security, DHS privacy officials, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties staff, DHS intelligence analysts, ODNI analysts, FBI counterterrorism staff, intelligence-community members, fusion-center analysts, relevant federal agencies, congressional briefing staff, and public-web posting staff must collect incident information, share intelligence, protect civil liberties, prepare annual reports, manage classified annexes, brief Congress, and disseminate threat information for five years.

Key Provisions

  • Requires annual DHS assessments for five years on terrorism threats from generative AI.
  • Requires analysis of extremist messaging, radicalization, recruitment, and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon risks.
  • Requires recommendations for countermeasures and congressional briefings within 30 days after each assessment.
  • Requires unclassified public posting while allowing classified annexes and excluding FOIA-protected information.
  • Requires DHS to incorporate and disseminate fusion-center information.
  • Requires ODNI, FBI, intelligence-community members, and relevant agencies to share threat information with DHS.

Evidence Chain:

This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

At a Glance

What This Bill Does

Requires DHS, in consultation with ODNI and other intelligence and law-enforcement entities, to provide annual five-year assessments of terrorism threats from generative AI, including extremist messaging, recruitment, CBRN risks, countermeasure recommendations, congressional briefings, public unclassified postings, classified annexes when needed, and fusion-center information sharing.

Key Policy Areas

Homeland Security, Artificial Intelligence, Counterterrorism

Primary Purpose

Requires DHS, in consultation with ODNI and other intelligence and law-enforcement entities, to provide annual five-year assessments of terrorism threats from generative AI, including extremist messaging, recruitment, CBRN risks, countermeasure recommendations, congressional briefings, public unclassified postings, classified annexes when needed, and fusion-center information sharing.

Policy Domains

Homeland Security Artificial Intelligence Counterterrorism

Substantive provisions

Identified Gains
  • Congressional homeland-security committees
  • Congressional intelligence committees
  • Congressional commerce committees
  • DHS intelligence analysts
  • Office of the Director of National Intelligence
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation
  • State fusion centers
  • Major urban area fusion centers
  • Local counterterrorism officers
  • Public
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rh
Public: , , ,
State fusion centers: , , ,
DHS intelligence analysts: , , ,
Federal Bureau of Investigation: , , ,
Local counterterrorism officers: , , ,
Major urban area fusion centers: , , ,
Congressional commerce committees: , , ,
Congressional intelligence committees: , , ,
Congressional homeland-security committees: , , ,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence: , , ,
Identified Costs
  • Department of Homeland Security
  • DHS privacy officials
  • DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties staff
  • DHS intelligence analysts
  • ODNI analysts
  • FBI counterterrorism staff
  • Intelligence-community members
  • Fusion-center analysts
  • Congressional briefing staff
Model: codex-gpt-5 | Version: bill_summary_v2 | Source: rh
ODNI analysts: , , ,
DHS privacy officials: , , ,
Fusion-center analysts: , , ,
DHS intelligence analysts: , , ,
FBI counterterrorism staff: , , ,
Congressional briefing staff: , , ,
Intelligence-community members: , , ,
Department of Homeland Security: , , ,
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties staff: , , ,

Legislative Progress

Passed House
Introduced Committee Passed
Nov 20, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland …

Nov 20, 2025 (inferred)

Passed House (inferred from eh version)

Nov 20, 2025

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to …

Nov 19, 2025

Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H4783-4785)

Nov 19, 2025

Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules …

Nov 19, 2025

The title of the measure was amended. Agreed to without …

Nov 19, 2025

On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, …

Nov 19, 2025

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without …

Nov 19, 2025

DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate …

Nov 19, 2025

Mr. Guest moved to suspend the rules and pass the …

Stakeholder Effects

cui bono?

How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.

Government
15 mentions across 3 clauses
+3 positive -12 negative

Congressional homeland-security committees, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties staff, Department of Homeland Security

Positive-direction: Congressional homeland-security committees

Negative-direction: DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties staff, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

State & Local Government
6 mentions across 3 clauses
+6 positive

Major urban area fusion centers, State fusion centers

Law Enforcement
3 mentions across 3 clauses
+3 positive

Local counterterrorism officers

3/3
sections analyzed
Full impact breakdown

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
Homeland Security Artificial Intelligence Counterterrorism
Actor Mappings
"dni"
→ Director of National Intelligence
"secretary"
→ Secretary of Homeland Security

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology