Economic Espionage Prevention Act
Summary
What This Bill Does
H.R. 1486, the Economic Espionage Prevention Act, would let the President impose specified sanctions beginning 30 days after enactment on foreign persons determined to be foreign-adversary entities knowingly engaged in one of three activities: economic or industrial espionage against U.S.-owned trade secrets or proprietary information, material support or services to a foreign adversary's military or other listed national-security entities, or violations of U.S. export-control laws. These are alternative grounds; an export violation need not also involve theft of a trade secret. The operative authorization says may, not a mandate to sanction every potentially covered person on day 30. The latest official action checked September 22, 2026 is Senate Foreign Relations referral on May 6, 2025; the bill is not law.
The available sanctions include blocking covered property within the United States or U.S.-person possession or control, and visa, admission, parole and other immigration-benefit restrictions for covered aliens. Visa revocation would take effect immediately and cancel other valid entry documents. The proposal does not seize every foreign asset worldwide. Existing 50 U.S.C. 1708 already authorizes certain cyber-espionage property sanctions; this bill adds a different conduct-based framework and immigration measures rather than creating the first federal espionage sanctions authority.
Who Benefits and How
U.S. businesses holding protected trade secrets, confidential designs, source code and other covered proprietary information may gain deterrence against theft or unauthorized transmission. Protection includes rightful license interests through the incorporated ownership definition. Sanctions remain discretionary, so reduced losses are a potential result, not guaranteed compensation. No new damages action or reimbursement fund is created.
The House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees receive a State Department report within 90 days on specified Chinese persons and entities supplying critical components to Russia's defense industry, related intermediaries and cooperation supporting Russia's war in Ukraine. It must also address specified post-enactment transactions and existing CAATSA sanctions. The report is unclassified with an optional classified annex; publication of the unclassified portion is permitted, not required. Naming a supplier in this report is not itself an automatic sanctions designation.
Goods importers gain an express limit: sanctions authority under this Act does not cover importation of goods. The definition includes physical products and inspection or test equipment but excludes technical data. This does not repeal import controls under other laws. Participation in an international standards-setting body and its activities is excluded from the section 4 meaning of transaction. Authorized U.S. intelligence activities are exempt, and necessary admission for international obligations or U.S. law enforcement is excepted from the immigration sanctions. National-security waivers may be renewed for periods of no more than 180 days each, with a presidential determination reported to Congress.
Who Bears the Burden and How
Foreign businesses and individuals meeting the presidential conduct determination face loss of access to covered property, transactions or entry benefits if sanctions are imposed. U.S. financial institutions and other covered counterparties would need to comply with implementing restrictions; violations, attempts, conspiracies and causing violations are subject to the incorporated IEEPA civil and criminal penalties. State must coordinate its report, and the President must establish enforcement procedures and guidelines. The bill appropriates no fixed funding.
A presidential report on notable foreign economic or industrial espionage developments is due within one year and for each of the next five years. A report is not required when the President imposed sanctions under this section during the previous calendar year. This reporting window is not a six-year sunset of the sanctions authority.
Knowledge includes actual knowledge or circumstances a person should have known. U.S. persons include citizens, lawful permanent residents and U.S.-organized entities including foreign branches, not every person merely present in the United States. The foreign-adversary definition still cites 15 CFR 7.4 even though Commerce moved that list to 791.4 effective July 18, 2024. The bill also does not separately define foreign adversary entity. These scope issues need interpretation or correction; the text should not be silently rewritten as blanket sanctions on all residents of six countries.
The introduced section 5 would have narrowed IEEPA protections for informational materials and travel transactions and excluded bulk sensitive personal data and connected-app source code from specified exceptions. The House removed those general IEEPA amendments entirely and substituted the goods-import exception. The historical proposal and its removal are analyzed in the version record, but they are not powers contained in the House-passed bill.
Key Provisions
- Authorizes discretionary property and immigration sanctions beginning 30 days after enactment, subject to presidential conduct findings, exceptions and renewable national-security waivers.
- Requires a 90-day State report on specified Chinese support for Russia, while making public release optional.
- Requires up to six annual presidential reports, with a prior-calendar-year sanctions exception and no matching sunset of sanctions authority.
- Provides a goods-import exception and removes the introduced bill's broader amendments to IEEPA information, travel and data protections.
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Authorize discretionary property-blocking and immigration sanctions against determined foreign-adversary actors engaged in espionage, national-security support or export-control violations, and require reports on Chinese support for Russia and foreign economic espionage.
Key Policy Areas
Economic Sanctions, Trade Secrets, Export Controls, Foreign Affairs
Primary Purpose
Authorize discretionary property-blocking and immigration sanctions against determined foreign-adversary actors engaged in espionage, national-security support or export-control violations, and require reports on Chinese support for Russia and foreign economic espionage.
Policy Domains
Economic Espionage Prevention Act
Identified Gains
- U.S. businesses protecting trade secrets and proprietary information
- U.S. software developers holding protected source code
- House Committee on Foreign Affairs
- Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
- Importers of physical goods
- International standards-setting participants
Identified Costs
- Department of State
- Executive branch sanctions administration
- Foreign-adversary businesses determined to engage in covered conduct
- Covered foreign visa applicants selected for immigration sanctions
- U.S. financial institutions handling sanctioned property
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
Passed HouseReceived; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign …
Passed House (inferred from eh version)
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to …
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without …
On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, …
Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules …
DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate …
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H1828-1830)
Mr. Mast moved to suspend the rules and pass the …
Mr. McCormick (for himself and Mr. Moolenaar) introduced the following …
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
Covered foreign individuals selected for immigration sanctions, People whose sensitive personal data would be covered by restrictions, People whose sensitive personal data would have received the proposed additional protection
Travelers conducting otherwise exempt ordinary travel transactions faces effects in multiple directions
Positive-direction: People whose sensitive personal data would be covered by restrictions
Negative-direction: Covered foreign individuals selected for immigration sanctions, People whose sensitive personal data would have received the proposed additional protection
Department of State, Executive branch sanctions administration, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Positive-direction: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Negative-direction: Department of State, Executive branch sanctions administration
Cross-border informational-material distributors
Cross-border informational-material distributors faces effects in multiple directions
Bulk sensitive personal data businesses
Bulk sensitive personal data businesses faces effects in multiple directions
Connected software application developers transferring source code
Connected software application developers transferring source code faces effects in multiple directions
Importers of physical goods within the bill-specific exception
Foreign-adversary businesses designated for covered conduct
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "president"
- → President of the United States
- "secretary"
- → Secretary of State
- "appropriate_committees"
- → House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees
Note: Section2 findings contain historical quotations and trade estimates; they are not new export restrictions or independently verified present-day factual conclusions.
Key Definitions
Terms defined in this bill
Covered physical articles, substances, materials, supplies or manufactured products, including inspection/test equipment but excluding technical data.
Actual knowledge or circumstances the person should have known.
U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or entity organized under U.S. or U.S.-jurisdiction law, including its foreign branch.
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology