HR1166-119

Passed House

To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes.

119th Congress Introduced Mar 11, 2025

Legislative Progress

Passed House
Introduced Committee Passed
Mar 11, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland …

Mar 11, 2025 (inferred)

Passed House (inferred from eh version)

Feb 10, 2025

Mr. Gimenez (for himself, Mr. Green of Tennessee, Mr. Moolenaar, …

Summary

What This Bill Does

The Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act prohibits the Department of Homeland Security from buying batteries from six named Chinese manufacturers (including CATL and BYD) and from companies on forced labor watchlists or identified as Chinese military companies. The ban takes effect on October 1, 2027, giving DHS nearly three years to find alternative suppliers.

Who Benefits and How

Domestic and allied-nation battery manufacturers stand to gain as DHS must switch its procurement away from Chinese suppliers to alternative sources. US-based battery makers particularly benefit from reduced competition in the federal marketplace, as Chinese companies - which currently dominate global battery production - are shut out of DHS contracts. National security and cybersecurity agencies benefit from reduced supply chain risks, as batteries from adversarial nations could potentially contain surveillance technology or pose infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Who Bears the Burden and How

Chinese battery manufacturers including CATL, BYD, Envision Energy, EVE Energy, Gotion High-tech, and Hithium lose access to US government contracts from the Department of Homeland Security. DHS agencies - including Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Secret Service, TSA, Coast Guard, and FEMA - will face higher procurement costs if alternative battery suppliers charge premium prices compared to Chinese manufacturers. US taxpayers may ultimately bear these increased costs through appropriations. DHS procurement offices must verify supply chains, identify compliant suppliers, and submit a 180-day report to Congress detailing the anticipated mission and cost impacts.

Key Provisions

  • Bans DHS battery procurement from six named Chinese companies plus entities on Uyghur forced labor lists, Chinese military company lists, and Commerce Department export control lists
  • Defines "produced by" broadly to include both final product assembly and majority component supply, closing loopholes for Chinese manufacturers using subsidiaries or shell companies
  • Creates two waiver authorities: (1) national security waiver if batteries pose no risk and no alternatives exist, and (2) research and testing waiver for laboratory purposes
  • Requires 15-day Congressional notification for any waivers granted by the Secretary of Homeland Security
  • Mandates a 180-day impact report covering all nine major DHS components, from Border Patrol to CISA
Model: claude-opus-4-5-20251101
Generated: Dec 24, 2025 22:16

Evidence Chain:

This summary is derived from the structured analysis below. See "Detailed Analysis" for per-title beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.

Primary Purpose

Prohibit the Department of Homeland Security from procuring batteries from specified Chinese manufacturers and entities on forced labor or military company lists, effective October 1, 2027

Policy Domains

National Security Procurement Policy China Relations Supply Chain Security

Legislative Strategy

"De-risk DHS supply chain from Chinese battery manufacturers by mandating domestic or allied-nation procurement; addresses both national security concerns and forced labor issues"

Likely Beneficiaries

  • Domestic battery manufacturers (US-based companies)
  • Allied-nation battery manufacturers (non-Chinese suppliers)
  • DHS cybersecurity/counterintelligence operations (reduced supply chain risk)

Likely Burden Bearers

  • Chinese battery manufacturers (CATL, BYD, others - lost DHS contracts)
  • DHS procurement offices (must find alternative suppliers, potentially at higher cost)
  • Taxpayers (potential cost increases if alternatives are more expensive)

Bill Structure & Actor Mappings

Who is "The Secretary" in each section?

Domains
National Security Procurement Policy Supply Chain Security
Actor Mappings
"the_secretary"
→ Secretary of Homeland Security
"secretary_of_defense"
→ Secretary of Defense (for Chinese military company identifications)

Key Definitions

Terms defined in this bill

2 terms
"entities specified" §2(b)

CATL, BYD, Envision Energy, EVE Energy, Gotion High-tech, Hithium Energy Storage, entities on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act lists, Chinese military companies identified by DoD, entities on Commerce export control lists, and their subsidiaries/successors

"produced by" §2(c)

A battery is treated as produced by a specified entity if the entity (1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses such battery, or (2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the components used in such battery

We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.

Learn more about our methodology