Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States requiring a balanced budget for the Federal Government.
Summary
What This Bill Does
This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment requiring the federal government to balance spending against recent receipts. Once ratified by three-fourths of the states, total annual federal expenditures could not exceed average annual receipts collected in the prior 3 years, adjusted for changes in the U.S. citizen population and inflation. Expenditures exclude payments on debt, and receipts exclude borrowing. Congress could authorize specific spending above the limit only by a roll call vote of two-thirds of each chamber, except that during a declared war Congress could approve excess spending by roll call vote. Any bill that creates a new tax or raises a tax rate would need approval by two-thirds of the whole number of each chamber. Congress would enforce and implement the amendment by legislation, and the amendment would take effect in the fifth year after ratification.
Who Benefits and How
Fiscal conservatives benefit because the Constitution would impose a hard spending cap tied to prior receipts and require supermajority votes for deficit spending and tax-rate increases. Future taxpayers benefit if the amendment restrains borrowing and slows debt growth. Members of Congress opposed to tax increases gain leverage because new taxes and rate increases would need two-thirds support in each chamber. Credit-market participants and deficit hawks benefit from a constitutional fiscal rule designed to make federal budgeting more predictable. States participating in ratification gain a formal role in deciding whether the federal fiscal constraint becomes binding.
Who Bears the Burden and How
Congress bears the main burden because annual appropriations and tax bills would have to fit the prior-receipts formula or clear supermajority hurdles. Federal agencies and program beneficiaries face risk of spending reductions when receipts fall or when Congress cannot assemble two-thirds support for excess spending. Tax-policy proponents bear a higher procedural burden because new taxes and rate increases require two-thirds approval by the full membership of both chambers. Emergency responders and social-insurance programs may face pressure outside declared-war contexts unless Congress authorizes specific excess spending by supermajority vote. Budget enforcement officials must implement formulas for receipts, citizen-population changes, inflation, debt-payment exclusions, and borrowing exclusions.
Key Provisions
- Limits annual federal expenditures to average receipts from the prior 3 years adjusted for citizen population and inflation.
- Excludes debt payments from expenditures and borrowing from receipts.
- Allows specific excess spending only by two-thirds roll call votes in each chamber.
- Allows excess spending during a declared war by roll call vote.
- Requires two-thirds approval of the whole membership of each chamber for new taxes or tax-rate increases.
- Directs Congress to enforce the amendment and delays effect until the fifth year after ratification.
Evidence Chain:
This summary is generated from the full bill text using AI analysis. Expand "Detailed Analysis" below for identified beneficiaries/burden bearers with clause-level evidence links.
At a Glance
What This Bill Does
Proposes a constitutional balanced-budget amendment limiting annual federal expenditures to average receipts from the prior three years adjusted for citizen population and inflation, requiring two-thirds votes for excess spending and tax increases, allowing war-year excess spending by roll call vote, and delaying effect until the fifth year after ratification.
Key Policy Areas
Budget, Tax, Constitutional Amendment
Primary Purpose
Proposes a constitutional balanced-budget amendment limiting annual federal expenditures to average receipts from the prior three years adjusted for citizen population and inflation, requiring two-thirds votes for excess spending and tax increases, allowing war-year excess spending by roll call vote, and delaying effect until the fifth year after ratification.
Policy Domains
House resolution provisions
Identified Gains
- Fiscal conservatives
- Future taxpayers
- Members opposing tax increases
- Deficit hawks
- State legislatures
Identified Costs
- Congress
- Federal agencies
- Federal program beneficiaries
- Tax-policy proponents
- Budget enforcement officials
Sponsors
Legislative Progress
ReportedOn motion to suspend the rules and pass the resolution …
Failed of passage/not agreed to in House On motion to …
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2583-2584)
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2583-2584)
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were …
DEBATE - Pursuant to the provisions of H. Res. 1115, …
Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2560-2568; text: …
Placed on the House Calendar, Calendar No. 63.
Reported by the Committee on Judiciary. H. Rept. 119-520.
Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held
Stakeholder Effects
cui bono?How this legislation distributes effects. Mention counts reflect frequency, not effect magnitude.
Federal program beneficiaries, Fiscal conservatives
Positive-direction: Fiscal conservatives
Negative-direction: Federal program beneficiaries
Bill Structure & Actor Mappings
Who is "The Secretary" in each section?
- "states"
- → State legislatures
- "congress"
- → Congress
We use a combination of our own taxonomy and classification in addition to large language models to assess meaning and potential beneficiaries. High confidence means strong textual evidence. Always verify with the original bill text.
Learn more about our methodology